Patent Law Blog (Patently-O)

Age of Patents when Asserted

By Dennis Crouch

The chart above is a histogram showing the age of utility patents at the time when an infringement complaint is filed. I used the Derwent LitAlert patent database and limited the search to only lawsuits filed Sept 16, 2011 - Sept 15, 2012 (this avoids false marking cases). I also excluded cases that were identified as declaratory judgment lawsuits in the LitAlert database. The data has some holes but it is roughly accurate.

Supreme Court on Patent Law 2013

The Supreme Court is scheduled to decide four intellectual property cases this term:

• Bowman v. Monsanto (patent exhaustion in second generation of GM seeds)
• Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (international copyright exhaustion)
• Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. (impact of limited covenant-not-to-sue on declaratory judgment jurisdiction in trademark law)
• Gunn v. Minton (whether legal malpractice claims arising out of representation in a patent dispute should be heard by the Federal Circuit)

There are several more pending petitions for certiorari. The most notable of these is Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) v. Myriad Genetics (patentability of isolated but naturally occurring human DNA). A second important pending petition is Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. (de novo review of claim construction). More than a dozen other petitions have been filed or are likely within the next two months.

Mossoff and Epstein on Patent Rights

By Dennis Crouch

Professors Adam Mossoff and Richard Epstein recently had an interesting discussion on the public policy concerns over the current patent system. Both professors are active participants in Federalist Society debates, and this discussion stems out of that format.

The audio podcast is available for free at this link: http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/patent-rights-a-spark-or-hindrance-for-the-economy-podcast

Duty to Use Your Property and Your Patents

By Dennis Crouch

Cornell professors Eduardo Penalver and Oskar Liivak have an interesting new essay on the absence of any use requirement in patent law. In the 1908 case of Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court held that patent owners have no duty to actually practice their patent. In that case, the court tied their analysis to real property where it recognized "the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive." In their essay, Penalver and Liivak challenge this notion of real property and, in turn, challenge its use as a metaphor for patent rights. They write:

[T]he law significantly hems in the rights of owners not to use their property, employing numerous doctrines, such as nuisance, abandonment, adverse possession, and permissive waste, to ensure that owners' decision not to use their property does not inflict harm on others. Even with respect to attentive nonuse, owners' rights are qualified, both by common law doctrines like necessity and by the state's power to override (or at least influence) owners' decisions about nonuse through eminent domain, regulation and taxation.

The essay also challenges the property/patent metaphor as inapt because of the "nonrivalrous nature" of information and "because of the particularly powerful way that patent law constrains the freedom of nonowners."

Edwardo Penalver and Liivak, Oskar, The Right Not to Use in Patent and Property Law (October 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2162667

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley Oral Arguments

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Docket No. 11-697 (Supreme Court 2012)

Here are a few quotes from today's oral arguments. More discussion of the case here.

….

MR. ROSENKRANZ: (on behalf of accused infringer Kirtsaeng): What [copyright holders] got [with the passage of Section 602] was a much more powerful weapon than a contract. [A] copyright weapon gives you injunctive relief, gives you multiples of damages which you don't get out of a contract remedy.

MR. ROSENKRANZ: The moment that a manufacturer learns that this Court says you get what we've called the Holy Grail of manufacturing, endless eternal downstream control over sales and rentals, you can ruin secondary markets that are competing with you, the moment that happens, that will be yet another reason for manufacturers silently to decide that they're headed -- that they're sending their manufacturing overseas.

….

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Rosenkranz, can I take you back to Justice Ginsburg's opening question? Just as a matter of copyright theory, I had always understood [that] a copyright holder has a kind of a bundle of rights. It's not one right that applies everywhere in the world. It's you have your U.S. rights and you have your Chinese rights, you have your rights under each jurisdiction's law. And your position is essentially to say that when I sell my Chinese rights to somebody, I'm also selling my U.S. rights to that same person, because the person who has the Chinese rights can just turn around and import the goods. I mean, that's the nature of your position, isn't it, that your U.S. rights are always attached when you sell more -- your rights under the jurisdiction of another country?

MR. ROSENKRANZ: Well -- so first, Your Honor, back in 1976, this notion of geographic division was very, very new, so it's not at all clear what Congress was thinking with that -- with respect to that. But secondly, no, we're not -- we're not saying that when the owner sells his Chinese -- its Chinese rights to the Chinese company, it is selling all rights. Certainly, the Chinese company cannot sell everywhere, but after that first sale, all of the manufacturer's rights are cut off.

….

JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, an American copyright holder licenses a British company to publish the work under British copyright law. 602(a) says he can't import the books into the United States, period…. The question is what happens when he sells it to his bookstore and you or I go in and buy it and we want to give a copy to our wife when we get back to the United States. The question is, … is that unlawful? … [What if] I bring back five copies and I give one to my son?

MR. OLSON (arguing on behalf of the copyright holder John Wiley): Well, there are fair use exceptions …

….

JUSTICE BREYER: [I]magine Toyota, all right? Millions sold in the United States. They have copyrighted sound systems. They have copyrighted GPS systems. When people buy them in America, they think they're going to be able to resell them…. Under their reading, the millions of Americans who buy Toyotas could not resell them without getting the permission of the copyright holder of every item in that car which is copyrighted?

MR. OLSON: … that is not this case….

JUSTICE KENNEDY: You're aware of the fact that if we write an opinion with the -- with the rule that you propose, that we should, as a matter of common sense, ask about the consequences of that rule. And that's what we are asking….

JUSTICE BREYER: I would like to know, if you were the lawyer for the Toyota distributor, and if you were the lawyer for the Metropolitan Museum of Art, or you are the lawyer for a university library, and your client comes to you and says, my God, I just read the Supreme Court opinion. It says that we can't start selling these old books or -- or lending them or putting them in our word processor or reselling the Toyota without the -- without looking -- displaying the Picasso without the permission of the copyright holder, who may or may not be Toyota itself. What, as their lawyer, do you tell them? Do you tell them, hey, no problem; or, do you tell them, you might become a law violator; or, do you tell them, I better litigate this? What do you tell them?

MR. OLSON: Well, each one of those situations that you posit, Justice Breyer, has a whole panoply of set of facts. With respect to the museums, with respect to the person bringing books into the United States, there are other defenses, including fair use. There are other defenses under the copyright law. But -- and one of the things is that, to a certain extent, if you're going to use the product created by someone else in a way that's contemplated by the copyright laws, maybe it's required that you actually comply with the copyright laws by going to the owner of the copyright and saying, look, here's what I propose to do, can I have a license to do this?

…

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Olson, do you have an answer to the outsourcing problem and the charges that if you read the statute as you are urging, then you are inviting the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs?

MR. OLSON: There are several answers to that. One, that's Congress's concern. And -- and there is no evidence that that would really actually happen. And Congress was concerned with creating a segmentation of the market. But it's entirely speculative as to whether or not people are going to start manufacturing books or other items outside the United States. Congress can address that if that should become a problem, but it's not something that was suggested as a part of what was taking place at that time.

…

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, the word has grounding. [What about the ancient principle found in] Coke on Littleton, 1628, where it says that "if a man be possessed of a chattel and give or sell his whole interest upon a condition, that condition is no good." And Coke says, and that's how it should be. And now that's picked up in Bobbs-Merrill; it's picked up in Dr. Miles. It's been the law. Now if, in fact, there are two ways of interpreting the statute, and one is consistent with that basic principle of commercial law, and the other produces some of the complexities that you have just mentioned, isn't it better to go with the common law and simply reaffirm a principle that's been in the commercial law almost forever?

MR. STEWART (arguing as amicus on behalf of the US Government): I give two answers for that. And the first is that Coke was saying that, in most circumstances at least, a sale is sufficient in order to divest the owner of his prior right to control distribution, but it doesn't say that a sale is necessary. And my point is that when Mr. Rosenkranz says the hypothetical foreign publisher who makes copies with authorization but ships … them into the United States without [authorization] could be held liable for infringement, there is nothing in section 109(a) that would allow a court to draw that distinction; that is, although 109(a) is sometimes referred to as a codification of the First Sale Doctrine, it doesn't require an antecedent first sale. So as long as the foreign publisher was the owner of the books at the type -- time they were manufactured, if those books were lawfully made under this title, under Petitioner's reading they could be imported and distributed. We know also that this was not an oversight, that Congress didn't intend the provision to be subject to a sort of implicit first authorized sale requirement, because the language was intended to cover copies that were made pursuant to a compulsory license.

….

No direct mention of patent law in the oral arguments.

International Copyright Exhaustion: Supreme Court to Decide Whether Copyright Holders Can Block Imports

By Dennis Crouch

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Supreme Court 2012)

Oral arguments are being held this morning in the Kirtsaeng copyright case involving international exhaustion. The case has direct implications on international patent law considerations.

Kirstaeng purchased legitimate copies of Wiley textbooks in various foreign countries and then imported those into the US for resale. The international versions of the textbooks vary somewhat from the US version (e.g., the foreign version covers evolution and is printed on cheaper paper). However, Kirtsaeng was able to find a substantial US market for the books and used the revenue to fund his own education. Copyright includes the exclusive right of distribution, and resale of a product is typically seen as a form of distribution. 17 U.S.C. 106. A separate provision also bars importation of copyrighted works without permission of the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. 602(a)(1). However, the copyright statute also includes an exception known as copyright exhaustion or the first sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. 109. The statute provides:

[T]he owner of a particular copy … lawfully made under this title … is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.

Patent law has an equivalent doctrine. Notably, however, the patent law doctrine of exhaustion is not bound by any statute but does stem from parallel common law origins. The exhaustion doctrine allows for a robust secondary market for goods.

In this case, Wiley wants to use its US copyrights to block Kirtsaeng from reselling his books. Kirtsaeng argues that he purchased non-counterfeit authorized copies of the books and that Wiley's copyrights are therefore exhausted. Wiley, in turn, focuses on the statute and argues that the US copyright is not exhausted because the foreign-made books were not "lawfully made under this title" where "this title" refers to the US Copyright Act. In its appellate decision, the Second Circuit agreed with Wiley and held that the foreign sale did not trigger the Section 109 exception. The decision supports a notion of country-by-country price discrimination of works protected by copyright (or patent). Unfortunately for US consumers, the price of these goods is typically higher in the US than abroad. In addition to price discrimination, the law is also being used to control access to goods in various countries. In many cases, these ideas have been implemented as mechanisms for preventing important of goods that do not – at first glance – appear to be protected by intellectual property. In the Supreme Court cases of Costco v. Omega and Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), the asserted copyrights were unrelated to the value of the product being sold. In Costco, the protected copyright was a small symbol on the under-side of the watch while in Quality King, the protected copyright was the shampoo bottle label. (On remand, the district court dismissed Omega's action on the ground of copyright misuse.)

The Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments in the case this morning. In 2010 the court heard Costco v. Omega. In that case, however, the court was deadlocked 4-4 (thus affirming the copyright holder's position). The ninth justice that will sit on this case is Justice Kagen who had recused herself in 2010 – apparently after working on the case as Solicitor General. In her absence, the DOJ has supported the copyright holders in arguing against international exhaustion.

In my view, Wiley likely has the better argument based on a straight reading of the statute. However, the implementation of Section 109 was largely a codification of the 1908 Supreme Court decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co v. Straus. And, it appears that international copyright exhaustion was on the mind of Congress at that time. Further, we already know that if the text of the statute is construed as copyright holders suggest, then the statute does not entirely define the scope of exhaustion. For instance, authorized sales within the US are seen as exhausting the copyright even if the work was not "lawfully made" in the US. In my mind, this opens the door to a potential atextual expansion of the exhaustion doctrine.

There are several interesting briefs filed in the case. The IPO, AIPLA, ABA all support the copyright holders rights to block importation of goods that the copyright holder sold abroad. For the most part, these organizations say that their arguments are "limited to the Copyright Act" and should not be read into "other fields, such as trademark and patent law" which "involve distinct statutory schemes and implicate separate policy concerns."

A group of law professors led by Jason Shultz filed an amicus brief and argues that the Wiley's argument "runs contrary to the statutory context in which § 109(a) appears, the common-law backdrop against which Congress legislated, and analogous principles of patent law as well." Federal Circuit precedent on the topic runs parallel to the Wiley decision finding no international exhaustion. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Interestingly, the brief rejects the Jazz Photo cases as against the weight of past and present Supreme Court precedent on the topic.

Mark Lemley filed a brief on behalf of Powell Books, et al. that runs in parallel with a brief filed by a group of art museums. Both briefs argue that their respective operations (selling used books and showing artwork) have long relied upon international exhaustion. If copyrights are not so exhausted, both business models will suffer greatly.

Notes:

• Read the briefs here: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
• The Supreme Court is hearing the Bowman v. Monsanto exhaustion case later this year. This case may offer some signaling as to how that case will turn out.

Good Things Come in Threes? DOJ, FTC and EC Officials Wax Eloquent About FRAND

Guest Post By Professor Jorge L. Contreras

For years, developers of standards in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector have committed to license patents that are essential to those standards on terms that are "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND). This February, I summarized the reasons that these vague but somewhat reassuring commitments have become so prevalent in the industry. Since then, the litigation over FRAND commitments has only intensified. In April, I summarized the major pending lawsuits that revolve around allegations that FRAND commitments have been violated. One of these, Microsoft v. Motorola (W.D. Wash.) is scheduled to go to trial on this issue in November, and Judge Robart has suggested (some would say threatened) that he may define FRAND for the parties if they can't reach agreement before then.

Against this backdrop, regulators in the U.S. and Europe have actively pursued a FRAND clarification program of their own. As I noted in February, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) appears to have persuaded Microsoft, Apple and Google to release a trio of "voluntary" statements describing their interpretations of FRAND. This public display occurred in connection with DOJ's review (and approval) of major patent acquisition transactions by each of these parties. The European Commission, which approved Google's acquisition of Motorola Mobility shortly thereafter, also exhibited a keen interest in Google's view of FRAND commitments.

Six months later, there has been another flurry of FRAND clarifications. This time, however, guidance is being offered not by companies, but by the regulators themselves (or, rather, by senior agency officials speaking "on the record" at public events). These include the following speeches by officials of the DOJ, FTC and EC:

• Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the FTC, at the Georgetown Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (September 19),
• Joseph Wayland, Acting Asst. Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of DOJ, at the Fordham Competition Law Institute (September 21),
• Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, also at Fordham (September 20),
• Fiona Scott-Morton, DOJ Deputy Asst. Attorney General for Economic Analysis, at the National Academies of Science (NAS) Symposium on Management of Intellectual Property in Standard Setting Processes (October 3),
• Howard Shelanski, Director of FTC Bureau of Economics, also at NAS (October 4), and
• Renata Hesse, Deputy Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of DOJ at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Patent Roundtable (October 10)

It is no coincidence that these officials each came forward with comments regarding FRAND within a few weeks of each other. As suggested by Dr. Scott-Morton, this effort was at least loosely coordinated within the three agencies, each of which is actively involved in matters involving the licensing of patents essential to industry standards. For example, the FTC has initiated an investigation of Google/Motorola in relation to its FRAND licensing practices and submitted a public statement to the ITC in Microsoft's case against Motorola (now resolved), the EC has launched FRAND-related investigations of both Google/Motorola and Samsung, and the DOJ is reported to have opened an investigation into Samsung's practices in this area. But despite the clear desire by these three agencies to send a message to the industry regarding FRAND, the scope of that message is not entirely clear. Below is a brief summary of the FTC, DOJ and EC officials' statements regarding FRAND:

Injunctive Relief. If the agency viewpoints share on one thing, it is a strong aversion to injunctions that seek to block the use of a standard after a FRAND commitment has been made. However, even here the extent of agency accord is unclear. For example, Mr. Almunia declares that "the worst-case scenario is when a company willing to take a license for standard-essential patents is hit by an injunction" (Almunia, p.6), yet he does not indicate whether, or on what basis, such an injunction might be limited. The FTC's position on injunctive relief is more restrained, and Chairman Leibowitz only notes that such relief may be "in tension" with the FRAND commitment (Leibowitz, p.7). This statement is consistent with the FTC's earlier comments to the ITC, suggesting that if a patent holder has made a "reasonable royalty offer" that has subsequently been refused by an infringer, relief in the form of an exclusion order might be appropriate. The most steadfast opponent of injunctive relief in the face of a FRAND commitment appears to be DOJ, which tipped its hand back in February when it applauded Apple's and Microsoft's statements "that they will not seek to prevent or exclude rivals' products from the market", while viewing Google's more qualified commitment as "less clear". Mr. Wayland refers to these earlier statements (Wayland, p.7), and to his testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, which held hearings on ITC exclusion orders in September (Wayland, p. 10-11). With respect to ITC exclusion orders he echoes the FTC's position, which has generally disfavored injunctive relief for FRAND-committed patents due to the increased leverage that negotiating in the "shadow" of such an injunction can give to the patent holder (FTC 2011 Report, p.225-26). But like the FTC in its recent public comments to the ITC, he indicates some tolerance for such injunctions when a potential licensee has not negotiated reasonably or is beyond the reach of the U.S. courts (Wayland, p.10-11). However, it is FTC Chairman Leibowitz who makes the boldest statement regarding injunctive relief, suggesting not only that such relief should not be granted in the face of a FRAND commitment, but that even seeking such relief could amount to unfair competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Leibowitz, p. 9). He thus warns companies that violating their FRAND commitments could lead to enforcement actions by the agency.

Antitrust and Competition Law Claims. Several of the agency officials suggest that violation of FRAND commitments could, under certain circumstances, constitute violations of antitrust or competition law. Mr. Almunia, for example, while acknowledging that the recent smartphone patent wars are "primarily patent cases, not competition cases", goes on to suggest that "this state of belligerence may encourage a company to use its patents as weapons to harm legitimate competitors" (Almunia, p.5). Ms Hesse of DOJ notes the "risks to competition" that may arise from collaborative standards-setting and so-called "patent hold-up" (Hesse, p.5). And Mr. Wayland unambiguously states that "the [Antitrust] division is ready to enforce the antitrust laws against standard-setting activities that harm competition" (Wayland, p.8). Mr. Almunia likewise indicates that the EC is "willing to provide clarity to the market through our enforcement" (Almunia, p.6).

But perhaps the most interesting comments regarding antitrust remedies are Chairman Leibowitz's statements regarding the "unfair methods of competition" that may result from seeking an injunction in the face of a FRAND commitment (Leibowitz, p.9). As noted above, he suggests that such conduct may run afoul of Section 5 of the FTC Act "which, as all of us in this room understand, Congress intended to extend well beyond the reach of the antitrust laws" (Id.). Chairman Leibowitz thus hedges his bets: even if antitrust doctrines are not sufficient to prosecute FRAND violations, the agency has tools beyond antitrust that it may use to correct such behavior (an argument that, perhaps, arises from the FTC's 2008 reversal by the D.C. Circuit in its antitrust case against Rambus, Inc. for abuse of the standardization process).

Magnitude of FRAND Royalties. Not surprisingly, the agency representatives do not speak much about the complex question of the magnitude of FRAND royalty rates. Historically, the FTC has maintained that appropriate royalties for standards-essential patents should be based on the ex ante value of the patented technology prior to adoption of the standard (FTC 2011 Report, p.22-23). Obviously, determining such a royalty in hindsight can be challenging, and perhaps Judge Robart's upcoming judicial intervention in Seattle may shed light on how best to conduct this analysis. Another nettlesome question regarding the magnitude of FRAND royalties arises from the comparative value of the many different patents that may cover the same standard (sometimes ranging in the thousands). In this regard, Chairman Leibowitz offers an interesting observation, possibly alluding to the pending disputes over Motorola's proposed royalty: "When the allegedly infringing component is, say, only one of 15,000 patents used in a smart phone or a tablet, is it fair to demand two percent of the entire sales price? To ask that question is to answer it."

SDO-Based Solutions. Unlike the FTC and EC representatives, the DOJ officials strongly encourage SDOs to implement policies that are likely to alleviate some of the risks and uncertainty currently associated with FRAND commitments. Both Mr. Wayland and Ms. Hesse reflect favorably on DOJ's 2007/2008 Business Review Letters approving the "ex ante" licensing disclosure policies proposed by VITA and IEEE (Wayland, p.8-9, Hesse, p.7-8). Such policies permit (in the case of IEEE) and require (in the case of VITA) that patent holders disclose their "most restrictive" licensing terms (including royalty rates) before adoption of a standard. Ms. Hesse notes that "[w]e saw then, and continue to see now, the potential benefits to competition from the implementation of such an approach" (Hesse, p.8). In addition to ex ante licensing disclosure, Mr. Wayland, Ms. Hesse and Dr. Scott-Morgan of DOJ all suggest concrete steps that SDOs should consider in relation to FRAND (Wayland, p.9; Hesse p.9-10; Scott-Morgan, p.1-4). These are summarized below (based primarily on Ms. Hesse's presentation, which is the most detailed and occurred latest in time).

1. Identify Excluded Patents. Identify patented technology that will not be offered on FRAND terms and "consciously determine" whether or not such technology should be included in a standard.
2. Transfer. Ensure that FRAND licensing commitments bind subsequent purchasers of patents. (This requirement was also advocated by Microsoft, Apple and Google in their February statements).
3. Cash-Only. Require that patent holders offer FRAND licenses on "cash-only" terms (presumably to eliminate (a) perceived abuses arising from "bundling" of non-essential patents with standards-essential patents, and (b) inherent barriers to entry for market entrants lacking their own patents to use as cross-licensing barter with other patent holders).
4. Limit Injunctions. Limit participants' right to seek injunctions after a FRAND commitment has been made. (This limitation was also advocated by Microsoft, Apple and Google in their February statements).
5. Arbitration. Set guidelines for FRAND royalty rates, or establish an arbitration or other mechanism for resolving disputes over the level of FRAND royalties.
6. Accuracy of Disclosure. Ensure that disclosure of "essential" patents is accurate and not overly broad (only suggested by Hesse, p.10).

The "inherent ambiguity" of FRAND commitments (Hesse, p.6) undoubtedly requires clarification, either by the parties making such commitments or, lacking that, by courts and regulatory agencies. The recent statements by agency officials at the DOJ, FTC and EC represent a good first step toward such clarification. At this point, there appears to be a developing consensus among private industry and the agencies that FRAND commitments should "travel with the patents" after they are sold, and that injunctive relief should be limited after a FRAND commitment is made. In other areas, however, there does not appear to be a high degree of consensus among the agencies and additional work by all stakeholders (SDOs, patent holders, product vendors and regulators) will be required before a common understanding of FRAND is finally developed. I agree with the DOJ commenters that SDO-based solutions are the most likely avenues toward widespread alleviation of FRAND uncertainty, and have proposed a slightly different set of recommendations for SDO policy reform. Barring this, however, the decision will be left to the courts.

Should a patentee with market power be allowed to charge monopoly prices?: March-In Rights and the NIH

Patents are no longer referred to as monopolies. Rightly so because the exclusive rights granted do not normally confer monopoly power in any relevant market. However, sometimes patents do confer so much market power that the owner can charge prices that bear no relation to the cost of manufacture (except for being well above that cost). Abbott's patents covering its antiretroviral drug ritonavir likely serve as one such example. Although not likely a true monopoly, Abbott is able to charge much more than its marginal costs. In the US, Abbott charges about $12 per 100 mg pill on its drug under the brand name Norvir. And, most patients are on a multi-pill daily regimine. In other high-income countries around the world, the drug is ordinarily sold at less than $2 per pill. Apparently to relieve political pressure, Abbott also lowers its price paid by the US Gov't for purchases under medicare and medicaid. Abbott has also apparently refused to allow its drug to be combined with other anti-viral treatments that would reduce cost and make life generally easier for patients.

The drug is protected by U.S. Patent No. 5541206, No. 5635523, No. 5648597, No. 5674882, No. 5846987, and No. 588604. And, there is little suggestion that these patents are invalid.

In a recent filing, Knowledge Economy International (KEI) has asked the NIH to use its March-In Rights to force Abbott to lower its price charged to US consumers. http://keionline.org/node/1573. The legal hook for KEI is that the US government funded a substantial portion of the initial drug development. That initial funding was critical and Abbott only fully committed and took-over all research funding once it realized the high likelihood that the drug would be a major profit source. Under Bayh-Dole, the US government has "march-in rights" for patents such as these to ensure that the innovations are reaching the marketplace in a way that serves consumers. However, the US government has never actually used its march-in rights. Although the US Gov't has not actually marched-in, a prior petition to the NIH is seen as one reason why Abbott reduced its price charged for the drug to the U.S. Gov't.

The Norvir situation is one of many cases that KEI sees as problematic. More generally, the organization has asked the NIH to adopt two rules to guide the use of March-In rights.

Rule 1: Ceiling on prices to U.S. residents: The Secretary shall normally grant open licenses to third parties to use patented inventions that have benefited from federal funding, subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty and an appropriate field of use, if a product or products based upon those inventions are sold in the United States at prices [more than 10%] higher than in other high income countries. . . . A licensee may rebut the presumption of unreasonable pricing by providing evidence that its actual risk adjusted R&D costs would not be recovered, but for the charging of higher prices in the U.S. market, or other evidence specific to the risk adjusted costs for the licensed invention.

Rule 2: Use of invention for a dependent co-formulation technology: The Secretary shall grant licenses to third parties to use patented inventions that have benefited from federal funding, subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty and an appropriate field of use, if a product based on those patented inventions: (a) is a drug, drug formulation, delivery mechanism, medical device, diagnostic or similar invention, and (b) is used or is potentially useful to prevent, treat or diagnose medical conditions or diseases involving humans, and (c) its co-formulation, co-administration or concomitant use with a second product is necessary to effect significant health benefits from the second product, and (d) the patent holder has refused a reasonable offer for a license.

I expect that the NIH will again reject this petition and refuse to exercise any march-in rights or develop a framework for the future. However, you may begin to wonder why Congress included march-in rights if they are never to be used.

New Book: Law of Superheroes

by Dennis Crouch

The book that we've all been waiting for is finally out: The Law of Superheroes.  I am serious here -- at least that I have been waiting for this book ever since I discussed the project with co-author James Dailey a few years ago when he visited the Mizzou campus.  Daily and Ryan Davidson have turned their popular blog (lawandthemultiverse.com) into book published by Gotham Books, a division of Penguin. Daily is a patent attorney and the book answers many IP questions that may have vexed comic book readers:

• Does Batman's use of Wayne Enterprises' advanced technologies to stop crimes (at night) negate patentability?
• Does Spiderman infringe any genetic engineering patents?
• In our universe, the Beatles broke up and John Lennon died. However, there are other (far better) universes where that did not happen. What copyright laws would apply when someone wants distribute copies of the Beatles' 40^th Anniversary Album that was brought back from that alternate universe?

One of the book's thirteen chapters focuses on intellectual property. But the book as a whole covers a host of topics ranging from Constitutional law to immigration; from criminal procedure to the legal treatment of non-human intelligence.

Great work by Daily and Davidson! I am already looking for Volume II. Law students beware: the book offers a host of original hypothetical questions that would be readily used on final examinations.

Amazon's current price is $14.60.

Top-25 Design Patent Recipients from the Past Year

1. Samsung Electronics :See D669,432 a contactless mobile device charger
2. Microsoft: See D669,498 a computer icon (as part of a display screen)
3. Procter & Gamble: See D668,878 a design on paper towel
4. LG Electronics: See D669,469 a tablet computer
5. Apple: See D668,674 a computer icon (as part of a display screen)
6. Research-In-Motion: See D667,807 an electronic device with a built in physical keyboard
7. Philips Electronics: See D668,812 a lamp
8. Nike: See D668,441 a tiny bit of a shoe
9. Toyota: See D668,592 the front-end of a car
10. FIH (a branch of Foxconn): See D668,648 an electronic device cover with fancy surface treatment
11. Cheng Uei Precision Industry: See D666,579 a stereo headseat
12. Honda Motor: See D668,594 a automobile grill
13. Hon Hai: See D668,664 a flash drive that folds like an old Leatherman
14. LG Innotek (Subsidiary of LG Electronics): See D667,383 packaging for an LED
15. 3M Innovative Properties: See D668,496 a scouring pad holder
16. Sony: See D668,637 earbuds
17. Panasonic: See D668,702 an overhead projector
18. Target Brands: See D668,176 a chain with the letter "E" attached
19. Gillette: See D668,532 a package for holding personal care product
20. S C Johnson & Son: See D668,542 the top of a plastic bottle with a closure device
21. Karl Storz: See D668,762 a medical device handle
22. Goodyear Tire Rubber: See D668,600 a tire
23. Beifa Group: See D668,293 a writing pen with a cap
24. Kohler: See D663,396 a toilet seat
25. Daimler: See D666,957 rims

Apple Patents an Encircled Musical Note

One of Apple's most recent design patents is Patent No. D668,263. The patent claims "The ornamental design for a display screen or portion thereof with icon, as shown and described." As the image shows below, the patented ornamentation is basically the design of a musical note with a surrounding circle and roughly resembles the iTunes icon. Although design patents are purported to be examined for novelty and obviousness. In reality they are not so examined.

In my view, design patents such as these would be fine so long as they are given exceedingly narrow scope (which they often are) and if the courts allowed for some amount of fair use (which they do not).

The senate recently passed a bill that would extend the design patent term an extra year--to 15 years from patent issuance.

The question: Is Patently-O infringing the design patent by showing the image on your screen? 

Should we Move Toward More Fee Shifting in Patent Cases?

By Dennis Crouch

Icon Health & Fitness v. Octane Fitness (Fed. Cir. 2012)

Following claim construction, the district court ruled on summary judgment that Octane's elliptical machines did not infringe Icon's U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710. However, the district court refused to find the case "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Under the statute, a "court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." And, without that exceptional case ruling, the defendant had no opportunity to recoup the money spent defending the case.

U.S. patent cases follow the "American rule" that largely forbids fee shifting except in "exceptional" cases. In Cybor, the Federal Circuit described the adjudication process as involving two steps: First determining whether the case is "exceptional" and then determining the scope of fee shifting that is appropriate (if any). The court wrote:

The determination of whether a case is exceptional and, thus, eligible for an award of attorney fees under § 285 is a two-step process. First, the district court must determine whether a case is exceptional, a factual determination reviewed for clear error. After determining that a case is exceptional, the district court must determine whether attorney fees are appropriate, a determination that we review for an abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, is based on erroneous interpretations of the law, or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc) (citations omitted). This process is akin to that used for enhanced damages where the court first considers whether the infringement was willful and then determines the scope of damage enhancement (if any). One key difference is that Section 285 provides the "exceptional" standard while the "willful infringement" requirement for enhanced damages was created by the court without any statutory key.

We call this the "American rule" of fee shifting because there is an alternate "British rule" that regularly awards fees to the prevailing party regardless of exceptionality of the case.

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In a short nonprecedential opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Octane's exceptional case motion. Its opinion confirms the traditional stance that an exceptional case award requires significant evidence of misconduct and that denial of a motion for attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court. "[W]e have reviewed the record and conclude that the court did not err in denying Octane's motion to find the case exceptional."

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Of most interest, Octane requested that the court revisit (i.e., lower) the standard for determining whether a case is exceptional. As it must, the panel here rejected that request because it is bound by prior Federal Circuit precedent. However, an en banc request on this point may garner some traction with the court.

Traditionally, there has been something of a bias relatively in favor of exceptional case findings for prevailing plaintiffs but not for prevailing defendants. The bias comes about because a prevailing plaintiff can typically include out-of-court activities such as willful infringement as part of its proof of exceptional case while a prevailing defendant can typically only prove an exceptional case based upon a patent plaintiffs activities during litigation or when securing patent rights.

I like to divide the "bad" plaintiff activities leading to an exceptional case finding into three categories: (1) inequitable conduct during prosecution; (2) litigation misconduct (such as discovery violations or destroying evidence); and (3) bringing a subjectively and objectively baseless lawsuit. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailer International, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, if a prevailing defendant seeks an "exceptional case" award based upon the filing of a worthless lawsuit, the plaintiff must provide clear and convincing evidence that the infringement claims were subjectively and objectively baseless. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (The person seeking attorney fees must establish the facts showing exceptionality by clear and convincing evidence.)

In its brief, Octane argued that the "subjectively and objectively baseless" requirement is unduly limiting and should be reduced to a standard that considers whether the claim was "objectively unreasonable." Octane writes:

Patent litigation is expensive. According to a survey published in 2009 by the American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") the median cost for a patent litigation in which the amount in controversy is from $1-25 million, through the end of discovery, is $2.5 million (inclusive of all costs). Unscrupulous large companies know this, and, unfortunately, can use patent litigation as a weapon against competitors, especially smaller competitors. Many smaller competitors simply do not have the financial resources or wherewithal to defend a patent infringement case, no matter how spurious the contentions. Judge Story once wrote that patent litigation is the "sport of kings." Larger companies can exploit this fact to the detriment of their smaller competitors.

Complicating matters, there is almost no economical or expeditious way for an accused infringer to extract itself from baseless litigation. Unlike certain forms of litigation ( e.g., securities litigation or antitrust litigation) rarely is a patent infringement action dismissed at the pleading stage. Rather, before a defendant accused of infringement has any hope of extricating itself from a litigation, often-times (as here) substantial discovery (both fact and expert), Markman briefing and hearing, and summary judgment briefing and hearing, must occur. By the time summary judgment is granted, substantial time is invested in the case not only by the parties, but by the district court, as well.

For their part, district court judges--who, in many instances, have no technical background and little familiarity with the patent system--are often faced with complex technology, difficult-to-read patent language and a body of case law that is both robust and nuanced. No matter how preposterous the merits of the infringement position may be, in order to reach a resolution on the merits, the district court judge must invest significant time and energy, to decipher the claim scope and understand the defendant's position. For these reasons, no matter how unreasonable the patentee's contentions, it is a rare district court judge who will have the courage to call a patentee's claims "frivolous" after the investment of time and effort necessitated by these cases.

For these reasons, and because of the inconsistent application of the "exceptional case" findings by district courts, Octane proposes that in the context of a prevailing accused-infringer, the legal standard for exceptional case should be re-evaluated. Octane respectfully proposes that a case should be deemed "exceptional" if the infringement claims asserted by the patentee were objectively unreasonable. If they were objectively unreasonable (as here), then the case should be deemed exceptional, and, unless equitable considerations counsel otherwise in the context of the particular case, fees awarded. Octane's rationale for this proposal are set forth below, as well as factors this Court might articulate to better assist district courts in identifying objectively unreasonable cases.

1. The Rationale for Fee Shifting Where a Patentee Asserts an Objectively Unreasonable Claim of Infringement Against a Competitor.

A patent grants to its holder a legalized monopoly. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) ("The heart of [the patentee's] legal monopoly is the right to invoke the State's power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without consent"); see also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mack Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) ("a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right of access to a free and open market.") This is permitted because the overall good of encouraging innovation and promoting disclosure is thought to outweigh the anticompetitive effects of a time-limited monopoly. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3255 (2010) ("even when patents encourage innovation and disclosure, 'too much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of ... useful Arts'.' "). But a patent is, nevertheless, by its nature anticompetitive, and for this reason, the ways in which a patentee may have granted, utilize and leverage a patent are not without limit and are often carefully scrutinized. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that patents are by nature anticompetitive and examining whether agreements improperly restricted competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent); see also Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3229 (noting "the tension, ever present in patent law, between stimulating innovation by protecting inventors and impeding progress by granting patents when not justified by the statutory design.")

Title 35 of the United States Code, § 285 authorizes such scrutiny in the context of infringement litigation and specifically authorizes an award of attorney fees in "exceptional" cases. But what is an "exceptional" case? This Court has endeavored to provide guidance to district courts as to the meaning of an "exceptional" case. This Court has indicated that fees are properly awarded in a variety of contexts, including "vexatious or unjustified litigation" or "frivolous filings." See, e.g., Takeda, 549 F.3d at 1388; Eon-Net LP, 653 F.3d at 1324; Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Bayer AG v. Duphar Int'l Research B.V., 738 F.2d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 1984). However, this Court has also indicated that absent litigation misconduct or fraud in securing a patent, a district court can award attorney fees only if the litigation is both: (1) brought in subjective bad faith and (2) objectively baseless. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP, 653 F.3d at 1324. These differing statements of the standard and other factors noted below, have led to inconsistent application of the exceptional case designation by district courts, particularly in the case of a prevailing alleged infringer.

Octane respectfully submits that commencement and maintenance of objectively unreasonable infringement contentions should be sufficient, standing alone, to deem a case exceptional. This standard is, in many ways, consistent with this Court's cases holding that unjustified or frivolous suits may be deemed "exceptional." Octane, however, advocates for reconsideration of the case precedent that indicates litigation misconduct or subjective bad faith should be required - in addition to baseless contentions - before finding a case exceptional.

Additionally, Octane proposes use of the words "objectively unreasonable" rather than "frivolous" or "baseless." As explained in more detail below, the words "frivolous" or "baseless" often imply misconduct by counsel, and perhaps even violation of Rule 11. Octane respectfully suggests that an action should not have to rise to the level of a Rule 11 violation, before a case could be deemed exceptional; else the remedies are duplicative.

Rather, patentees (including non-practicing patentees) asserting their legal monopoly should at least have to assert objectively reasonable causes of action, or else the risk of paying for the litigation should shift to the patentee, regardless of counsel's conduct. This is fair and consistent with the overarching goals of the patent system. The alternative--leaving patentees unchecked to assert thin-beyond-reason causes of action--has a huge anticompetitive impact on society and constitutes a gross injustice to innocent defendants.

As any defendant accused of patent infringement could attest, the mere existence of litigation typically has a detrimental impact on business, as customers become nervous about buying a product accused of infringement. This translates into higher costs for end customers as the patentee is able to prevent competition (often legitimate competition) and maintain monopoly prices. Meanwhile, the only recourse for a wrongfully accused infringer, apart from recouping fees under the present standard, is to bring a separate tort cause of action after conclusion of the Federal patent case in state court (which has even less experience with patent law than most district courts), or advance a cost-prohibitive antitrust action, if market share and other elements can be established. For these reasons, district courts need to know that they can find a case exceptional when a patentee fails to assert its legal monopoly responsibly and asserts and maintains objectively unreasonable causes of action.

Considerations a district court might consider when evaluating whether the patentee's contentions were objectively unreasonable include: (1) more than one claim element was missing in the accused device, (2) the case was resolved on summary judgment, (3) the patentee was not practicing the claimed invention, (4) the patentee's claim of infringement was based on a claim construction position that: (a) contradicted the prosecution history, or (b) read a limitation out of the claim entirely, or (c) was not rationally related to what was actually invented, (5) the patentee ignored or reargued the court's claims construction, (6) the accused device incorporated technology that pre-dated the asserted patent, in lieu of the technology disclosed in the patent-in-suit, and (7) the accused infringer communicated to the patentee near the start of the case an alleged design around or element(s) not present in the accused product; the patentee proceeds forward unreasonably; and the defendant ultimately prevails on that issue.

Octane submits that the above factors are examples of factors a district court may consider when determining if a case was objectively unreasonable. These factors encourage early candid discussions between the parties and potentially fosters early settlement, which has been recognized as a laudable goal of the judicial system. Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 469, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Moreover, the standard appropriately shifts the risk of fees to a patentee that proceeds forward with weak claims having no reasonable chance of success. Accused infringers should not have to bear the heavy cost of patent litigation where patent owners proceed forward with no more than a scintilla of hope or a desire that the accused infringer will collapse when confronted with a weak claim.

To be clear Octane is not proposing that "exceptional case" means any case in which an alleged infringer prevails. But cases that are objectively unreasonable should be "exceptional", and not the norm. The cost of spurious infringement claims should be borne by the patentee, not the alleged infringer trying to compete fairly in the marketplace. In those instances (instances which would be even less frequent under this standard than at present), fee shifting is appropriate.

2. Exceptional Case Status Should Not Require Proof of a Rule 11 Violation.

By calling for a standard that allows for the award of fees in "objectively unreasonable" cases Octane is not necessarily arguing for a departure from the line of cases that would allow an award of fees in "frivolous" or "baseless" cases. However, Octane is proposing that the "exceptional" case standard of 35 U.S.C. § 285 should not be commensurate with a Rule 11 violation.

To begin, Rule 11 already includes provisions for sanctions, which would render Section 285 unnecessary if they require proof of the same conduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Beyond this, labeling a case "frivolous" such that it constitutes a violation of Rule 11 is not a step that most courts take lightly, not only because of the time and money investment in these cases, but also because labeling a case "frivolous" such that it constitutes a violation of Rule 11 requires condemnation of litigation counsel's conduct. Rule 11 provides, among other things, that by signing all materials submitted to the Court an attorney is representing that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law. . ." If a case is "frivolous" under Rule 11, then a patentee's counsel must have acted inappropriately, a conclusion that most courts are loathe to reach.

A case should not have to rise to the level of a Rule 11 violation before it is deemed "exceptional." Pursuing objectively unreasonable claims (though perhaps not rising to the level of a Rule 11 violation), should not be the norm for patentees, and when it does occur and the patentee is unsuccessful, the case should bear the moniker of an "exceptional case."

3. Exceptional Case Status Should Not Require Litigation Misconduct Apart from Asserting an Objectively Unreasonable Claim.

Asserting an objectively unreasonable claim is a form of litigation misconduct. Nevertheless, no separate requirement for litigation misconduct should be necessary to establish an exceptional case. A patentee that pursues an objectively unreasonable claim but otherwise responds to discovery in a timely manner, does not destroy relevant documents, shows up to depositions, etc... should still bear the cost of its competitor's fees, when the unreasonably maintained cause of action fails. No additional litigation misconduct should be necessary.

Moreover, the Federal Rules provide for sanctions for specific litigation misconduct as it occurs. See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) (authorizing sanctions for improper certification of disclosures and discovery responses); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (providing for sanctions for failure to attend a deposition); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (authorizing motions and sanctions if a party fails to respond or make appropriate disclosure to discovery requests); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ("any attorney. . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct"). To the extent a patentee (or its counsel) takes some action in litigation that is wrongful, drives up costs, or otherwise violates litigation rules, then the alleged-infringer may bring that conduct to the district court's attention at the appropriate time, and the district court should order appropriate sanctions, including fines. Encouraging district courts to deal with litigation misconduct in this manner, promotes professionalism and civility and better addresses the specific issues in a timely manner.

Though litigation misconduct could, of course, also be a factor in deeming a case "exceptional", Octane propose that it should not be a requirement for finding a case exceptional in the face of objectively unreasonable claims.

4. Exceptional Case Status Should Not Require Proof of Bad Faith.

In a patent case, the most an accused infringer can ever hope for is recoupment of attorney's fees and costs. Even in the rare cases where this is awarded, however, the accused infringer is not made whole. That party is still out the hundreds of hours dedicated by company personnel to the defense of the case (hours that could have been spent on research and development, sales efforts and other endeavors), not to mention the often-significant cost that the suit may have had on the accused infringer in the marketplace. Unlike on the patentee side, where the plaintiff may get treble damages against a willful infringer, the wrongfully-accused infringer has no such remedy against a patentee. The accused infringer is entitled to, at most, recoupment of reasonable fees.

Why is this significant? It is significant because under the law, subjective bad faith ( i.e., the willful, wonton or reprehensible nature of a party's conduct), while the critical factor in an award of punitive damages (which an alleged infringer cannot recover), is not a pre-requisite, in most statutory schemes, to an award of reasonable attorney fees. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (allowing court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in civil rights actions); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (mandating the award of reasonable attorney fees for any person injured by violation of the antitrust laws); 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (allowing court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in fair housing actions). In this instance, the statute merely requires that the court find the case "exceptional" before awarding fees. It says nothing about requiring a showing of subjective bad faith. Octane submits that in view of the differences between punitive damages and reasonable attorney fees and the ways in which these are typically dealt with in statutes and by the courts, an alleged infringer should not have to make a showing of subjective bad faith in order to show that an objectively unreasonable case is "exceptional."

Regardless of intent (which is inevitably almost impossible to prove), a patentee that asserts an objectively unreasonable cause of action against its competitor should bear the risk of paying that competitors fees if it is unsuccessful.

This is an interesting problem. At the end of the case, a prevailing party has generally proven that the losing party's case is without merit (i.e., it lost). In that sense, at the end of the case, the position is subjectively, reasonably, and objectively baseless. The question is, however, at the beginning of the case (and to some extent throughout the case) did the position have some merit?

At first cut the proposed fee shifting appears to be a good mechanism for shifting risk onto plaintiffs who, in turn, will avoid filing baseless claims. A benefit of the current rule (objectively baseless) is that it is fairly clear and so the self-weeding is easy. Octane's multi-factor proposal makes this a much more difficult if not impossible task – meaning that the new rule would also end up discouraging some amount of valid patent claims.

Notes:

• Octane is represented by Rudy Telscher and Kara Fussner of Harness Dickey's St. Louis office. Larry Laycock and his team at Workman Nydegger in Salt Lake represent Iconn.
• There is a good chance that Octane won't push this case any further since it won the underlying decision (non-infringement) and that decision was affirmed on appeal.

Reviewing PTO Claim Construction: Calls for De Novo Review of Proper Standard

By Dennis Crouch

Flo Healthcare v. Kappos and Rioux Vision (Fed. Cir. 2012), Inter Partes Reexamination No. 95/000,251.

In an interesting three-way opinion, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the USPTO's rejection of Flo's reexamined patent claims. In the process, however, the court provided significant additional guidance for the PTO on when claim elements that do not include the magical word "means" should nevertheless be interpreted as means-plus-function elements. See 35 U.S.C. 112(6). Here, the court found that the claim term "height adjustment mechanism" as used in the context of the patent specification should not be interpreted as a means-plus-function element.

Senior Judge Plager wrote the unanimous majority opinion and also filed a concurring opinion with "additional views" regarding appellate review of PTO claim construction Judge Plager argued that Federal Circuit precedent is unclear:

[W]e now appear to have two contradictory lines of authority on the question of how this court reviews Board claim constructions—a deferential "reasonable" (arbitrary/capricious-type) review, and a no-deference "pure" law type review. [Compare In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997) with In re Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2000).] The fact that the APA now governs our review of PTO decisions does not provide guidance on which is the right standard. This is because the APA itself provides one standard for "pure" questions of law—which are reviewed without deference—and different, more deferential, standards for questions of fact and for mixed questions of fact and law.

The question then becomes whether claim construction by the Board is to be considered a question of "pure" law—the way this court treats claim construction in district court litigation under Cybor—and thus to be reviewed without deference; or whether it is something else, a blend of law and fact and judgment—as the Supreme Court said in Markman, a "mongrel practice"—in which case it is at least arguably subject to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of APA § 706. Interestingly, none of the cases applying the Baker Hughes no-deference standard has paused to explain why that is the preferable standard as a matter of law or policy, or how it relates to the review standard that the Board uses.

Three additional factors weigh relatively in favor of deference toward PTO claim construction decisions even if court claim construction decisions continue to be reviewed de novo. First, claim construction at the PTO is decided initially by technical fact finders (patent examiners) and then by mixed fact/law specialists (PTAB judges). Second, the PTO's form of claim construction "broadest reasonable construction" is a factual standard as is (virtually) any reasonableness judgment. Finally, the Supreme Court's placement of decision making authority with a judge rather than a jury (Markman) that led to the Cybor no deference standard is tangential to the PTO's role in claim construction. The decision makers in patent prosecution are defined by statute and codified rules rather than by the Supreme Court.

Judge Plager does not here suggest that one approach is correct, but does argue in favor of en banc rehearing to provide clear guidance to patentees and others concerned with patent rights. Judge Plager also offers an apology for the confusion since he authored the Morris opinion and was on the Baker Hughes panel.

This case involves a direct challenge to PTO claim construction decisions. The next step removed will involve collateral challenges during infringement litigation. In that case, what deference should be given to PTO conclusions at the time of the patent grant?

Judge Newman also agreed with the majority decision and provided her own additional views on the topic of the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard used in patent prosecution. Judge Newman argues that the PTO should conduct claim construction applying the same standard as a court would later in litigation. The problem, according to Judge Newman is that the "broadest reasonable interpretation" is being applied as a standard of claim construction whereas it is actually merely an "examination protocol, not a rule of law."

In its implementation, the examiner starts with a blank slate on which the applicant has described the subject matter he wishes to patent. The examiner is charged with searching the entire world knowledge, and to decide what the applicant is entitled to claim, as a matter of law. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §706 ("After the application has been read and the claimed invention understood, a prior art search for the claimed invention is made."). In this demanding process, the examiner views the applicant's presentation broadly, in order to assure that all possibly relevant prior art is explored. That is the role of "broadest reasonable interpretation": it is an examination tool whereby the applicant and the examiner work together to determine and define the "invention" to be claimed.

Regardless of the path used to get there, Judge Newman argues, the claim construction is either correct or it is incorrect and it is the Federal Circuit's role to make that determination accurately and uniformly. Thus, Judge Newman sees an acute problem in situations such as this case "where the same issue can be finally adjudicated to different appellate outcomes, depending on the tribunal from which it came." An en banc hearing is also requested to remedy this "pernicious" conflict.

Notes:

• The infringement lawsuit between these parties was filed in 2007 (the same year as the inter partes reexamination request). That litigation settled in 2010, but there is not a clear mechanism for settling inter partes reexaminations once they get rolling. The new inter partes reviews can be settled.

Citing References at the PTO

So far in 2012, the USPTO has issued just about 200,000 utility patents. As part of the application process, patent applicants have a duty to identify prior art references that are material to patentability. About 13% of applicants submit no prior art. The median submission is 8 references. However, the data is highly skewed. While most entities submit a relatively small number of references, there are a few entities that submit a large number of references for consideration at the USPTO. Amazingly, the top ten percent of patents (in terms of references cited) are associated with over two-thirds of the seven million prior art citations in this set. Although the median number of references cited by applicants is 8, this skew shifts the average way up to 36 references. The submission of four or five references can be quite helpful. The submission of forty references is unlikely to be helpful (absent a second level search tool). In the past, this has prompted the USPTO to consider mechanisms to place additional burden on applicants who feel the need to submit such a large number of documents for consideration.

Citation also varies by country of origin. The chart below shows average applicant citation count according to assignee home country.

Questions on AskPatent:

• http://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/775/how-can-i-find-cheapest-lawyer-to-file-patent
• http://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/771/what-happens-if-i-come-with-an-idea-that-was-already-patented
• http://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/772/prior-art-for-an-apparatus-for-audio-mapping

Two recent 101 Cases at the PTAB

By Dennis Crouch

Ex parte Thomsen (PTAB 2012) (App S.N. 11/314,709)

SAP's patent claims are directed to a "method to determine statistics for a field of a database table." In the appeal, the claim in question has three particular steps:

• determining that the field of the table is associated with a field of a check table;
• determining a relationship between a number of distinct values of the field in the table and a number of distinct values of the field in the check table; and
• determining the number of distinct values of the field in the table based on the relationship and on the number of distinct values of the field in the check table.

In its recent decision, the PTAB affirmed the examiner rejection of this claim on statutory subject matter grounds. The panel wrote:

Considering the language of independent claim 1 as a whole, we agree with the Examiner that the process of claim 1 does not meet Bilski's "machine or transformation test" and could be performed within the human mind or by a human writing on a piece of paper. The claim recites a number of steps that are not tied to a particular machine -- the claim does not recite any machine performing the functions of the steps, e.g., a processor. Nor do these steps transform data into a different state -- the claim simply recites: (1) "determining that the field of the table is associated with a field of a check table;" (2) "determining a relationship between a number of distinct values of the field in the table and a number of distinct values of the field in the check table;" and (3) "determining the number of distinct values of the field in the table based on the relationship and on the number of distinct values of the field in the check table. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).

Here, to the extent any transformation takes place, the transformation is of one type of data into another type of data -- (a) determining an association, (b) determining a relationship, and (c) determining a number. This is not a "transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing constituting patent-eligible subject matter." In re Bilski, at 962; see id. at 963-64 (discussing patent-eligible data transformations). More importantly, the claim is entirely devoid of any mention of a "machine." While Appellant urges that "[t]he claimed database tables, fields and values necessarily involve the use of a computer or machine" in actuality the "determining" steps could be accomplished within one's mind or utilizing a pen and paper.

Our reviewing court guides that "a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101." CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373. Because we conclude that the scope of claim 1's method steps covers functions that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, we conclude that unpatentable abstract mental processes fall within the subject matter of claim 1.

In the past year, the BPAI has similarly cited CyberSource in several dozen cases.

=====

Ex parte Battles (PTAB 2012) (App. S.N. 10/859,029)

HP's patent application is directed to a "computer-readable medium that stores a program that, when executed by a digital camera causes the camera to perform" various functions associated with a histogram of light information from a photo-sensor on the camera.

The PTAB has affirmed the examiner's Section 101 rejection – finding that the claim unduly includes patentable subject matter because the computer-readable medium might be a signal.

Appellant contends that the "computer readable medium," as recited in claim 21, is drawn to statutory subject matter because the computer readable medium is further recited to store programs, and that transitory, propagating signals cannot store programs. We agree with the Examiner that the "computer readable medium," as recited in claim 21 and as construed in light of the disclosure is drawn to non-statutory subject matter.

In the originally filed disclosure, Appellant discloses, "a 'computer readable medium' can be any means that can store, communicate, propagate, or transport the data ... [and it] can be, for example, but not limited to ... infrared... or propagation medium now known or later developed." Per the originally filed disclosure, the claimed "computer readable medium" can be a transitory, propagating signal and transitory, propagating signals are ineligible. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Nuijten continues to be regularly cited by the PTAB – with almost 500 citations in the past five years.

Patent Pro Bono

By Dennis Crouch

We have begun the week designated as "National Pro Bono Week." Most state attorney ethics rules indicate that "every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services unable to pay." See ABA Model Rule 6.1. In its proposed ethics rules, the USPTO suggested no need to adopt the ABA Model Rules regarding public service.

The USPTO recognizes that every practitioner, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay and that every practitioner should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services. However, attorney practitioners' individual state ethical rules should provide guidance and regulations regarding their respective duties to provide voluntary pro bono service, accept court appointed representation, and serve as members of legal service and legal reform organizations. The USPTO is declining to add an increased regulatory requirement on attorney practitioners.

Unfortunately, this statement by the PTO neglects the reality that a large number of PTO practitioners are not lawyers but are patent agents.

The America Invents Act (AIA) does include a directive requiring the USPTO to help establish patent pro bono programs. In their recent article, Amy Salmela and Mark Privratski go through one approach to a patent prosecution pro bono program that they helped to create in Minneapolis. See Patent Law Pro Bono: A Best Practices Handbook. The Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) has also announced its new role as the "National Clearinghouse" for receiving information from individuals and businesses interested in receiving pro bono assistance in the Virginia and Maryland area. See www.fedcirbar.org/ptoprobono. Other regional patent pro bono operations are beginning around the country.

En Banc Question: Who Proves (Non)Infringement When Licensee Challenges Patent

by Dennis Crouch

Medtronic v. Boston Scientific & Mirowski Family Ventures (Fed. Cir. 2012) on request for rehearing [Download Medtronic_Petition_Rehearing_EnBanc]

Medtronic has filed an interesting request for rehearing en banc following its recent loss to Boston Scientific. In my post on that panel decision I wrote "Good-Standing Licensee Must Prove Non-Infringement in DJ Action."

During patent litigation, it is normally the patentee that has the burden of proving infringement. In this case, however, the Federal Circuit flipped the burden and instead began with a presumption of infringement. The court recognized that its decision went against the weight of precedent, but based its conclusion upon the special circumstances in this case and the Supreme Court's holding in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).

Now, this case is different from typical patent litigation because the plaintiff who filed the case (Medtronic) is not the patentee seeking to enforce a patent. Rather, Medtronic has asked the court to issue a declaratory judgment that its operation does not infringe the Mirowski patent. U.S. Patent No. 4,928,688. Further, unlike the ordinary declaratory judgment case, Medtronic has signed the contract and given its word to pay ongoing royalties. The key holding in MedImmune is that a current patent licensee has standing to seek a declaratory judgment "that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed." Thus, under MedImmune, a licensee is not required to breach its contract before seeking declaratory relief. Prior to that case, the Federal Circuit had repeatedly ruled that a licensee in good standing could not challenge a patent because it had no apprehension of suit.

The present case falls squarely within the MedImmune expansion of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. The situation is interesting because the patentee would likely have no standing to sue for infringement even though the licensee now has standing. This situation, although unique, falls within the Supreme Court's general policy of encouraging licensees to challenge patent rights that it announced in Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).

Because of this special factual background of the case, the patentee could not file an infringement counterclaim and therefore asked the court to place the burden of proving non-infringement onto the DJ plaintiff. Considering this issue, the Federal Circuit agreed – holding that the licensee had the burden of proving non-infringement in this situation. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Linn wrote:

This case requires us to determine the proper allocation of the burden of persuasion in the post-MedImmune world, under circumstances in which a declaratory judgment plaintiff licensee seeks a judicial decree absolving it of its responsibilities under its license while at the same time the declaratory judgment defendant is foreclosed from counterclaiming for infringement by the continued existence of that license. . . . [I]n the limited circumstance when an infringement counterclaim by a patentee is foreclosed by the continued existence of a license, a licensee seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and of no consequent liability under the license bears the burden of persuasion. . . .

In its petition for rehearing, Medtronic directly challenges this holding. The question presented is:

Whether a legal presumption of patent infringement should exist such that in a declaratory judgment action brought by a licensee seeking a declaration of noninfringement the burden of proof is shifted to the declaratory judgment plaintiff to prove non-infringement.

In my view, it is a bit of an overstatement to say that the court applied a presumption of patent infringement. While we usually think of a simple dichotomy between infringement and non-infringement, it is fair to say that this case presents a potential third option. Because the patentee has not alleged infringement. If the patentee wins the ultimate lawsuit, the final holding should not be that of infringement but rather should merely be a denial of the request for declaratory relief.

For its part, the challenger makes a strong case that the holding here (if overstated) still goes against the weight of Federal Circuit precedent and more than 100 years of Supreme Court precedent.

Judges Linn, Lourie, and Prost were on the original panel. It will be interesting to see how the other eight judges respond.

PTAB Backlog: Over the Hump!

By Dennis Crouch

The new Patent Trial and Appeal Board has cause to celebrate!

In 2008, the Board's backlog of pending ex parte appeals began to rise at an alarming rate. Being a government body, the alarms did not really begin to sound until 2010 and the fire trucks only recently arrived. Since 2008, the number of pending cases has risen almost ten-fold to its current height of more than 26,000 pending appeals. During this period, the backlog rose each and every month without a single decrease.

Now, for the first time in more than four years, the monthly backlog figure has dropped. The Board's numbers for September 2012 show that the body disposed of 311 more cases than it received for the month. The chart below shows the PTAB/BPAI backlog over the past several years. The last data point on the right hand side of the chart shows this happy decrease. Congratulations!

This transformation is due to the large number of new administrative judges at the PTAB. Although there may be a few bobbles, I expect that the backlog will begin a serious and steady decline by January 2013.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes

By Dennis Crouch

• Germany's Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law has released a paper detailing "Twelve Reasons for Concern" with the proposed European Unitary Patent Court. Their concerns are categorized within the themes of (1) complexity of the regime, (2) imbalances in the system, and (3) lack of legal certainty for investments in innovation. http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/MPI-IP_Twelve-Reasons_2012-10-17_final3.pdf. The tone here is more of constructive criticism of the approach rather than an outright rejection of the idea. The photo of Max Planck (shown to the right) was taken just after he learned of the unitary patent system. Annsley Merelle Ward has more about the UK perspective on Unitary Patent Enforcement as part of her regular excellent IPKat coverage.
• Malibu Media v. John Doe 16, 2:12-cv-02078 (E.D. Pa. 2012). There is a tremendous amount of unauthorized distribution of pornographic videos through various internet channels such as BitTorrent. In recent years, porn copyright holders have been fairly successful in convincing many file-sharers to settle cases. Unauthorized file sharing is much more likely to be seen as deviant behavior if the files being shared are pornographic. And so the settlements are largely for the purpose of keeping that activity hidden from public view. In this case, various anonymous Johns in Eastern Pennsylvania were sued for using BitTorrent to share the motion picture known as "Anneli Leila Menage a Trois." It is a fairly easy process these days to identify the IP addresses of BitTorrent users. Malibu has opted to pursue its case against just one defendant who is still labeled John Doe 16 in what the court is calling a "Bellweather trial." Trial is scheduled for early next spring.
• "Copyright troll" stories are being chronicled by dietrolldie
• Missouri is known for many things, including the South Butt parody apparel. In 2010 the company seemingly won the trademark lawsuit brought by the North Face. However, as part of the settlement, South Butt agreed to get permission for further parodies of North Face. Thus, when they started a new Butt Face line of clothing, the North Face filed and has won a contempt motion. In the consented court order, South But has agreed to stop its further attempts to bully the classy apparel company. Yes, you can sign away your fair use rights.

USPTO Reopens the First-Inventor-to-File Comment Period

From Janet Gongola, Patent Reform Coordinator:

On July 26, 2012, the USPTO published a notice of proposed rulemaking and a notice of proposed examination guidelines to implement the first-inventor-to-file (FITF) provisions of the AIA. The notices set a comment deadline date of October 5, 2012. The USPTO has received several requests for additional time to submit comments. Therefore, the USPTO is reopening the comment period to provide interested members of the public with an additional opportunity to submit comments to the USPTO.

The new deadline for receipt of written comments in response to both the notice of proposed rulemaking and the notice of proposed examination guidelines to implement the first-inventor-to-file provisions of the AIA is November 5, 2012.

The proposed rules along with already-submitted commentary can be found here: http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/fitf_guidance.jsp. Discussion of whether the AIA eliminates Secret Prior Art is here.

Technology Patents LLC. v. T-Mobile (UK) Ltd.

By Jason Rantanen

Technology Patents LLC. v. T-Mobile (UK) Ltd. (Fed. Cir. 2012) Download 11-1581
Panel: Bryson (author), Prost, Reyna

This case involves a suit brought by prolific inventor Aris Mardirossian's company Technology Patents LLC against more than 100 domestic and foreign defendants that TPL accused of infringing US Reissue Patent No. RE39870.  While the primary subjects addressed by the court are those of claim construction and infringement , there are several additional noteworthy issues discussed at the end of the post.

The '870 patent relates to a global paging system.  According to the patent, the prior art was deficient because "it did not fulfill the need for a cheap and efficient global paging system that allows users who expect to receive messages or pages abroad to 'remotely input country designations in which they are to be paged.'"  Slip Op. at 13, quoting '870 patent.  The '870 patent sought to cure the deficiencies of the prior art: "The ’870 Patent solved this problem by claiming a system which allows for paging of the receiving user (“RU”) in countries where the RU “may be located,” as per a list input by the RU." Id., quoting district court.  Claim 4, the primary claim addressed on appeal, recites  (claim terms at issue in the appeal are in bold):

4. A system for paging a receiving user in a country-selective paging system, comprising:

a paging system spanning a plurality of different countries of the world, the paging system including a plurality of servers, and wireless transmitters in different countries for transmitting paging messages to receiving users;

interconnecting servers so as to permit digital communication of signals between the plurality of servers via at least the packet-switched digital data network;

a first website or server located in a first country for allowing an originating user to page the receiving user who may be located in a second country different from the first country, the originating user not necessarily knowing what country the receiving user is located in;

wherein the paging system determines if the second country is currently designated by the receiving user as a designated country in which the paging system is to attempt to page the receiving user;

when the paging system determines that the second country has been designated by the receiving user, means for sending a paging communication via at least the packet-switched digital data network to a second website or server, the second website or server being in communication with a wireless transmitter located in the second country, and wherein the paging communication causes the second website or server to initiate paging the receiving user via the wireless transmitter in the second country; and

when the paging system determines that the second country has not been designated by the receiving user, the paging system initiates paging operations in another country in a predetermined order in an attempt to page the receiving user.

The over 100 companies companies that TPL sued roughly fell into three categories: (1) domestic carriers and handset companies, (2) software providers, and (3) foreign carriers.  Following claim construction, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement to the domestic carriers.  On appeal, TPL challenged the district court's claim construction and noninfringement rulings. 

Claim Construction: Much of the claim construction dispute revolved around the meaning of "receiving user."  The district court construed this term to mean a "person or party," while TPL contended that it means "the combination of the person and the handset."

Applying what has often been described as a holistic approach to claim construction, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's construction.  In other words, the court applied a flexible, relatively unstructured approach to construing the claim terms as opposed to a rigid rules-based approach.  In this particular case, that meant looking closely at the intrinsic evidence.  "The text of the patent makes clear that the term “receiving user” does not refer to a person-pager combination."  Slip Op. at 19. The court applied a similar approach to the two remaining claim terms.

Holistic Infringement Analysis: TPL also argued that, even if the CAFC affirmed the district court's claim constructions, it nevertheless erred in its grant of summary judgment of noninfringement.  On this point, too, the Federal Circuit affirmed.  While much of the CAFC's conclusion was based on the "receiving user" limitation, the court's overall approach bore many similarities to its holistic claim construction: the court made frequent reference back to the specification even as it assessed the question of infringement, rather than rigidly applying its claim construction. 

For example, in responding to TPL's argument that because the accused systems permitted users to select the carrier when traveling abroad, some of which contained country information (see below figure), the court pointed out that "The specification and the claims make clear that the invention is concerned with the country in which the receiving user is located, not with the receiving user’s carrier." Slip Op. at 29.  This carried through to the assessment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, as the court concluded that "the distinction betwen selecting a carrier and selecting a country is not insignificant in the context of the patent....That is a fundamental difference between the accused systems and the claimed invention that goes to the heart of the claimed invention."  Slip Op. at 34. 

 

Additional notes:

• This lawsuit was filed in 2007 - well before the September 16, 2011 enactment of the America Invents Act, which substantially altered the rules for joining multiple unrelated defendants within a single infringement lawsuit. 
• The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement to the software providers as well, in part on the ground that it concluded that certain claims required mutiple actors and TPL failed to show that the defendants have discretion or control over the end users.  The Federal Circuit concluded that it was unnecessary to consider the recent en banc decision in Akamai Technologies v. Limelight addressing divided infringement because the claimed software system could be "used" by a single actor even if the user did not have physical control over all elements of a system. Slip Op. at 36 (citing Centillion Data Sys. v. Qwest Communications, 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
• The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the foreign carriers.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit did not address the jurisdictional question, instead concluding that "Our ruling sustaining the district court’s decision in favor of the domestic carriers thus dooms TPL’s claim of infringement against the foreign carriers as well. For that reason, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the district court was correct in dismissing the case against the foreign carriers for lack of personal jurisdiction."  Slip Op. at 39.

UK Appellate Court Confirms Pan-European Win for Samsung on iPad Community Design Charges

By Dennis Crouch

Samsung Electronics v. Apple, [2012] EWCA Civ 1339

The English (and Wales) court of appeals has issued a new decision in the ongoing global intellectual property battle between smartphone competitors Apple and Samsung. This case focused on Apple's Community Design No. 000181607-0001 and affirms the trial court ruling by the High Court Judge Colin Birss that the three accused Samsung Galaxy models do not infringe. The court has also affirmed Judge Birss's equitable order forcing Apple to advertise its loss (in order to partially correct damage done to Samsung's reputation).

Apple's iPad registered community design being asserted here is the simple design shown below.

A registered European Community Design is roughly equivalent to a US Design Patent. However, the Europeans have done away with the examination process and replaced it with registration without considering whether the design is actually novel. Thus, while the European law requires that a registered community design be novel (a lower standard than nonobvious), that issue is not raised in the initial registration process. The US continues to examine design patents for novelty and nonobviousness. However, the USPTO's examination of design patent novelty can best be described as a farce. In a 2010 study, I found that the vast majority of design patent applications do not receive even a single rejection during the examination process and only 1.2% are the subject of an obviousness or novelty rejection. In that essay I identified our system as that of de facto registration. Because of the in-expense and ease of registration, Community Designs have been quite popular.

Up to now, the process of obtaining Community Designs has been largely separate from that of US design patent rights. This will change, however, if the US finalizes legislation implementing the Hague Agreement. Earlier this year the US Senate passed the "Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012" (S. 3486) that would implement the Hague Agreement (as well as the procedural Patent Law Treaty PLT). If there is no major objection, the House of Representatives is likely to pass its version of the Act in the lame duck session of Congress following the November presidential election.

The opinion in the present case is written by Lord Justice Robin Jacob who has retired from the bench but is regularly called back to hear intellectual property cases. As you will find with virtually all of Lord Justice Jacob's decisions, the case is well written, layered, and informative. Lord Justice David Kitchin (another IP focused jurist) joined the panel. In addition to the related design patent litigation in the U.S., this particular community design is being litigated in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.

Infringement of a community design is defined in Article 10 of the Community Design Regulation EC 6/2002 and asks whether the accused design "does not produce on the informed user a different overall impression" after taking into consideration "the degree of freedom of the designer in developing his design." Although worded somewhat differently, this standard is on track with U.S. design patent infringement law that considers whether an "ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art designs, would be deceived into believing that the accused product is the same as the patented design." In both situations, the "most important things [to be considered for infringement] are the registered design, the accused object and the prior art and the most important thing about each of these is what they look like."

Jacob, LJ, begins his opinion with a statement about copying—notably that copying is irrelevant to the infringement analysis:

3. Because this case (and parallel cases in other countries) has generated much publicity, it will avoid confusion to say what this case is about and not about. It is not about whether Samsung copied Apple's iPad. Infringement of a registered design does not involve any question of whether there was copying: the issue is simply whether the accused design is too close to the registered design according to the tests laid down in the law. Whether or not Apple could have sued in England and Wales for copying is utterly irrelevant to this case. If they could, they did not. Likewise there is no issue about infringement of any patent for an invention.

4. So this case is all about, and only about, Apple's registered design and the Samsung products. The registered design is not the same as the design of the iPad. It is quite a lot different. For instance the iPad is a lot thinner, and has noticeably different curves on its sides. There may be other differences – even though I own one, I have not made a detailed comparison. Whether the iPad would fall within the scope of protection of the registered design is completely irrelevant. We are not deciding that one way or the other. This case must be decided as if the iPad never existed.

The appellate opinion fully supported Judge Birss's initial determination that substantial differences led to a rejection of the infringement contention. In particular, when compared with the registered design, Samsung devices are thinner and have substantial surface ornamentation. Other features – such as a flat rectangular screen – the court found to so "banal" as to not contribute to the infringement analysis. The court found the rounded corners also unremarkable and of obvious function for a handheld device. Normally, an accused infringer cannot avoid infringement with use of its distinctive trademark on the product. In this case, however, the court found that Samsung's trademark name on its device helped to distinguish the device from the Apple registered design because of the label was additional ornamentation that contradicted Apple's approach of substantially lacking surface ornamentation.

Taking all this as a whole, Judge Birss could not see any infringement. In the appeal, Jacob, LJ, agreed noting that "Overall I cannot begin to see any material error by the Judge."

54.    I would add that even if I were forming my own view of the matter, I would have come to the same conclusion and for the same reasons. If the registered design has a scope as wide as Apple contends it would foreclose much of the market for tablet computers. Alterations in thickness, curvature of the sides, embellishment and so on would not escape its grasp. Legitimate competition by different designs would be stifled.

European-wide declaration of non-infringement affirmed. Now, in all likelihood Apple will take its appeal to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) who is the final arbiter of EU community design law.

Parallel Pan-European Preliminary Injunction by German Courts: Prior to Judge Birss's final decision, Apple applied ex parte for a preliminary injunction in a German court that was granted "without Samsung having an opportunity of being heard." In July 2012 (a few weeks after Judge Birss's decision) the German Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted a pan-European preliminary injunction (interim injunction) against the Galaxy 7.7. Under community design litigation rules, Judge Birss's decision takes precedent and lifts that preliminary injunction. In his opinion, Lord Justice Jacob was highly critical of the German courts for taking that approach while the case was pending before Judge Birss sitting as a community design judge.

56. Firstly I cannot understand on what basis the [German] Court thought it had jurisdiction to grant interim relief. I do not think it did [have jurisdiction] for several reasons.

At minimum, a national court associated where interim relief is sought loses jurisdiction as soon as the court seized of the substance of the case (according to community design law) issues its decision.

In addition to wrongly hearing the case, Jacob, LJ also argues that the German Court wrongly decided the case.

61. … I regret to say that I find the Oberlandesgericht's reasoning on the merits sparse in the extreme….

62. What the Oberlandesgericht did not do was to consider Judge Birss's decision in detail. It gave only meagre reasons for saying "The Court cannot concur with the interpretation of the High Court". I regret that. …

63. … If courts around Europe simply say they do not agree with each other and give inconsistent decisions, Europe will be the poorer.

There are probably three ways to see this conflict: (1) as a lack of effort on the German court's part (unlikely); (2) as a lack of respect for UK courts (more likely); or (3) as an indication that German's support stronger design rights than do the UK courts (most likely).

The decision also suggests that the German court should force Apple to compensate Samsung for the trouble it has caused with its approach to obtaining a preliminary injunction:

Whether or not Samsung has any claim in the German courts for all the losses it has suffered as a result of preliminary measures which proved to be unjustified is obviously not a matter for us. I hope it does. If the position were the other way round, that the unjustified preliminary measures had been granted by the English and Welsh courts, the "injured" party would have a remedy under the cross-undertaking in damages which the English court normally requires as a condition of granting a preliminary measure which is not ultimately vindicated in a main trial.

At paragraph 78.

Ghost Lines in Design Patents: Although minor in the context of this appeal, Lord Justice Jacob has an interesting comment on the dotted "ghost" lines that have become common in US design patent drafting. According to the MPEP, those lines are allowed as "Environmental structure" so long as "clearly designated as environment in the specification." MPEP § 1503. The Apple registration included a dotted line frame showing the boundary of the operational portion of its screen. Samsung unsuccessfully argued that dotted line should not be given any patentable weight based upon what Jacob, LJ calls "a complicated point based on the guidelines for examination."

21. There is one other point about how the informed user would assess the registered design, a point decided by the Judge adversely to Samsung. Views 0001.1 and 0001.3 show the front of the tablet. There is a rectangular dotted line shown. Apple submitted, and the Judge accepted, that the dotted line indicated a frame below a glass face – of the kind now familiar on all sorts of touch-screen devices. Samsung ran a complicated point based on the guidelines for examination. It submitted these would lead the informed user to conclude that the dotted lines were there to indicate that a feature was not protected: thus the fact that the Samsung device does have a "frame" is to be disregarded.

22. This is faintly absurd: a bit like the notice-board reading "Ignore this notice." For if there were no dotted rectangular line, the front face of the design as registered would be entirely plain. So it would then be for the informed user to form a judgment as to whether a tablet with a frame created a different overall impression. In short, on Samsung's contention if there were no dotted lines the position would the same as if they were there.

This development if applied broadly could actually become a major source of contention and difficulty in implementing the global design rights system suggested by the Hague Agreement.

As an aside on the ghost line point, I briefly reviewed the prosecution history file of the US design patent that serves as the priority filing for the community design in this case. See U.S. Design Patent D504,889. In my review, I did not find any applicant remarks indicating that the dotted line in the frame is merely an environmental structure or indicating that the dotted line should not be considered as an element of the design patent. Judge Koh considered this issue during the US litigation of the '889 patent and agreed in dicta that "A reasonable interpretation of the dotted lines in the D′889 patent … is that the dotted lines are intended to show the inset screen below the glass-like surface. At this point, without the aid of prosecution history, evidence regarding drafting principles, or argument from the parties, the Court considers the dotted lines to most likely indicate an inset screen and are likely part of the claimed design." Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 2011 WL 7036077 (N.D.Cal. December 02, 2011). For its decision, the court cited Bernardo Footwear, L.L.C. v. Fortune Dynamics, Inc., 2007 WL 4561476 (S.D.Tex. Dec.24, 2007). In that case the court held that broken lines in a design patent were part of the claimed design because the drafter had failed to explain the significance (or significance) of the broken lines.

Notes:

• David Musker has more on his Community Design blog: Class 99. As David notes, the decision includes a couple of important elements of substantive community design law including (1) the definition of an "informed user" and (2) how courts should define and consider functional features of the registered design.
• The good folks at Groklaw have written on Judge Koh's design patent claim construction from a different front -- arguing that the court inappriately ignored funcationality issues. See, Richard Redano, The Mysterious Disappearance of Functionality Considerations from the Apple v. Samsung Design Patent Claim Construction and Its Prejudicial Impact.
• Florian Mueller has more here.

Design Patent Damages: When is proof of copying required for profit disgorgement?

By Dennis Crouch

In this post, I question whether copying is a required element for profit disgorgement under the design patent remedy provision of 35 U.S.C. § 289.

An important element of design patent protection is the special damages provision found in 35 U.S.C. § 289. According to the statute, design patent owners have an optional remedy available of disgorging the "total profit" of an infringer. It was this profit disgorgement that likely drove the bulk of Apple's $1 billion award in the recent Apple v. Samsung jury decision. When the adjudged infringer is profitable, the disgorgement provision can lead to an enormous award.

Section 289 is titled "Additional remedy for infringement of design patent" and is written as follows:

Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.

Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or impeach any other remedy which an owner of an infringed patent has under the provisions of this title, but he shall not twice recover the profit made from the infringement.

In patent cases, copying is normally not an element of proving infringement. And, although proof of copying will be important in determining punitive damages, it is also not normally an element in determining the underlying damages. In the design patent cases, copying has not traditionally been seen as required in order to seek profit disgorgement. However, in my view, a plain reading of the old statute suggests that copying may in fact be required when the infringing product does not embody the identical design found in the patent. The key phrase repeated in the statute is "colorable imitation."

The "colorable imitation" language was included in the original 1887 legislation. By that time, however, the term was already in frequent use in trade-mark cases and implied copying.* The suggestion here is that, when the infringement falls under the "colorable imitation" prong, that a disgorgement damage award should only occur when a plaintiff offers some proof of copying. A more aggressive position (and probably less defendable position) could also argue that the statute always requires some proof of copying because "appl[ying] the patented design" implies that knowledge learned from the original is being used to create the new article of manufacture.

Assuming that the distinction for the copying requirement is between whether the infringer "applies the patented design" or "applies … any colorable imitation thereof," it will be important moving forward to understand how to differentiate between these two.

Notes:

• Professor Tom Cotter has an interesting take on the Apple v. Samsung damage award in a post titled Apple v. Samsung and awards of defendant's profits: the potential for overcompensatory damages in design patent infringement cases. See also Colin B. Harris & Andrew M. Ollis, Design Patent Damages, 2 No. 5 Landslide 57 (May/June 2010).
• The original design patent law review article was published in Volume 1 of the Yale Law Journal. See, Frederic H. Betts, Some Questions under the Design Patent Act of 1887, 1 Yale L.J. 181 (1892).
• * The hyphen has since been removed from trademark common usage.

IP in the US Presidential Debates

There was one reference to patents in this week's debate between President Obama and his challenger Governor Romney:

CROWLEY: iPad, the Macs, the iPhones, they are all manufactured in China. One of the major reasons is labor is so much cheaper here. How do you convince a great American company to bring that manufacturing back here?

ROMNEY: The answer is very straightforward. We can compete with anyone in the world as long as the playing field is level. China's been cheating over the years. One by holding down the value of their currency. Number two, by stealing our intellectual property; our designs, our patents, our technology. There's even an Apple store in China that's a counterfeit Apple store, selling counterfeit goods. They hack into our computers. We will have to have people play on a fair basis, that's number one.

Guest Post: New USPTO Proposed Ethics Rules, Part I

Guest Post by Professor Lisa Dolak.

On October 18, 2012, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued a Notice of proposed rulemaking relating to "Changes to Representation of Others Before The United States Patent and Trademark Office." The essence of the proposal is to replace the current ABA Model Code-based USPTO ethics rules with a version of the ABA Model Rules, versions of which have been adopted in 50 jurisdictions (49 states and the District of Columbia).

In the Notice, the USPTO indicates that its goal is to modernize its ethics rules and to harmonize them with those that already govern most of the registered and non-registered practitioners who represent others before the USPTO, "while addressing circumstances particular to practice before the office". The Notice references several sources that may provide useful interpretative guidance regarding the proposed rules, including existing USPTO-specific precedent, "the Comments and Annotations to the ABA Model Rules", and "opinions issued by State bars and disciplinary decisions based on similar professional conduct rules in the States." Significantly, however, the Notice expressly disclaims the imposition of significantly new standards on those who are subject to USPTO enrollment and discipline oversight, stating "any change is not a significant deviation from rules of professional conduct for practitioners that are already required by the Office."

For the most part, the USPTO seeks to conform its rules governing professional conduct to the ABA Model Rules, with certain specific language tailored to the specialized nature of practice before the USPTO. The Notice also highlights, however, the ways in which the USPTO's new rules would deviate from the ABA Model Rules. And it proposes revisions to certain provisions of the rules governing the conduct of disciplinary investigations, which rules were adopted in 2008.

The first thing to note is the proposed numbering scheme for the new USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, proposed USPTO Rule of Professional Conduct 11.107 corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.7. USPTO Rule 11.302 would parallel Model Rule 3.2, and USPTO Rule 11.804 – the proposed new USPTO rule relating to "misconduct" – corresponds to Model Rule 8.4. It appears, in fact, that the USPTO has endeavored to match up its proposed rules to the Model Rules by subsection, where appropriate. Thus, proposed "Sections 11.804(a) – (f) correspond to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) – (f), respectively."

Some examples of the many instances where the USPTO indicates an intent to conform with the corresponding ABA Model Rule include proposed sections:

• 11.107, relating to concurrent conflicts of interest (see ABA Model Rule 1.7);
• 11.109, relating to conflicts of interest and duties to former clients (see ABA Model Rule 1.9);
• 11.110, relating to the imputation of conflicts within law firms (see ABA Model Rule 1.10);
• 11.116, relating to a practitioner's obligations in declining or terminating client representations (see ABA Model Rule 1.16);
• 11.401, relating to a practitioner's obligation to be truthful when dealing with third parties on a client's behalf (see ABA Model Rule 4.1); and
• 11.501 and 11.502, relating to the responsibilities, respectively, of a supervisory practitioner and a subordinate practitioner (see ABA Model Rules 5.1 and 5.2).

In other respects, the proposed rules would be tailored to account for particularized aspects of USPTO practice. For example,

• with regard to proposed Section 11.105 relating to a practitioner's responsibilities regarding fees, the Notice states that "[n]othing in paragraph (c) should be construed to prohibit practitioners gaining proprietary interests in patents" in accordance with USPTO rules.

In addition, there are several proposed rules that are modified to reinforce or accommodate the duty of disclosure or the inequitable conduct doctrine. The proposed rule (Section 11.106) relating to confidentiality obligations "includes exceptions in the case of inequitable conduct before the Office in addition to crimes and frauds". A subsection of this rule would permit a practitioner to reveal information relating to a representation to the extent the practitioner reasonably believes necessary "[t]o prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from . . . inequitable conduct before the Office." Significantly, another subsection of Section 11.106 would expressly reinforce a practitioner's duty of disclosure, notwithstanding his or her confidentiality obligations ("A practitioner shall disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable duty of disclosure provisions.").

Similarly, proposed Section 11.303(e) provides: "In a proceeding before the Office, a practitioner shall disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable duty of disclosure provisions." According to the USPTO, "[t]he practitioner's responsibility to present the client's case with persuasive force is qualified by the practitioner's duty of candor to the tribunal. See Lipman v. Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363, 50 USPQ2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1999)."

Another manifestation of the USPTO's efforts to implement specialized patent-related policy is found in proposed Section 11.303(a)(2), which extends the practitioner's duty to disclose adverse controlling legal authority beyond inter partes situations to ex parte proceedings (where the authority is not otherwise disclosed). In the Notice of proposed rulemaking, the USPTO indicates that this rule is justified by the effect that USPTO decisions have on the public interest.

In other notable aspects of the Notice, the USPTO:

• notes that it has not incorporated into the proposed rules any of the recently(August 2012)-adopted changes to the Model Rules, "since the states have not adopted those changes at this time";
• reminds practitioners that "[f]ailure to comply with [state professional conduct] rules may lead to . . . possible reciprocal action against the practitioner by the USPTO"; and
• proposes to remove the practitioner maintenance fee currently set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 11. 8(b), because "the Office has suspended collection of those fees".

Finally, proposed section 11.1 would provide definitions of terms used in the proposed professional conduct rules, including "practitioner" (which would include registered attorneys and agents as well as persons authorized to represent persons before the USPTO in trademark and non-patent matters and persons given limited recognition in patent matters), "informed consent", "reasonable belief"/"reasonably believes", "screened", "writing", and "written". One of the more notable subsections would define "[f]raud" and "fraudulent", as follows:

Fraud or fraudulent means conduct that involves a misrepresentation of material fact made with intent to deceive or a state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of intent, where there is justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party deceived, inducing the party to act thereon, and where there is injury to the party deceived resulting from reliance on the misrepresentation. Fraud also may be established by a purposeful omission or failure to state a material fact, which omission or failure to state makes other statements misleading, and where the other elements of justifiable reliance and injury are established.

With regard to fraud and fraudulent behavior, the Notice expressly acknowledges the USPTO's decision not to adopt the corresponding ABA Model Rules definitions. "Instead, the Office believes a uniform definition based on common law should apply to all individuals subject to the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct." "Accordingly," the Notice states, the proposed rules adopt "the definition of common law fraud . . . discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." The proposed adoption of a specific definition of "fraud" is notable, given the USPTO's obligations under the AIA to report instances of detected "material fraud" in the context of supplemental examination to the Attorney General, and its decision not to include a definition of "material fraud" in the final rules governing supplemental examination.

Other aspects of the Notice, including key ways in which the proposed rules deviate from the Model Rules, and how the USPTO proposes to modify existing rules relating to disciplinary investigations, will be highlighted in subsequent posts.

Comments relating to the proposed rules are due 60 days after their publication in the Federal Register. Based on the anticipated publication of the proposed rules on Thursday, October 18, the deadline for comments will be Monday, December 17, 2012.

Apple v. Samsung: Adding Elements to Avoid Infringement

By Dennis Crouch

Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 4820601, App. No. 2012-1507 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (N.D.Ill. 12-CV-0630) (APPLE II)

This is my second post on the appellate decision that I term Apple II. [Read the First Apple II Post.] In Apple II, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated N.D. California District Court Judge Koh's preliminary injunction order that would have forced Samsung's Galaxy Nexus smartphone off the market pending conclusion of the infringement lawsuit. The appellate court provided two independent reasons for vacating the preliminary injunction order: (1) that Apple had failed to provide proof of irreparable harm due to Samsung's continued use of the particular invention covered by the patent; and (2) that a finding of infringement is unlikely based upon the claim construction as corrected by the Federal Circuit. This post focuses on the claim construction issue.

The patent at issue in this case is U.S. Patent No. 8,086,604. That patent issued in December 2011 but stems from upon an application originally filed in January 2000 and appears to be largely directed to aspects of Apple's Siri application (although the original invention is not tied to a mobile device). After construing claim 6 of the patent, the district court found that Samsung's product likely infringes. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has reversed that claim construction in a way that substantially narrows claim scope and thus negates any likelihood that Samsung infringes. Although the claim-at-issue uses open-ended "comprising" language, the appellate panel held that an apparatus that includes additional similar (but non-infringing) elements would not be covered by the patent.

Claim 6 is directed to an "apparatus for locating information in a network" comprising various software elements. The basic idea is that the system has a set of heuristic modules corresponding to different search areas. We all use heuristics for searching. For example, if you want to find prior art relating to a chemical compound, you might hire an expert chemistry searcher. On the other hand, if your search area is airplane seat design, you might hire someone else. Under the language of the patent, these search strategies could be defined as two different heuristic modules each corresponding to their respective search area. In the lawsuit itself, Apple identified the three heuristic modules as (1) a Google Search Module; (2) a Module that allows for Search of Internet Browsing History; and (3) a Search of a user's Contacts List. One difficulty with considering this case is that this invention appears in hindsight to be ridiculously obvious. However, obviousness is not the topic of the appeal.

The patent claim requires "a plurality of heuristic modules … wherein: each heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm corresponding to said respective area." Samsung's product allegedly uses a plurality of heuristic modules corresponding to different search areas. However, the accused product does not use "different, predetermined heuristic algorithm" for each and every different search area. I have modeled this below with a diagram of the Galaxy Nexus Search System associated with five different Search Areas (A,B,C,D,E) but only three different Heuristic Modules (X,Y,Z). Although some of the Heuristic Modules are re-used by the system, Apple argues that the system still infringes under standard patent law that would find the addition of non-infringing elements to an infringing core does not negate infringement. See CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (infringing device may include additional, unrecited elements).

Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Prost (joined by Judge Moore and Reyna) rejected Apple's argument and instead agreed with Samsung that the claim "requires that [each and] every heuristic module within the accused device use a unique heuristic algorithm."

[D]espite the use of "comprising," claim 6 is not amenable to the addition of other modules that do not use different heuristic algorithms because such addition would impermissibly wipe out the express limitation that requires every module to have a unique heuristic algorithm.

It appears from the court's remarks that a simple claim amendment might have saved Apple's case:

• Original: "a plurality of heuristic modules … wherein: each heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm …"
• Proposed: "a plurality of heuristic modules … wherein: each of the plurality of heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm …"

However, Apple might not have been able to obtain patent protection if it had clarified that the system might use the same heuristic algorithm for a variety of search areas. In particular, during prosecution Apple used the limitation in question to avoid prior art. The company argued "Andreoli does not describe … that each of the local and remote search operations employs a different heuristic algorithm." Although the appellate panel based its decision on what I see as odd linguistics, this prosecution history argument is probably the most damning evidence.

Apple has at least one continuation application pending and thus has the opportunity to further shape its claims in a way that captures the market while avoiding prior art. See U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2012-0166477. The USPTO is also in the early stages of conducting an inter partes reexamination that was filed in August 2012 by Motorola Mobility (Google). See Inter Partes Reexamination No. 95/000,685.

Conference: AIA Survival Guide

George Mason University is hosting the IEEE AIA Survival Guide workshop this Friday October 19, 2012 from 9:00 am – 5:00 pm. Great lineup of speakers, including USPTO Reform Coordinator Janet Gongola, Professor Adam Mossoff, David Boundy, and Rick Neifeld.

Inexpensive: $95 for the day, including CLE and Lunch. Live Webcast also available.

http://www.ieeeusa.org/IP-Pros/Workshops/Oct2012/default.asp

LegalZoom Query

Does anyone know how to identify a patent application prepared by legal zoom? I'm looking to do some quality analysis (not a punchline).

THOSITA: Obvious to a Team Having Ordinary Skill in the Art

By Dennis Crouch

Inventors Per Patent: The number of inventors per patent has risen fairly steadily for the past 40 years. Today, most patents are directed toward inventions created by teams of two or more inventors working in a collaborative environment. When done well, teamwork can add tremendous value to the creative process and can also provide a combined depth of knowledge beyond most individuals.

Individual PHOSITA: From its inception, the 1952 Patent Act allowed for joint inventors. However, the question of obviousness focuses on a single hypothetical individual: "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103. The AIA slightly amends this portion of Section 103 to clarify that the "said subject matter" is "the claimed invention." This is a change made throughout the statute and puts-to-rest ongoing arguments for identification of a "core" invention for each patent.

PHOSITA as a Team: In its most recent decision, the UK Royal Court of Justice appellate panel took a different path – finding that question of obviousness should be judged from the viewpoint of a "skilled team." MedImmune v. Novartis, [2012] EWCA Civ 1234 (Kitchen, LJ). For the case in question, the court found that the "patent is addressed to a team of scientists with differing backgrounds in areas such as immunology, in particular antibody structural biology, molecular biology and protein chemistry, but with a common interest in antibody engineering."

The skilled team construct is not entirely new to UK case law. See, for example, Schlumberger Holdings Ltd v Electromagnetic Geoservices AS, [2010] EWCA Civ 819 (Jacob LJ), and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Smith International (North Sea) Limited, [2006] EWCA Civ 1715 (Jacob LJ). The starting point for these UK courts is essentially identical to that of US courts. In particular, the UK Patents Act 1977 defines "inventive step" as being "not obvious to a person skilled in the art." The corresponding language is found in Article 56 of the European Patent Convention (defining inventive step with reference to being obvious to a person skilled in the art). In building the notional teams, the UK courts have been somewhat careful to avoid hindsight bias in the process. Dyson Appliances Ltd v Hoover Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1440. Despite the progress, it is clear to me that the UK courts are still working out what it means to be obvious to a team as opposed to obvious to an individual person.

What is added by a Team Analysis?: In 2011, I questioned whether obviousness analysis should reflect some nuances of teamwork:

As compared to a solo worker, teams often have an overall broader depth of knowledge, but are often plagued by communication difficulties. In the obviousness analysis, this shift could be reflected in a broader scope of potential prior art but a more rigorous analysis of whether the ordinary team would make leaps of analysis necessary to combine disparate prior art.

Despite providing arguments on both-sides, I suspect that a notional team would tend to make an obviousness conclusion more likely. The knowledge of those of skill in the art is considered in other areas of patent law such as claim construction, enablement, and definiteness.

THOSITA under US Law: One statutory question moving forward is whether a section 103 "person" can be interpreted to encompass a team of persons. The answer is almost certainly yes. Perhaps the greatest driving factor for this conclusion is found in Section 102 that begins with the statement that "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless…" For that statute, the term person certainly apply to teams of joint inventors.

One major problem with my starting point of increased-team-size is the reality that the obviousness question is not designed around a "skilled inventor" threshold but that of a skilled craftsman of "ordinary skill." This means that there is not really any statutory hook for pushing the obviousness analysis to track the culture of innovation and creative experimentation. Rather, the focus is merely on ordinary craftsmen and what would have been common sense at the time. By design, this creates a low inventiveness threshold intentionally does not consider the particular inventive path taken. "Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made." 35 U.C.C. 103 (post-AIA).

See:

• Dennis Crouch, Person(s) Skilled in the Art: Should the Now Established Model of Team-Based Inventing Impact the Obviousness Analysis?, Patently-O (2011)
• Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law's PHOSITA Standard, 23 Harvard JOLT 227 (2009)

Federal Circuit Rejects Galaxy Nexus Preliminary Injunction Finding No Irreparable Harm Despite a Market Shift in Samsung’s Favor.

By Dennis Crouch

Apple v. Samsung, --- F.3d ---, App. No. 2012-1507 (Fed.Cir. 2012) (N.D.Ill. 12-CV-0630) (APPLE II)

This case is important because it further reduces the chances that the owner of a component patent will obtain injunctive relief.

Patent litigation is fairly slow and often takes years for a case to proceed through trial and appeal. One shortcut to action is a motion for preliminary injunction. Such a motion asks a court to exert its equitable power to immediately stop the harm of ongoing infringement – even before ultimately concluding that the patent is valid, enforceable and infringed. Following an extension of eBay v. MercExchange, courts require a patentee to satisfy a four-factor test before granting injunctive relief.

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest."

Generally, these preliminary injunction factors can be thought of as being identical to the eBay permanent injunction factors with the addition of having to prove the likelihood of success on the merits. (In a permanent injunction scenario, the merits have already been decided.) An important aspect of preliminary injunctions in patent cases is that they are immediately appealable as a matter of right. This right of immediate appeal is different from almost every other district court decision except for the ultimate dismissal of the case.

In this case, Judge Koh issued a preliminary injunction ordering Samsung to stop sales of its Galaxy Nexus smartphone based upon the likelihood of its infringement of Apple's Patent No. 8,086,604. I should pause for a moment to note that this case is different from the parallel Apple v. Samsung case that resulted in a $1b jury verdict for Apple that is currently being challenged by Samsung. The patent in the case-at-hand is related to Google's Siri system that uses a set of heuristic modules for searching various types of information.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit has vacated Judge Koh's decision – finding that the district court "abused its discretion" in issuing the injunctive order favoring Apple. The court found two basic problems: (1) that Apple had failed to prove irreparable particularly linked to Samsung's use of this particular invention; (2) that the district court had construed the asserted claims too broadly with the result being that Apple probably cannot prove infringement. Either of these issues would be sufficient to reject the preliminary injunction.

In discussions of injunctive relief, this opinion will likely be termed Apple II in order to distinguish it from the federal circuit Apple v. Samsung decision issued earlier this year in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hereinafter Apple I). Both decisions build on the nexus analysis that links the patented invention to the alleged irreparable harm – "that a sufficiently strong causal nexus relates the alleged harm to the alleged infringement."

This nexus analysis for irreparable harm is parallel to that employed in other areas of patent law such as consideration of secondary factors of non-obviousness and in proving lost profits. This development obviously makes it much more difficult to obtain injunctive relief in the typical high-tech scenario where a retail product includes thousands of small innovations that each contribute incrementally to the ultimate value of a product.

In Apple I, the court described the law as follows:

To show irreparable harm, it is necessary to show that the infringement caused harm in the first place. Sales lost to an infringing product cannot irreparably harm a patentee if consumers buy that product for reasons other than the patented feature. If the patented feature does not drive the demand for the product, sales would be lost even if the offending feature were absent from the accused product. Thus, a likelihood of irreparable harm cannot be shown if sales would be lost regardless of the infringing conduct.

In Apple II the court continues:

In other words, it may very well be that the accused product would sell almost as well without incorporating the patented feature. And in that case, even if the competitive injury that results from selling the accused device is substantial, the harm that flows from the alleged infringement (the only harm that should count) is not. Thus, the causal nexus inquiry is indeed part of the irreparable harm calculus: it informs whether the patentee's allegations of irreparable harm are pertinent to the injunctive relief analysis, or whether the patentee seeks to leverage its patent for competitive gain beyond that which the inventive contribution and value of the patent warrant.

It only follows that the causal nexus analysis is not a true or false inquiry. The relevant question is not whether there is some causal relationship between the asserted injury and the infringing conduct, but to what extent the harm resulting from selling the accused product can be ascribed to the infringement. It is not enough for the patentee to establish some insubstantial connection between the alleged harm and the infringement and check the causal nexus requirement off the list. The patentee must rather show that the infringing feature drives consumer demand for the accused product. Only viewed through the prism of the causal nexus analysis will the irreparable harm allegations reflect a realistic sense of what the patentee has at stake.

Here, Apple proved that its Siri application (also covered by the patent) is popular and also that demand for the Galaxy Nexus had come at the expense of iPhone purchases. However, the court found that Apple failed to show that the customer demand for Galaxy Nexus was driven by its allegedly infringing feature. Without proving that link, the court could not find that the (alleged) infringement caused irreparable harm.

Apple I was decided by Judges Bryson and Prost with a partial dissent by Judge O'Malley (concurring on this issue). This case, Apple II was decided by Judges Prost, Moore, and Reyna acting unanimously.

Taken as a pair, Apple I and Apple II are important because they further reduce the chances that the owner of a component patent will obtain injunctive relief. Before eBay, irreparably harm was hardly a consideration. Since eBay, the irreparable harm factor has largely focused on whether the patentee has a product or potential product being harmed by ongoing infringement. Now, the question will move to the next level of granularity in a way that will be difficult for patentees to prove.

Software Patents: 50 Years of Circuitous Artifices

By Dennis Crouch

I recently asked the courts for a decision on whether software is patentable. In my short essay, I argued that we have a de facto system that allows the issuance of software patents, but only after the innovative software elements are "hidden by innuendo and obfuscation." This makes software patents "harder to find, harder to examine, harder to understand, and thus much more problematic than they need to be."

In response, I received a nice note from longtime patent attorney Michael Rackman of Gottlieb Rackman in NYC. Rackman highlighted his 50-year-old article on the topic published as a student note in the 1963 volume of New York University Law Review. It turns out that my suggestions are simply a refrain echoing his thoughts from so long ago. Rackman's 1963 article concluded:

It is theoretically and practically possible to secure effective patent protection for computer programs. The patents issuing as a result of first attempts probably will obscure, or already have obscured, the true nature of the claimed inventions.

Perhaps naïve at the time, Rackman was hopeful that the intentional obfuscation would end soon. He wrote:

Perhaps in the future it will be common practice to seek and secure program patent protection without resort to circuitous artifices.

I guess that future is still ahead of us.

Notes:

• Michael Rakman, Note, The Patentability of Computer Programs, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891 (1963).
• See also, Orin Kerr, Computers and the Patent System: The Problem of the Second Step, 28 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 47 (2002) ("After almost forty years of debate and case law development, we seem no closer to a consensus than when we started.").

Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior Art?

In many ways, prior art is the core of the US patent system. Patentability requires that any invention-to-be-patented be "new" as defined by 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, and 103. Prior art serves as the underlying evidence to prove that the invention is not new. As implied by its name, prior art has a temporal aspect in that the "prior art date" must come before (i.e., be prior-in-time to) the critical patentability date of the invention in question. Sometimes, the identical invention is found within a single prior art reference. In that case, the newness doctrine of "novelty" as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102 will do the invalidating work. However, more often than not, a prior art reference will only teach a portion of the purported invention. In that case, the prior art may still serve a useful roll when applying the obviousness doctrine defined by 35 U.S.C. § 103.

We've talked about two key features of prior art: (1) being earlier in time and (2) teaching some aspect of the invention being claimed. Those two elements are never sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of prior art. Rather, the law always requires one additional element to take this information from being merely prior private knowledge to being prior art. As part of the America Invents Act move to a first-to-file regime, this additional step will always involve (3) transferring knowledge.

One argument favoring a first-to-file regime is its focus on publicly available information rather than privately held knowledge. And, in most cases, the step of transferring of knowledge highlighted above is a public act. Thus, prior art may be created through publication, patenting, or public use. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (post-AIA). The AIA retains one form of temporally-secret prior art in that the prior filing of a patent application by "another inventor" will be deemed prior art as of its filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (post-AIA; formerly defined by § 102(e)). This is secret prior art because patent applications are typically kept secret by the USPTO for 18-months after they are filed. However, I term § 102(a)(2) prior-art-as-of-filing-date as only temporally (or temporarily) secret because such a reference cannot be used as prior art unless and until the prior-filed application is made public through either publication or patenting. Perhaps because of the unfairness of associated with its secrecy, most other countries besides the US only allow this type of prior art for novelty arguments and not for questioning obviousness (inventive step).

The AIA did eliminate several types of secret of prior art, including prior secret invention by another inventor under pre-AIA § 102(g) and prior knowledge transferred from another to the patent applicant under pre-AIA § 102(f). The individualized secrecy of these prior art references created two main problems: (1) that patentability could not be fully evaluated with going through the arduous process of obtaining additional information from interested parties and (2) that the secrecy gave interested parties more of an opportunity to fraudulently create (or destroy) documents after-the-fact. Making patentability based upon publicly available information can hypothetically lead to some unjust outcomes, but it has the enormous benefit of providing clear(er) notice to anyone who cares to look.

Two important secret prior art questions remain -- namely whether either (1) secret commercial uses (by the patentee) or (2) secret on-sale activity (by anyone) create prior art that can invalidate a patent on novelty grounds and contribute to invalidation on obviousness grounds. The Patent Act never expressly authorized the first type of prior art and has arguably now rejected the second. Advocates for a transparent prior art system argue that the AIA should be interpreted as eliminating both.

Secret Sales: One type of prior art that is traditionally thought of as potentially secret is created by what is known as the on-sale bar. An invention that is on sale before the critical patenting date will result in prior art that renders any patent invalid. There are a few ways that a sale or offer-to-sell could be secret: for example, (1) it might be an offer between two individuals that is subject to a (formal or informal) confidentiality agreement or (2) it might be an offer that does not fully disclose the scope of the invention.

The AIA retains the identical language of its predecessor statute regarding on sale activity that occurs prior to the defined critical date. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (post-AIA) with 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (pre-AIA). Although the "on sale" term itself is identical, the context of the new statute is arguably different. In particular, the new statute has added a catchall phrase "otherwise available to the public" that suggests that the on-sale activity must also be available to the public. The new statute reads as follows:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -- 1. the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or …

The open question is whether the language here creates a legally cognizable implication that the "on sale" activity must be available to the public as well.

Secret Commercialization by the Patentee: In his 1946 decision in Metallizing Engineering, Judge Learned Hand explained that a patentee's commercial use of its process (even if done secretly behind factory walls) counted as a "public use" sufficient to invalidate the later-filed patent application. The court wrote "That it is a condition upon an inventor's right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or [a patent]." Under the rule, secret commercial uses of an invention by a third party does not count as a public use. This distinction is found nowhere in the patent statute, but has been judicially recognized for many years. While the new statute retains the "public use" language, many suggest that a strong congressional intent that the new statute eliminate the Metallizing rule.

USPTO Proposed Interpretation: In a set of proposed examination guidelines, the USPTO indicated its interpretations that the statute has altered these provisions in favor limiting the application of secret prior art. In particular, the USPTO's position is that, while the statute is not entirely clear on these points, the legislative history indicates that that prefiling secret sales and commercial uses do not qualify as prior art under the revised Section 102. The PTO writes: "The legislative history of the AIA indicates that the inclusion of this clause in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) should be viewed as indicating that AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) does not cover non-public uses or nonpublic offers for sale.

For the most part, patent attorneys appear to agree with the USPTO's proposals. The American Bar Association's IP Law Section writes:

ABA IPL respectfully submits that the passage "otherwise available to the public" reflects the touchstone of what constitutes prior art under the AIA under section 102(a)(1). This section requires availability to the public or public accessibility is an overarching requirement. Such accessibility is critical to provide a simpler, more predictable and fully transparent patent system. As such, for a "public use," for a determination that an invention is "on sale," as well as to assess whether an offer for sale has been made, the statutory requirements under the AIA require a public disclosure. Thus, non-public offers for sale (and non-public uses) would not qualify as prior art under the AIA.

The AIPLA agrees, writing:

AIPLA believes that an offer for sale needs to be public to qualify as "on sale" prior art under §102(a)(1). . . . AIA §102(a)(1), unlike pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §102(b), contains the residual clause "or otherwise available to the public." This is a major policy change achieved by the new legislation, which would further the goal of increasing objectivity in the identification of prior art. . . .

[T]he legislative history of the AIA indicates that the inclusion of this clause in §102(a)(1) should be viewed as indicating that §102(a)(1) does not cover non-public uses or non-public offers for sale. AIPLA believes that such an interpretation reflects the clear intent of Congress. It is also consistent with the broad goal of global harmonization under a first-inventor-to-file system.

The IPO agrees as well – arguing in its comments to the USPTO that the AIA "overrules Metallizing Engineering by excluding 'secret' commercial activity from the 'on sale' provision" and that the only on sale activity relevant to patentability under the AIA is when an invention is "publicly on sale." LES is also on board with this interpretation.

Several individuals disagreed, including Lawrence Pope who wrote:

Certainly, any change in patent law which abandoned a long established policy and allowed inventors to engage in secret commercial exploitation of their inventions for as long as they liked without forfeiting their right to obtain valid patent protection on the same, would require quite explicit statutory language. In addition, it would be expected that any such major change would be reflected in a more extensive legislative history than the mere comments of two members. One would at least expect to see it reflected in the Committee Report reporting on the legislation to the House of Representatives.

Mark Lemley also argued that the PTO's interpretation is quite problematic:

[T}he proposed Guidelines take the position that the AIA has reversed an unbroken line of precedent of both the Federal Circuit and the regional circuits tracing back to Judge Learned Hand's decision in the Metallizing case. Those cases hold -- for impeccable policy reasons -- that the term "public use" in old section 102(b) should be interpreted to prevent an applicant from making a secret commercial use for more than a year while delaying the filing of a patent application. A contrary conclusion, as the PTO now proposes, will enable inventors to keep their process inventions secret for years or even decades, and then surface and file a patent application. That is directly contrary to the goals of first-inventor-to-file in the AIA, which encourage early filing of patent applications.

Concluding that Metallizing and the cases that follow it were abrogated will have another, even more pernicious effect. Metallizing, Gore v. Garlock, and other cases interpret the term "public use" in the old statute. One might reasonably conclude that those cases stretch the meaning of that term, but what the courts said they were doing was interpreting "public use." The term "public use" appears unchanged in new section 102 under the AIA. For the PTO to conclude that the new law opens the door to reinterpretation of the settled meaning of terms present in both the old and new statutes opens a dangerous door. Parties and courts might be expected to try to revisit the meaning of "on sale," "patented," "printed publication," and many other settled statutory provisions, creating enormous uncertainty. To take just one example, the inherency doctrine, like the Metallizing rule, is not articulated expressly in either the old or new statute. If the reenactment of the term "public use" opens the door to revisiting Metallizing, it also opens the door to revisiting inherency, the "ready for patenting" rule in on sale bar, and a host of other settled cases. The PTO, patent applicants, and litigants would be much better served by leaving existing precedent interpreting unchanged statutory terms in place.

Read more comments here: http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/. (Note, the equally major issue is the USPTO's interpretation of the disclosure grace period that is also part of the commentary).

What's the Big Deal?: The USPTO does not have substantive authority to shape the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 102. In the end, this issue will be resolved by the courts or else clarified by Congress in a technical amendment. In many ways, the arguments above are simply a preview for a Federal Circuit and Supreme Court ruling on the issue. One problem with the USPTO's narrow view of the prior art is that it delays the eventual resolution of this issue since it gives patent applicants nothing to challenge. In any event, this is a debate that will continue for at least the next decade and likely beyond.

Making Software Patents Transparent and Understandable: Begin by Determining Whether Software is Patentable

By Dennis Crouch

One major problem with software patents is their forced lack of transparency. The USPTO has granted hundreds of thousands of patents that should rightfully be termed "software patents," but almost none of those patents include a claim directed to "software." Rather, the innovative software is being hidden by innuendo and obfuscation because of the perceived ban on patenting software per se.

I contend that if we are going to allow software patents, we should do so openly and honestly. In that world, patent claims would be able to match the words of the computer scientist inventors and might simply be written as "Software comprising …" or "A computer program comprising …" We are not in that world.

In the 1960's the USPTO began pushing against the patenting of bare computer software. Its 1968 guidelines formalized the USPTO's position against computer programs as unpatentable mental steps under 35 U.S.C. § 101. That approach was largely vindicated by the Supreme Court cases of Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) and Parker v. Flook (1978). However, the combination of Diamond v. Diehr (1981); new leadership at the USPTO; and the formation of the Federal Circuit all rejuvenated the patenting of computer software. Many still hold to the idea that software per se cannot be patented because the software is not a machine or apparatus and because the software only becomes a non-abstract patentable process once implemented on a particular device. In Bilski v. Kappos (2010), the court rejected categorical exclusions of business method patents (and thus presumably software patents). At the same time, however Bilski and the subsequent case of Mayo v. Prometheus (2012) serve to revive the pre-Federal-Circuit case law and create further direct tension with software patents.

The result from this long history is that we still have software patents but they are hidden under the surface. They are harder to find, harder to examine, harder to understand, and thus much more problematic than they need to be. After fifty years of controversy; meandering administrative practice; and inconsistent Supreme Court decision making, it is time for the courts to take a stand and deliver the law in a way that is clear and precise. Finally answer the question: Is software patentable?

Federal Circuit To Announce Whether Software is Patentable?: En Banc Rehearing on Section 101 Issues

By Dennis Crouch

CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp, App. No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc order)

The Federal Circuit has refocused its attention on the question of patentable subject matter and has ordered an en banc rehearing of CLS Bank Int'l. v. Alice Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2012). In its initial panel opinion, the Federal Circuit held that, when considered as a whole, the claimed data processing invention was patent eligible. Judge Linn wrote the majority opinion suggesting that a court should only reach Section 101 issues when subject matter ineligibility is "manifestly evident". Judge Prost wrote in dissent and argued that the majority improperly ignored the Supreme Court's most recent statements on the topic found in Prometheus. The patentable subject matter question in CLS Bank is virtually indistinguishable from the parallel issue in Bancorp v. Sun Life. In that case, however, the Federal Circuit ruled the invention ineligible.

In its en banc order, the court reformulated the questions presented as follows:

a. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible "abstract idea"; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?

b. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?

The Federal Circuit has asked for the USPTO to file a brief as amicus curiae. Further amicus briefs may be filed without consent of the parties or leave of the court but must otherwise follow Federal Circuit's Rule 29.

More Reading:

• CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Patenting Software Ideas
• CLS Bank v. Alice: The "Nothing More Than" Limitation on Abstract Ideas
• Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?
• Ongoing Battles over Patentable Subject Matter
• Director Kappos: Some Thoughts on Patentability
• If the software method is not patentable, then neither is the "computer readable medium"
• Ultramercial v. Hulu: Computer Programs and Patentable Subject Matter

The Removal of Section 102(f)’s Inventorship Requirement; the Narrowness of Derivation Proceedings; and the Rise of 101’s Invention Requirement

By Dennis Crouch (October 5, 2012)

In a prior Patently-O essay, I wrote that the removal of the inventorship requirement of Section 102(f) opens the door to patenting obvious variants of inventions created by someone else. In that essay, I mentioned the newly designed derivation proceedings, but opined that they would not be much use in this situation. I wrote that "it appears to me that those actions (even if timely filed by the originator) would be unsuccessful because derivation proceedings are limited to cases where the derived claims are "substantially the same" as the originator's innovation. The substantially the same limitation is much narrower in scope as compared with the potential wide variety of obvious variants." 102(f) Essay.

I received a response to that essay from Professor Sarnoff who reports that he and Chico Gholz have a soon-to-be-published article in IP Today addressing the PTO's new rules for triggering derivation proceedings. The punch line of their article is that the legal scope of derivation proceeding is even narrower than I suggested—thus allowing for a third party to patent quite minor variations of ideas obtained from someone else. (I encourage you to read the article once it is published.)

The America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) entirely rewrote the section 135 of the patent act. That provision previously detailed the interference process and now focuses exclusively on derivation proceedings as they will apply to patent applications filed on or after March 16, 2013. New section 135(a) limits derivation proceedings to instances where an alleged wrongdoer files an earlier patent application "claiming" the original inventor's (but late filer's) "claimed invention." In their article, Gholz and Sarnoff correctly argue that there is not much room for variation here. Under the statute, the derived invention (as claimed) must be for the same subject matter as the original invention (as claimed), even if their language differs. This further confirms what I see as the problematic naming of "derivation proceedings." In my mind, the meaning of the word derivation suggests some amount of modification. While a derivation depends upon having an original source, the final results are ordinarily a modification of that source. With Gholz-Sarnoff, we learn that this ordinary meaning does not fit to the Derivation Proceedings as defined by the AIA. A better term for the AIA defined action might be "False Inventorship Claim Proceeding."

Gholz and Sarnoff recognize that the PTO took a different view when it codified the rules at 37 C.F.R. §42.405(a)(2). That provision broadly authorizes derivation proceedings when the petitioner's claims are "substantially the same" as the alleged deriver's claims, with "substantially the same" defined in 37 CFR 42.401 as "patentably indistinct." Gholz and Sarnoff argue that the PTO is wrong in this interpretation and that the Federal Circuit will eventually overrule the PTO's misapplication of the law.

Further, as noted by Sarnoff in his Patently-O article and as reiterated in the new Gholz-Sarnoff article in response to the views of Armitage, the original inventor may not have conceived of the obvious variant and thus may not be able to provide the required oath in regard to the obvious-variant claim so as to trigger the derivation proceeding.

In our prior e-mail communications (repeated here with permission), Sarnoff has also explored other ways to block patenting of the obvious variants. He writes:

1. A person who conceives of an obvious variant is normally treated as an inventor of an invention (just of an obvious one), so lack of inventorship under Section 101 may not be a successful approach to invalidating the claim made by the deriver, although the deriver will likely be entitled at least to joint-inventor status; and
2. Current inventorship law may not necessarily treat the originator of the underlying invention as a joint-inventor of the obvious variant of which the originator did not conceive, even if the originator added a significant contribution to conception by the deriver, and thus it may not always be possible to correct inventorship to permit the originator to obtain joint inventor status and joint ownership of the obvious variant.
3. However, the courts have sometimes extended unpatentability to obvious variants even when the statute does not clearly provide for it, as they did in In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (extending Section 102(b) to claims that were obvious in light of statutory bar art). [Note, this explains Professor Sarnoff's prior equivocation that I discussed here. DC.]

The bottom line here that I began with my recent essay and continue with this additional discussion revealed by Gholz and Sarnoff is that the elimination of section 102(f) and the narrow scope of derivation proceedings have created a potential problem by offering a roadmap for bad behavior. The law now apparently sanctions the patenting of minor variations of innovations created by someone else. This raises several levels of concern. Most directly, we are concerned about (1) how the obvious variant patent negatively impacts the idea originator and (2) how the obvious patent burdens the public who must either license or avoid infringement.

The current law basically places the burden on the idea originator to protect his or her rights by (1) keeping the idea secret and then relying on contract and trade secret law to protect that secrecy; (2) quickly filing for patent rights; or (3) quickly going public with the idea in a way that creates prior art. Any of these overlapping choices can be sufficient to block or invalidate an obvious variant patent. I am also not overly concerned that this approach unduly shifts a burden to the idea originator. My problem with that approach – as suggested by Anon – is that the idea originator might not be proactive enough to take the actions necessary to protect the public's interest in not being burdened by patents covering obvious innovations.

New Pressure on Section 101: This whole scenario then puts tremendous pressure on courts (including the Supreme Court) to expand the powerful (but ungainly) tool of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and use that fundamental statute to block these derived variant patents that are not otherwise prohibited by statute. The Supreme Court is unlikely to stand for the patenting of obvious variants of ideas derived from another. And, the most straightforward way for the court to act is with the return of something akin to the invention requirement that was thought to have been eliminated by the 1952 Patent Act. That action would likely add steel to the link between newness and subject matter eligibility in a way that many of us see as problematic. (Perhaps under the framework of "inventive contribution.") The better approach is a statutory change that shifts rights with fewer ripple effects.

Sarnoff's perspective is that Section 101 should have an active and engaged role in the patent eligibility doctrine. In his recent article on the post-1952 invention requirement, Sarnoff writes (with apologies to Dr. Strangelove): "[T]o those who believe in using private property to motivate creative advance, using eligibility determinations to restrict access to the patent system is the bomb that threatens our future viability. For the reasons discussed [in the article], I believe we need to learn to stop worrying and to love that bomb." Joshua Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63 Hasting Law Journal 53 (2011).

Notes:

• In addition to raising this interesting topic, I should (and do) also thank Gholz and Sarnoff for their editorial suggestions on this essay.

Supreme Court Questions Whether Patent Law Malpractice Claims “Arise Under” the US Patent Laws (And Thus Are Amenable to Federal Jurisdiction).

By Dennis Crouch

Gunn v. Minton (Supreme Court 2012)

Over the past few years we have seen an ongoing subject matter jurisdictional battle between state courts, regional federal circuit courts of appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The issue as raised in various context is when a complaint stating a non-patent cause of action should be considered to "arise under" the patent laws so as to ensure that the case is heard by a federal district court and subsequently by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. These non-patent / patent cases can arise in a variety of disputes, including disputes over legal malpractice, contracts and licenses, employment disputes, bankruptcy, challenges to arbitrations, and antitrust disputes.

The issue in the present case is whether state courts in Texas properly have jurisdiction over legal malpractice claims against patent attorneys (or patent litigators). Legal malpractice is generally a state law tort claim, but the Federal Courts have jurisdiction over claims arising under the patent laws. Although there is Federal Circuit precedent on point, this case actually arises from a Texas state court dismissal of Mr. Minton's malpractice claim based upon the state court's interpretation of federal law.

Now, the Supreme Court has agreed offer its final view on the question of when the Federal Courts (and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) have jurisdiction here. Although nominally a patent case, the case could have much broader impact because it will essentially be interpreting the generic constitutional and statutory limitation of "arising under" jurisdiction.

Background on the Dispute: The case started several years ago when Mr. Vernon Minton developed a set of software that he leased to the Texas Int'l Stock Exchange (TISE). That lease to TISE occurred more than one year before he filed a provisional patent application on the invention embodied by the product. The USPTO granted Minton U.S. Patent No. 6,014,643. However, in a later lawsuit against NASDAQ, the patent was invalidated via the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and that invalidity finding was upheld by the Federal Circuit on appeal. Minton v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In that decision, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the lease to TISE constituted a "sale" for 102(b). In a post-judgment motion, Minton asked the district court to consider whether the use by TISE was an experimental use. However, the district court refused to consider that issue because of its untimely introduction.

The present lawsuit arose when Minton sued his patent litigation counsel (who have now joined the Fulbright & Jaworski firm). The crux of the malpractice claim is that the litigation counsel failed to timely plead the experimental use question. Minton filed the lawsuit in Texas state court and lost on a pretrial motion based upon the trial court's judgment that Minton had failed to present "a scintilla of proof . . . to support his claims." That no-damages judgment was affirmed by the Texas court of appeals. However, the Supreme Court of Texas took an orthogonal view and held that Texas courts actually lacked subject matter jurisdiction over case. In particular, the Texas Supreme Court held that Minton's malpractice claim required resolution of a substantial question of patent law and therefore fell within the exclusive "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts and, eventually, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This ruling gives Minton another shot at winning the case - this time in federal district court. The Texas court wrote:

This case arises out of patent infringement litigation. We consider whether federal courts possess exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that require the application of federal patent law. The federal patent issue presented here is necessary, disputed, and substantial within the context of the overlying state legal malpractice lawsuit. Additionally, the patent issue may be determined without creating a jurisdictional imbalance between state and federal courts. We conclude that exclusive federal jurisdiction exists in this case. Accordingly, without reaching the merits of the legal malpractice claim, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss this case.

The 5-3 Texas Supreme Court decision follows the lead set by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Immunocept, L.L.C. v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In those cases the Federal Circuit gave a broad interpretation to arising under jurisdiction based upon the court's congressionally mandated goal of national uniformity in the patent system. Both the Akin Gump and the Fulbright Jaworski cases were decided on the same day by the same panel and both penned by then Chief Judge Paul Michel. (Judges Lourie and Rader joined). Although the Texas court did not treat the Federal Circuit decisions as binding precedent, the Court chose to adopt the logic of those decisions. The dissent argued that the State of Texas has a strong interest in (and a regulatory scheme in place for) ensuring that Texas attorneys maintain a high level of quality and that federalism concerns suggest that many of these cases should be adjudged at the state court level. In a non-patent case, the Supreme Court approved of this more nuanced analysis of arising under jurisdiction in the case of Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). In 2012, the Federal Circuit has decided at least three other jurisdictional disputes over attorney malpractice. In each case, Judge O'Malley argued against federal circuit jurisdiction based upon her reading of Grable. See Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP (Fed. Cir. 2012)(O'Malley, J., concurring); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP (Fed. Cir. 2012)(O'Malley, J., joined by Wallach, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for en banc rehearing); and USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2012)(O'Malley, J., joined by Mayer, J., concurring).

Question Presented: The attorneys challenging federal jurisdiction raised the following questions:

Did the Federal Circuit depart from the standard this Court articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), for "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, when it held that state law legal malpractice claims against trial lawyers for their handling of underlying patent matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts? Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving patents, are state courts and federal courts strictly following the Federal Circuit's mistaken standard, thereby magnifying its jurisdictional error and sweeping broad swaths of state law claims - which involve no actual patents and have no impact on actual patent rights - into the federal courts?

In his responsive brief, Minton reframed the question as follows:

Minton filed a legal malpractice claim against the Attorneys arising from a patent infringement lawsuit. Do federal courts have exclusive "arising under" jurisdiction where the sole substantive issue is the application of a patent law doctrine which is an essential element of Minton's malpractice claim?

Underlying Law: As suggested by both questions presented, the underlying law on federal court jurisdiction over patent cases begins with the federal statute – 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). There are two key phrases here. First, federal jurisdiction only exists when the civil action is considered to be "arising under [an] Act of Congress relating to patents." Second, if federal circuit exists then it is exclusive of state jurisdiction.

Not a Constitutional Question: The statutory "arising under" language is intended to reflect the parallel language found in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution that limits federal judicial power to cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority…" However, the two sources have been interpreted somewhat differently. The constitutional "arising under" limits have been broadly interpreted to allow courts to hear cases even when the federal claim is only raised in a defense or counterclaim. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). On the other hand, the "arising under" language in sections 1338 and 1331 have been more narrowly interpreted under the well pleaded complaint rule. In his 2004 article on Holmes Group, Professor Cotropia writes:

The phrase "arising under" originated from Article III of the Constitution, defining the jurisdiction of the federal court system. The Supreme Court interpreted this phrase, as it appears in Article III, to extend the constitutional grant of federal judiciary power to every case where federal law potentially forms an ingredient of a claim. Article III allowed "[t]he mere existence of a latent federal 'ingredient' that might in theory be dispositive of the outcome of a case . . . to bring the entire case, including ancillary nonfederal issues, within the jurisdiction of the federal courts." An implementing statute is needed, however, for lower federal courts to exercise the powers conferred by Article III. With such an implementing statute, lower federal courts could enjoy some or all of the constitutional "arising under" grant of jurisdiction.

Christopher Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Jurisdiction, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (Fall 2004); See also Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597 (1987).Because the Constitutional limitation has been so broadly interpreted, all of the practical discussion is focused on the meaning of "arising under" as it is found in the statutory context.

In Grable (following a long line of precedent), the Supreme Court confirmed that – under the statute – a case may "arise under" federal law even when the cause of action is purely a non-federal state-law claim. However, when the cause of action is not based on a federal claim, Grable requires (1) a substantial underlying contested federal issue and (2) that federal jurisdiction over the case "be consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts." Grable interpreted the "arising under" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 rather than the patent jurisdictional statute of section 1338. However, in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized that those two statutes should be interpreted in parallel.

Is Patent Law Different?: Although I wrote above that the case has non-patent implications, patent law presents some particulars that might not exist in other areas of law. These involve the particular exclusive jurisdictional statute for patent law. Thus, although state courts have jurisdiction to also decide most federal claims, they cannot decide patent claims. In addition, Congress has spoken regarding its desire for uniformity in the application of the patent laws. These stated federal interests could be sufficient to explain a difference between federal jurisdiction over patent law malpractice claims and not over say trademark law malpractice claims. The malpractice is a relatively minor question compared with jurisdiction over contract claims that involve patent rights (such as a patent license or sale). It would be a big deal if the Supreme Court opened the door to greater federal jurisdiction over these claims. As I explain in the next paragraph, I think it is unlikely that this case would be a vehicle for expanding federal jurisdiction and instead will more likely be a vehicle for contracting federal jurisdiction – at least when compared with the holdings in Akin Gump and Fulbright jurisdictional decisions discussed above.

Grable is the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on this issue and that case the court tempered federal arising under jurisdiction by requiring courts to be mindful of the appropriate balance of power between state and federal courts. Despite Grable, both the Federal Circuit and now the Texas Supreme Court have continued to maintain broad jurisdictional reach over these malpractice cases. In these cases, the minority dissenting viewpoint has argued for less expansive jurisdiction. In this setup, the Supreme Court is more likely to resolve the conflict between these ranges than it is to identify a result to the extreme. In addition, in the years since Grable, there has been a continued focus and recognition of legitimizing State's rights. This notion of the importance of State's rights places an additional thumb the scale of reduced federal jurisdiction over these types of cases.

AIA Expands Arising Under Jurisdiction: Although not applicable for this case, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) has altered federal court jurisdiction in a way that overrules the Supreme Court decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted the applied the well pleaded complaint rule to the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C. § 1295) in holding that patent issues raised only in counterclaims do not "arise under" the patent law in a way that creates Federal Circuit jurisdiction. The AIA amends the statute to clarify that Federal Circuit jurisdiction includes cases where the patent issue is first raised in a compulsory counterclaim. In addition, the new law indicates that "No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents" and also provides a right of removal from state court if either party raises a claim for relief "arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents."

Self Replicating (and Alive) Inventions: Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Monsanto v. Bowman

By Dennis Crouch

Mr. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., Docket No. 11-796 (Supreme Court 2012)

Beginning its 2013 term with a bang, the Supreme Court has granted Vernon Bowman's petition for a writ of certiorari in the Indiana farmer's longstanding battle against Monsanto Co. The patents at issue cover Monsanto's genetically modified seed technology that protects broadleaf plants such as soybeans from being damaged by the application of the popular broadleaf herbicide glyphosate (another Monsanto invention known as RoundUp).

After losing at the Federal Circuit, Bowman presented the following questions to the Supreme Court:

Patent exhaustion delimits rights of patent holders by eliminating the right to control or prohibit use of the invention after an authorized sale. In this case, the Federal Circuit refused to find exhaustion where a farmer used seeds purchased in an authorized sale for their natural and foreseeable purpose - namely, for planting. The question presented is:

Whether the Federal Circuit erred by (1) refusing to find patent exhaustion in patented seeds even after an authorized sale and by (2) creating an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion for self-replicating technologies?

In its brief-in-opposition, Monsanto reformulated the question as follows:

Whether the Federal Circuit correctly ruled that Monsanto's patent rights in biotechnology related to genetically modified plants (here, patented technologies that make soybeans resistant to glyphosate-based herbicides) are independently applicable to each generation of soybeans embodying the invention, such that a grower who, without authorization from Monsanto, creates a new generation of genetically modified soybeans infringes Monsanto's patents.

When asked for commentary on the case, the Solicitor General advised the Supreme Court to deny certiorari. In doing so, however, the Solicitor was harshly critical of the Federal Circuit's precedent on exhaustion – stating flatly that the Federal Circuit's "conditional sale" doctrine is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.

The Revival of Parker v. Flook

The Supreme Court's much maligned 1978 decision in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) is seeing something of a revival following the Federal Circuit's substantial rejection of the case under Judge Rich. The chart above shows the citation count for the case over the past 30 years. Part of the revival is based upon revived interest in the subject matter eligibility doctrine in general. However, the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos (2010) and Mayo v. Prometheus (2012) both treat the case favorably. The most controversial aspect of the Flook decision is its language regarding the "inventive concept" rather than merely focusing attention on a patent claim "as a whole." In that case, the court wrote:

Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.

In analyzing merits briefs filed at the Federal Circuit, I found that the case was cited in 13 briefs from 1996-2006. In the past six years (2007-2012) the case has been cited by more than 130 briefs.

With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information.

By Dennis Crouch

Before the America Invents Act (AIA), the Patent Act included a specific prohibition on patenting something the purported inventor did not actually invent. According to the statute, "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... 102(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented." 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (pre-AIA). When that provision was eliminated, Congress was assured by various parties that the inventorship requirement was sufficiently protected by the U.S. Constitutional reference to "inventors" and by the "[w]hoever invents or discovers" preamble of 35 U.S.C. § 101. This position is exemplified by Joseph Matal in his recent article on the creation of the AIA.

Some may think that, because § 102(f) has been repealed, there is no longer any legal requirement that a patent for an invention be obtained by the inventor. Not so. Both the Constitution and § 101 still specify that a patent may only be obtained by the person who engages in the act of inventing. Indeed, even commentary on the 1952 Patent Act noted, with respect to § 102(f), that "[t]his paragraph is perhaps unnecessary since under § 101 it is 'Whoever invents ...' who may obtain a patent and later sections provide that the inventor must apply for the patent and execute an oath of inventorship."

Joseph D. Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2012).

To be clear, even under this duplicative construct we should recognize that Section 102(f) does have the important effect of eliminating 102(f)/103 prior art defined by the 1997 OddzOn Prods decision. The 102(f)/103 scenario is probably best termed a "derived knowledge" situation that occurs when an applicant learns of an invention created by someone else and then comes-up with an obvious variant of that invention. Under pre-AIA law, the resulting patent would properly be invalidated on 102(f)/103 obviousness grounds even if the prior-invention had never been made public or the subject of a sale. By removing 102(f), the AIA also removes the prospect of 102(f)/103 prior art. In his AIA article, Robert Armitage writes "subsection [102(f)] had become, as far as the courts were concerned, a prior art provision for assessing obviousness." Understanding the America Invents Act its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2012). Armitage explains why the change is particularly fitting as part of the move-towards transparency embodied by the AIA first-to-file rules.

Moreover, putting a "prior art" provision of pre-AIA § 102(f) ilk into the new law would have undone the transparency/objectivity reforms that its elimination by the AIA worked to perfect. Congress simply rejected the notion that every individual named as an inventor on a patent application should be queried to determine what secret or private information the inventor was already aware of, from the work of someone else, at the time the invention was made by that individual. Congress rejected the notion that the inventor's private knowledge learned from others should then be provided to patent examiners to determine whether the inventor's claimed invention could be nonetheless regarded as "obvious" (perhaps in combination with other prior art).

Armitage at 98. Armitage and Matal were both instrumental in the development and passage of the AIA. Their well written articles explain the choices made in the AIA legislation and attempt to explain their visions for how ambiguities should be interpreted. Professor Sarnoff agrees with Armitage here that the AIA removes knowledge that a putative inventor obtained from another is no longer prior art. In his Patently-O Patent Law Journal Article, Sarnoff wrote:

By eliminating existing § 102(f), the new act removes the substantive prior art basis that used to prevent patents on derived inventions that are the same as or obvious in light of the derived knowledge. Because § 102(f) was treated as prior art for obviousness, it provided substantive grounds for denying or invalidating patents on obvious variants of a derived invention (e.g., applications or improvements of, or additions to or modifications of, a derived invention) as well as to the derived invention itself.

Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Review 12.

Sarnoff absolutely agrees with Armitage that the law will no longer prevent an applicant who derived an invention from obtaining a patent on an obvious variant of that invention. I.e., the USPTO has no tools to prevent a third party from patenting obvious variants of information obtained from another. Now, the AIA does provide for a third party to initiate a derivation proceeding or a civil action for derivation. However, it appears to me that those actions (even if timely filed by the originator) would be unsuccessful because derivation proceedings are limited to cases where the derived claims are "substantially the same" as the originator's innovation. The substantially the same limitation is much narrower in scope as compared with the potential wide variety of obvious variants. Sarnoff largely agrees with my analysis here, but in a more equivocal manner.

The new derivation procedure and civil action also may be inadequate to prevent the deriving applicant from obtaining the patent on an obvious variant even when the originator does file a derivation petition, when the original inventor learns about the obvious variant from the deriver (and had not earlier conceived of the obvious variant). And in litigation defending against the deriver's patent on an obvious variant, an unrelated third party may be unable to challenge the deriver's patent for obviousness (although it may be able to challenge it for improper inventorship, but only if the elimination of § 102(f) has not undermined the substantive basis for such invalidation.

Sarnoff (emphasis added).

Unlike Armitage & Matal, Mark Stadnyk is a total Washington DC outsider. His company MadStad designs and sells after-market motorcycle parts (mainly windshields and accessories). MadStad and Stadnyk filed suit in 2012 challenging the AIA as an unconstitutional modification of the US patent laws and asking the federal court to render the law null and void. One of the argument MadStad presents is that the statutory elimination of 102(f) is problematic because it runs contrary to the IP enabling clause of the US Constitution. The US Constitution empowers Congress to develop a patent system that grants rights to "inventors." And, according to MadStad, the new AIA creates a system where (1) non-inventors can apply for patent and (2) rights wrongly granted to non-inventors cannot be challenged in court by negatively affected third-parties.

In its response to MadStad, the USPTO recently presented its idea regarding inventorship. The USPTO rejects MadStad's argument and instead follows Matal's "duplicative" theory. (Matal is now an assistant solicitor at the USPTO.)

The USPTO writes:

The AIA does not sanction the award of patents to anyone but inventors. Retained verbatim—unaltered by the AIA—section 101 continues to restrict the grant of patents to inventors. Section 101 states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added); see AIA, passim (no changes to § 101). By retaining section 101, the AIA still requires as a condition of patentability that the named inventor actually invent the claimed subject matter.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs remarkably allege that the AIA eliminates the inventorship requirement and thus will allow an individual who is not an inventor to obtain a patent. The basis of their claim is that the AIA deletes section 102(f), which provides that a person will not be entitled to a patent if he "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented." 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). Plaintiffs accordingly allege that, without section 102(f), "being an inventor is no longer a condition of patentability" nor "a requirement of patent validity under Section 282 of the Patent Act," which establishes the defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. Plaintiffs' allegations are legally incorrect. Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have concluded that §101—which the AIA retains—is a condition for patentability and can be used as a defense in an action involving patent infringement and validity.

Thus, according to the USPTO, the AIA's deletion of the redundant requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) is irrelevant, as section 101 will continue to require that a patent only be awarded to an inventor.

Moving forward, the question is what work do the US Constitution and Section 101 actually do on the inventorship front? The link between patents and their inventors is strong and deeply rooted. As such, it is unlikely (in my view) that MadStat is correct in its argument that Section 102(f) was the only provision guaranteeing continuation of that link. An important question, however, is what to do about the inventorship requirement of the IP empowering clause. Are the limits of that clause implicitly embedded into the conditions and requirements of patentability or, instead, do we use those limits to invalidate legislation that fails to conform to the constitutional restrictions.

Prior to the 1952 patent act, lack-of-inventorship was a condition for patentability under the precursor to our Section 101 and was explicitly listed as a defense that a defendant charged with infringement could plead under the precursor to our Section 282. Thus, "the defendant may plead … That [the patentee] was not the original and first inventor or discovered of any material and substantial part of the thing patented." See RS § 4920 (Patent Act of 1870).

There are real ongoing questions that stem from the elimination of section 102(f): Is Armitage correct in his assessment of the law that a third party can now patent an obvious variation of an idea secretly learned from the true inventor? Is the USPTO correct that a patent can be challenged for improper inventorship as a violation of 35 U.S.C. 101?

Notes:

• Scott Pierce substantially adds to the discussion with his article titled The Effect of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act on Collaborative Research, 94 J.P.T.O.S. 133 (2012).

The Patent Song (Musically Calling for More Reform)

Is the New Supplemental Examination a Complete Replacement for Owner Initiated Ex Parte Reexamination?

By Dennis Crouch

This essay focuses on supplemental examination but, perhaps surprisingly, the essay does not consider inequitable conduct inoculation. The ability of supplemental examination to cure inequitable conduct has received a significant amount of attention. However, supplemental examination is likely to have a broader value for patent owners. In particular, supplemental examination offers an expanded and beneficial avenue for patent owners to subtly enter ex parte reexamination. In its official estimates, the USPTO predicts that patent owners will entirely stop filing ex parte reexaminations. Rather, in the USPTO's estimation, 100% of the cases that would have been filed as owner-filed reexaminations will now be filed as supplemental examinations. The USPTO writes:

[T]he Office estimates that it receives approximately 110 requests for ex parte reexamination filed by patent owners annually. In view of the benefits to patent owners afforded by supplemental examination under 35 U.S.C. 257(c), the Office is estimating that all 110 requests for ex parte reexamination that would have been filed annually by patent owners will instead be filed as requests for supplemental examination. However, the Office is also estimating that more than 110 requests for supplemental examination will be filed annually due to a combination of: (1) the benefits to patent owners afforded by supplemental examination; (2) the fact that the "information" that may form the basis of a request for supplemental examination is not limited to patents and printed publications; and (3) the fact that the issues that may be raised during supplemental examination may include issues in addition to those permitted to be raised in ex parte reexamination (e.g., issues under 35 U.S.C. 112).

See Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48827 (2012). Although not suggested by the USPTO, there is some thought that the supplemental reexamination will also take some demand away from the current reissue system.

As a starting point on this topic, it is useful to remember that ex parte reexamination has been left virtually unchanged by the America Invents Act (AIA). The greatest exception is not a process change but rather a seven-fold increase in the price-tag for filing a request for ex parte. This takes the price from $2,500 to almost $18k. Ex parte reexaminations will still be conducted by examiners in the central reexamination unit (CRU) and the Board (now the PTAB) will handle first level appeals. The AIA "clarifies" the law that adverse decisions from the PTAB may be appealed only to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and that the patentee has now right to file a civil action in district court to overturn an adverse decision during the reexamination.

The reissue process was also left untouched except that the AIA removes the "without any deceptive intention" language from 35 U.S.C. § 251. The reissue statute now reads as follows:

Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. No new matter shall be introduced into the application for reissue.

However, unlike reexaminations, reissue fees associated with reissue applications have been kept low – remaining mostly equivalent to fees associated with original prosecution. For patents in litigation (or likely to be litigated) the fee differential will be a relatively minor factor in the ultimate choice. However, that fee differential could be quite important for more average patents – those part of a large portfolio but that would become more valuable if given a secondary review. Since this post is getting quite long, I'm going to save the comparison between supplemental examination and reissues for a different post.

Comparing Supplemental Examination with Ex Parte Reexamination: The process of supplemental examination is quite similar to that of ex parte reexamination. You can think of ex parte reexamination as having two main parts: (1) request stage; and (2) examination stage. At the request stage, the USPTO must decide whether the reexamination request raises patentability issues that are significant enough to warrant full reexamination. If the issues presented are not significant enough then the reexamination request is denied and the case is over. However, if the issues are deemed significant then the patent is fully reexamined. That reexamination can result in claims being cancelled, amended, or confirmed as patentable. In many ways, supplemental examination can be seen as simply changing name of the request stage. For supplemental examination, the request stage is the supplemental examination. In that stage, the USPTO is simply conducting a cursory review to determine whether the issues presented in the supplemental examination request raise a substantial new question of patentability. If not, then the supplemental examination is concluded (with a certificate). If substantial questions are raised then a full reexamination is ordered and conducted. As in the request stage of ex parte reexaminations, supplemental examination is completed very quickly (3-months) and without any additional outside input beyond the request itself.

Supplemental examination offers four primary benefits for a patent owner as compared with directly filing a request for ex parte reexamination:

• When a patent owner files a reexamination request on its own patent, it has to first convince the USPTO that its patent has a problem. With supplemental examination, the patentee need not make any such statement. Rather, the supplemental examination request simply points to material that should be considered with minor explanation and the PTO makes the judgment as to whether the submitted material raises any substantial new questions of patentability. This helps patentees avoid potential prosecution history issues that often trap patentees in the reexamination process. This may also mean that the supplemental examination document request is less expensive to prepare.
• In ordinary circumstances, Ex parte reexaminations are instituted based upon printed publications or patents. Supplemental examination can be used to raise all sorts of issues based upon "any supporting document" or legal issue (such as patentable subject matter).
• If the PTO concludes that no substantial question of patentability is raised by the request then, with supplemental examination, it issues a "supplemental examination certificate" that the patentee can take and show to a district court judge and jury. While the decision in supplemental examination is effectively the same as a denial of a request for ex parte reexamination, the cognitive impact is different. In the ex parte reexamination scenario, the PTO merely denied a request to review the case. On the other hand, in the supplemental examination scenario, the PTO actually conducted a supplemental examination; determined that the submitted issues do not raise a substantial question of patentability; and issued an official certificate saying as much.
• As discussed elsewhere, the supplemental examination also provides the inoculation against inequitable conduct charges.

There are some downsides to supplemental examination, but in most cases it will be a better option when compared with an owner-requested ex parte reexamination.

The GAIN Act Stacks 5-Years of Market Exclusivity for Antibiotics

Guest Post by Jacob S Sherkow. Sherkow is a fellow at Stanford Law School's Center for the Law and Biosciences. This post originally appeared on Sherkow's Stanford Site.

This week's New Yorker has an interesting article on the rise of antibiotic resistant gonorrhea (subscription required). What caught my attention was its discussion of something called the GAIN Act ("Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now")–a new law that apparently seeks to encourage pharmaceutical research of antibiotic resistance by giving pharmaceutical companies manufacturing a "qualified infectious disease products" (QIPDs) an additional five years of market exclusively–with or without a patent. The Act comes as title VIII to Senate Bill 3187, the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (the "FDASIA"). The FDASIA generally concerns the regulation of user-fees for FDA drug approval. (That is, allowing pharmaceutical companies to pay for part of the FDA approval process.) There are a few surprising things about the law: (1) Despite the high level of congressional partisanship, it was passed rather quickly. The bill went from being introduced in the House to receiving the President's signature in just over a month. (2) Although it seems like the additional protections afforded to manufacturers are significant–and concern a broad variety of public interests–there has been almost no discussion of the Act in the popular press. And (3), a number of companies–some of which were already conducting Phase III trials of qualifying drugs when the bill was passed–seem to have benefited. The GAIN Act is a relatively complex piece of legislation that requires detailed analysis, but for now, I'll briefly review the broad outlines.

"Non-IP" Market Exclusively

Prior to the GAIN Act, several classes of new drug applications (NDAs) received statutory market exclusivity, independent of whether the underlying drugs were protected by a patent. New drugs–that is, new active ingredients–received four to seven-and-a-half years of protection from the date of application. (21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).) Old drugs with new uses received three years. (Id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).) And drugs for a "rare disease or condition"–as designated by the Secretary of DHHS–received seven years. (Id. § 360bb(a)(1).) During these "exclusivity periods," FDA could not approve another version of the same drug, even if those drugs were not protected by a patent.

The GAIN Act

The GAIN Act adds a class of applications to that list–"qualified infectious disease products" or QIPDs. (Like drugs for "rare diseases and conditions," QIPDs are to be determined by the Secretary.) If the QIPD fits any of the three categories, above (i.e., a new drug, an old drug with a new use, or a drug for a rare disease), then its market exclusivity is automatically extended by five years. This means that new drug QIPDs will have a minimum statutory protection of nine years; old drug/new use QIPDs will have a total of eight years of protection; and rare disease, i.e., "orphan" QIPDs will have a whopping twelve years of "non-IP" market exclusivity.

As for what qualifies as a QIPD, it's up to the Secretary, although the statute lists several "superbugs" as suggestions. Interestingly, the GAIN Act provides that once an application has been classified as a QIPD, that designation–and its attendant exclusivity–cannot be taken away, even if the Secretary removes a "bug" on the statutory list of QIPDs. Because the exclusivity periods in the GAIN Act are as long, or longer, than any Secretary will have his or her job (because, presumably, a new President, after eight years, will replace the Secretary), previous Secretaries' QIPD designations will have significant "dead hand control" on future ones'.

GAIN vs. Patent Terms

There has long been concern that patents do not provide enough incentives to drug companies to develop new as opposed to follow-on drugs. (There are a number of proposed reasons for this: FDA approval uncertainty, the length of the approval process, increased patent litigation, patent thickets and licensing concerns, and others.) The current wisdom is that, on average, a pharmaceutical patent will have an "effective patent life"–the amount of patent protection lasting after the FDA approval process–of about fourteen and-a-half-years. The reality is likely shorter due to recent backlogs at the patent office and the increasingly aggressive challenges from generic manufactures. Regardless, the GAIN Act now appears to offer protection on par with patents, with the added advantages of being immune from challenges from competitors or "de-listing" by the Secretary. These seem like fairly significant protections and may even obviate the need for patents in some instances.

The core question, of course, is whether the GAIN Act, with its generous protections, will spur enough innovation in a critical public health area that it's worth the hit to other researchers and consumers. Only time will tell, but a more thorough vetting of the Act would be to everybody's gain.

The Removal of Section 102(f)’s Inventorship Requirement; the Narrowness of Derivation Proceedings; and the Rise of 101’s Invention Requirement

Inter Partes Reexaminations: USPTO Can Only Consider References from the Request that Were Found to Raise a Substantial Question of Patentability

By Dennis Crouch

Belkin v. Kappos (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Appeal of Inter Partes Reexam No. 95/001,089)

OptimumPath's U.S. Patent No. 7,035,281 broadly covers a wireless router with onboard authentication and is based upon an application filed in the year 2000. When Belkin filed its inter partes reexamination request, it argued that a set of four prior art references render all 32 claims unpatentable. The USPTO partially granted Belkin's request. However, the USPTO found that only one of the four references ("Pierce") raised a substantial new question of patentability, and the Pierce-SNQ only related to claims 1-3 and 8-10 of the '281 patent. The USPTO thus rejected the request as to the remaining claims 4-7 and 11-32. Further, the USPTO also rejected the notion that the four-reference combination raised a SNQ with regard to claims 1-3 and 8-10.

Belkin filed a petition to challenge the partial denial. Since the reexamination had been granted as to claims 1-3 and 8-10, Belkin only challenged the USPTO's adverse decision regarding the other claims. That petition was duly denied. As prosecution developed, the Examiner (supported by the BPAI) determined that the lone reference (Pierce) did not actually anticipate claims 1-3 or 8-10. Further, the USPTO refused to consider the four-part combination obviousness argument that had been rejected at the request stage. The BPAI then confirmed the Examiner's decision – holding that the Board did not have the power to now decide that the combination of references raise a SNQ of patentability because that determination is not appealable under 35 U.S.C. § 312(c).

The USPTO differentiates between petitions and appeals and according to the Board, Belkin erred by failing to timely petition to challenge SNQ determination rather doing what it did (waiting to appeal that determination after receiving an adverse examiner decision0.

Now, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has affirmed the Board decision – holding that

The proper course of action was for Belkin to have petitioned the Director to review the determination that the arguments relying on the [other three references] did not raise a substantial new question of patentability pursuant to 37 C.F.C. § 1.927. Belkin did not do so, and thus that decision became final and non-appealable, rendering those issues beyond the scope of the reexamination.

One problem raised by this decision by Judge Lourie and joined by Chief Judges Rader and Judge Wallach is that it conflicts with the MPEP.

MPEP § 2648 identifies a hypothetical situation parallel to Belkin's – where an inter partes reexamination request on a particular claim is granted based upon one set of prior art but denied based upon another set of prior art. According to the MPEP, no petition challenging the partial-grant may be filed with regard to that claim and that once granted, the reexamination will consider "all prior art."

[N]o petition may be filed requesting review of a decision granting a request for reexamination even if the decision grants the request as to a specific claim for reasons other than those advanced by the third party requester. No right to review exists as to that claim, because it will be reexamined in view of all prior art during the reexamination under 37 CFR 1.937.

MPEP § 2648. The Federal Circuit decision here considered the conflict created by the MPEP and ultimately determined that the MPEP does not carry the weight of law and thus is easily discarded. The court writes:

[T]he MPEP does not have the force of law, and is only entitled to judicial notice as the PTO's official interpretation of statutes and regulations with which it is not in conflict. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

This holding here (following Molins) becomes even more important under the AIA as the PTO has received a substantial additional amount of rulemaking authority for determining the proper methodology of conducting the array of post-grant challenge options. Here we have a re-affirmance that the USPTO's statements in the MPEP will not be given the same deference that will be due to rules promulgated and printed in the code of federal regulations (CFR). The court noted that this decision should not be seen as offering any guidance as to how the AIA will be interpreted (since this case applies the old law regarding inter partes reexaminations).

Limit Scope of Reexamination: The court here goes on to hold that the Patent Act strictly limits the prior art that the USPTO can apply in considering challenged claims during reexamination. In particular, in the reexamination the PTO can only consider the prior art that the director found raised the substantial questions of patentability. The court writes:

In any event, in order to reconcile what may otherwise appear to be conflicting provisions, we hold that, under the statute, available prior art may only be considered to answer the specific questions of patentability found by the Director.

In a footnote, the expressly refuses to rule on a situation where the patentee amends claims or adds new claims during the reexamination. Thus, in those situations, the PTO might have the power to consider other references.

We do not reach the issue of what prior art references the PTO may or may not consider during reexamination in response to an amended or substituted claim.

The problem with this holding on the "statute" is that the court does not actually identify the statutory provision that lead to its conclusion. I suppose that the best statute on point is Section 312(c) that limits the appeal of SNQ determinations. If we allow a requester to force the consideration of additional references by appealing to the BPAI - then that begins to look like an appeal of the SNQ determination. That seems to be a fairly weak argument and perhaps that is why the court did not spell it out.

For its part, the Board was likely thinking of this case as an important stake-in-the-ground to limit the scope of the new post grant review regimes (that the Board is handling directly rather than the CRU). The importance is evidenced by the fact that the case was decided by an expanded 5-judge panel which included Board Vice-Chief Judge James T. Moore and Judge Allen MacDonald as added members.

Trans-Border Active Patent Inducement under Akamai

By Dennis Crouch

This post discusses Professor Holbrook's new essay on the extraterritorial consequences of the recent Akamai decision.

In Akamai v. Limelight, an en banc Federal Circuit (CAFC) expanded the scope of liability for actively inducing patent infringement (inducement). Under the old rule, an active inducement charge required proof that an induced third party actually practiced the patented method. Akamai loosened that constraint a bit. Under the new rule, actively inducing infringement of a patented method no longer requires underlying infringement by the third party. The court replaced that element with a requirement of proof that each step of the patented method be performed. Thus, the difference between the old and the new is that active inducement no longer follows the single infringing actor rule that is *still* applied in the context of direct infringement. Under the new rule, a defendant could be held liable for active inducement even when it took three different actors to collectively perform the patented-steps. The statutory basis for active inducement is 35 U.S.C. §271(b) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."). At least as interpreted, the statute does not provide any help in understanding which of these two interpretations (old & new) are correct.

Akamai raises a host of further more detailed question about application of the newly revised doctrine.     

In his most recent essay, Professor Timothy Holbrook (Emory) focuses on one of his specialties – international application of the patent laws – and considers how the new law of inducement applies in the international and trans-border patent infringement context.

The crux of Holbrook's essay begins with the statutory definition of direct patent infringement that uses the phrase "within the United States" as a territorial limitation on patent infringement actions. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The old rule of active inducement was linked to this definition and thus included an implicit territorial limitation as well. In Akamai, the court decoupled active inducement from the direct infringement definition of 271(a) and challenges whether (and how) a territorial limitation will be applied moving forward.

One suggestion is that the Federal Circuit should rely upon its control-and-beneficial use doctrine developed in NTP v. Research-in-Motion, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), to determine whether the territorial limits of the patent laws bar an inducement action. However, NTP is a deeply unsatisfying opinion and has little basis in the law, and such an extension of that opinion would have even less basis in law. Holbrook suggests that when portions of the induced activity occurs in another country, the court should focus on whether the patentee bringing the infringement action has a parallel patent in that other country. If so, then the inducement action can move forward. On the other hand, the absence of such parallel patents suggest that the trans-border inducement action unduly extends US law. Holbrook writes:

The baseline principle would be as follows: if there would not be infringement of the patent in the foreign country, then there would be no infringement of the United States. As I have advocated elsewhere, this approach takes into account potential conflicts with foreign law, which is one of the justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality.

I should note that Holbrook has offered his solution more broadly as a replacement for the NTP test.

For patentees, the interesting result of Professor Holbrook's approach is that provides an additional incentive for patentees obtain foreign patent protection because that protection bolsters their US patent rights. In this sense, it gives an edge to non-US innovators who are already much more likely to obtain foreign rights than are US based entities. The approach also offers a straightforward avenue for someone to receive the benefit of practicing the invention without paying royalties and without infringement liability. The approach would be to identify countries where the patent is not protected and induce performance of some steps of the method there. However, in most cases that approach is likely too far-fetched for most situations.

Read the essay: Timothy Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of Akamai, forthcoming in the Emory International Law Review (2012) online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154277.