By Dennis Crouch
In re Chevalier (Fed. Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential) (Patent Application Ser. No. 11/407,778)
In a non-precedential but instructive opinion, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the USPTO's obviousness rejection of L'Air Liquide's application covering devices used to form gas-liquid dispersions. The Board rejected claim 1 as obvious, over a combination two prior art references – finding that it "would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to modify the Kwak device in view of the teachings of Howk."
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The difficulty with appealing PTAB decisions is that conclusions of fact made by the USPTO's appellate board are reviewed for substantial evidence. In order to win an appeal on a factual question, the patent applicant must go quite a bit further than simply proving that the PTAB's decision was wrong. Rather, the PTAB decision will only be overturned if not based on "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence. Restated, the question is whether the factual conclusion is based upon "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." "[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966).
This case represent the most frequent form of PTAB decision – that the applied-for patent claim is unpatentable as obvious over a combination of references. The ultimate question of obviousness is a question of law (reviewed de novo on appeal). However, that ultimate conclusion is based upon a set of factual underpinnings as explained by Graham v. Deere. The Federal Circuit has also held that "[t]he presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a pure question of fact." In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Chevalier challenged the combination of references – arguing that the combination of Kwak and Howk would be inoperable. Apparently Chevalier took the drawings from Kwak and Howk and unsuccessfully tried to jam them together. The Federal Circuit saw that process as "misapprehend[ing] the nature of the obviousness inquiry."
The obviousness inquiry does not ask "whether the references could be physically combined but whether the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole." In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981) (stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"). Rather, in a case such as this where each of the elements of the claim are known to the art, the obviousness inquiry requires a finding that the combination of known elements was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art.
Here, each of the elements of the claim is taught by Kwak with the exception that the Kwak deflector is not attached to the drive shaft. This deficiency in Kwak is supplemented by Howk, which teaches a deflector attached to the drive shaft. The examiner found, and the Board affirmed, that one of ordinary skill would be motivated to modify Kwak in view of Howk because the modification "would facilitate a more rapid and more complete conversion from axial flow to radial flow of the liquid exiting from the bottom of the device." Ex Parte Gilbert Chevalier, 2011 WL 6747404 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 21, 2011). Chevalier does not challenge this finding. Accordingly, we find no error in the Board's determination that Kwak and Howk could be combined to achieve the claimed invention, nor do we find any error in the Board's determination that one of ordinary skill would be motivated to combine these references to achieve an aeration device that more rapidly and more completely converts axial flow to radial flow in the gas-liquid mixture.
The appellate panel then moved to KSR v. Teleflex to bolster its decision:
Our conclusion is strengthened by Chevalier's admission that the deflectors of Kwak and Howk are "recognized equivalents performing the same function of converting axial flow to radial flow." Appellant's Br. 9. The Supreme Court stated in KSR that "when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result." KSR. Here, the claimed invention merely substitutes the deflector of Howk, which is attached to the drive shaft, for the deflector of Kwak, which is attached to the floor of the basin. This substitution achieved only the predictable result of converting the axial flow of the gas-liquid mixture to radial flow.
Rejection affirmed
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The problem with the appeal here is that the appellate arguments are essentially a repeat of the lawyerly discussion of facts made to the examiner and PTAB. When those do not work at the PTO, they are highly unlikely to work on appeal to the Federal Circuit. (No factual affidavits were submitted in the case at the PTO). If Air Liquide had wanted to win the case, they would have been better served to hire expert witnesses to provide testimony either as affidavits to the PTAB or else bring forth that evidence in a civil action. Of course, that approach is likely more expensive and raises a greater potential of inequitable conduct charges down the line – especially in cases like these where other members of the patent family have already issued.
