Falana v. Kent State University

By Jason Rantanen

Falana v. Kent State University (Fed. Cir. 2012) Download 11-1198
Panel: Linn (author), Prost and Reyna

This case raises an important issue for developers of chemical compounds: when is an inventor's contribution to the method of making a claimed compound an inventive contribution?

The plaintiff in this Section 256 action, Dr. Olusegun Falana, was a post-doctoral researcher hired by Kent State and Kent Displays, Inc. to synthesize organic molecules in connection with a project to develop a temperature independent, high helical twisting power chiral additive for use in portable liquid crystal displays. During his employment, Dr. Falana developed a synthesis protocol for making a novel class of chemical compounds. Dr. Falana used this process to synthesize a compound within this genus designated "Compound 7." While Compound 7 possessed some of the desired characteristics, and represented "significant progress," it did not completely satisfy the project goals. Dr. Falana subsequently resigned from KDI and Kent State to take another position.

A few months after Dr. Falana's resignation, the Kent State professor who had selected Dr. Falana used Falana's synthesis protocol to synthesize another member of the novel class, "Compound 9." Compound 9 possessed the desired degree of temperature independence, and KDI and Kent State filed an application that led to Patent No. 6,830,789; the patent did not list Dr. Falana as in inventor.

Upon learning that he was not listed as an inventor, and after receiving an unsatisfactory response from the Chief Science Officer at KDI, Falana filed a Section 256 action to correct inventorship. The district court ruled in Falana's favor following a bench trial, further finding that the case was exceptional and awarding attorneys fees in an amount to be determined.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that Dr. Falana had contributed to the conception of the claimed invention. Drawing upon established law, the court first noted that "[c]onception of a chemical compound 'requires knowledge of both the specific chemical structure of the compound and an operative method of making it.'' Slip Op. at 12 (quoting Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, Dr. Falana contributed to the method of making the claimed compound in a way the required more than the exercise of ordinary skill. The court recognized an important limitation on its holding, however:

"[This] does not mean that such an inventor necessarily has a right to claim inventorship of all species within that genus which are discovered in the future. "Once the method of making the novel genus of compounds becomes public knowledge, it is then assimilated into the store-house of knowledge that comprises ordinary skill in the art." Id. at 15-16.

Comment: The court was also careful to limit its holding in another way. It could have concluded that Falana was inventor simply due to his contribution to the method used to make Compound 9. It did not. Instead, the panel held "that a putative inventor who envisioned the structure of a novel genus of chemical compounds and contributes the method of making that genus contributes to the conception of that genus." Id. at 15 (emphasis added). It was able to articulate the rule in this way because it agreed with the district court that the patent's independent claims do not include a temperature independence limitation – in other words, the claims as construed were not limited to Compound 9, but rather encompassed the genus of compounds produced using Falana's synthesis protocol. Falana thus contributed both to the method of making the genus as well as the structure of the genus itself. The opinion implies that the outcome could conceivably be different if the claims had been limited to Compound 9. See, e.g., Slip Op. at 17.

Finality of Judgment: Federal Circuit practitioners may want to pay particular attention to the section at the end of the court's opinion in which it concluded that the district court's exceptional case determination was not before it in this appeal. Although the court's ruling on the issue of inventorship represented a final judgment, the court concluded that absent a determination of the attorney fees, the exceptional case determination did not. Nor, the court concluded, was there a basis for it to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the issue.