Patent Law Blog (Patently-O)

USPTO Maintenance Fees

by Dennis Crouch

[This is an update of my 2009 post on the topic]

Over half of the USPTO operational budget is derived from maintenance (or renewal) fees paid by patentees. Fees are due at 3½, 7½, and 11½ years after issuance and each subsequent fee is substantially higher. Thus, under the current schedule, the first fee is $1,130, the second fee is $2,850, and the third fee is $4,730.  For the USPTO, this comes without any costs — all the work of examining is already complete.  The funds are used to subsidize ongoing examination. The USPTO has proposed to increase the maintenance fees substantially in near future as a mechanism of raising further funds for patent operations. 

The chart below shows the percentage of patents where maintenance fee payments are made for patents grouped by year of patent issuance.  The vast majority of patentees pay the first fee, but only about 50% pay all three. The 12–year delay in paying fees makes the chart appear to be missing data on the right side.

USPTO revenue from maintenance fees has been growing over time — lead primarily by an increase in the number of patents issued; an increase in the percentage of fees paid; an increase in the fees charged; and a decrease in the percentage of small entities who pay only ½ fare.

All USPTO fees are subject to market whims and macro-economic effects.  Maintenance fees are a particular problem because a decrease in maintenance fee payments does not lead to any decrease in workload for the Office. In 2009, the USPTO was suffering under a budget shortfall and I noted that the greatest cause of that shortfall was the dropping rate of renewal.

As an aside – it is interesting to note that, even though small entities receive a 50% discount on maintenance fee payments, they are much more likely to abandon their patents and not pay the mantenance fees. [Link]

Tags: Maintenance+Fees, Academic+Studies, Fees

BPAI Appeals Cyclic Decision Making

By Dennis Crouch

The USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals (BPAI) has an incredibly large backlog of ex parte appeals pending – more than 25,000. In 2006, that figure was less than 1,000 pending appeals. Since then, the backlog has grown month-after-month-after-month. Cases being decided by the BPAI now were fully briefed more than two years ago, and began the appeal briefing process more than three years ago. Most of those are on applications filed at least five years ago with priority claims reaching back even further. The current USPTO solution is to hire more Administrative Patent Judges – 100 new judges this fiscal year with at least that many arriving next year. I agree that this is an important part of the solution. However, in my view simply hiring more judges is insufficient.

The following chart looks at the number of BPAI decisions each month. The pattern reveals the results of a performance rating system (i.e., quota system) used to judge the Judges. Ordinarily, BPAI judicial performance is reviewed two times per year, and that process is reflected in a systematic incentive for the judges to do more work at the end of the fiscal year (September) and at the midpoint (March). The chart shows those months as the high-points for BPAI output and the subsequent months as low-points.

It seems to me that the current cadre of Administrative Patent Judges have proven that they have the capability of increasing their throughput by 60% or more in any given month. But, the Judges only act on that capability when properly motivated. I hate to play the "if I were manager" game, but once these phenomena are recognized, a likely general solution is fairly obvious – provide motivation for the Judges to more often work to their potential. Economists have shown that people almost always act in their own self-interest – that's why personal incentives work. However, in a team environment, personal incentives are rarely sufficient. Most highly successful teams also rely on team and other goal oriented incentives that suggest a culture of success. In my mind, the chart showing high-effort-as-deadline-approaches suggests a commitment to personal achievement but also a lack of commitment to the broader timeliness goal of ex parte patent appeal administration. Of course, timeliness is only one variable in the time-quality-cost equation, and the other important elements cannot be ignored.

As the PTO moves to more than double the size of the Board, now is the time to make structural changes to ensure a better future for this important segment of the Office.

Note - A key feature of the chart above is that the figures for FY2012 are significantly higher than for prior years. Unfortunately, the increase in productivity is still only slowing the growth of the backlog. With the increase in judges, I expect for the backlog to begin declining by the end of this fiscal year. Further, once implemented, the proposed increased appeal fees will also tend to reduce appeals filed.

Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making

Last year, Professor Merges and I co-authored this short article on the administration of Bilski. In light of the pending Section 101 cases and Judge Rader's opinion in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen, I thought I would post it here again. Download the twenty-page essay from SSRN.

Here is the introduction:

Now that the Supreme Court has decided Bilski v. Kappos, there is an enormous amount of speculation about the case's impact on patent applicants, litigants, and other participants in the patent system. Most of the commentary is concerned with the holding in Bilski, how this holding will be applied by courts and the Patent Office, and ultimately, the effect of the holding on inventors, and those who hold and seek patents.

We take a different approach; rather than try to cut through the complexity of Bilski, or predict how it will be applied, we talk about how to avoid it. We are interested in how to minimize the cost and confusion that accompany a review of patents for § 101 subject-matter eligibility. To be specific, we propose that the § 101 issue of Bilski be considered only when doing so is absolutely necessary to determine the validity of a claim or claims in a patent. We believe any claim that can be invalidated under one of the less controversial and less complex requirements for patentability—§§ 102, 103, and 112, for instance—ought to be disposed of without considering subject matter patentability. In other words, the Bilski issue should be avoided wherever it is not strictly necessary. To support this conclusion, we present a set of empirical data that indicates that the vast majority of patent claims challenged on subject matter eligibility grounds were also challenged on other patentability issues.

We set the stage for our proposal in Part II, which briefly reviews the history behind Bilski and explains its open-ended holding and individualized approach. The difficulty of applying the Bilski ruling to different types of patent claims leads us to Part III, in which we call into question an accepted (if largely implicit) principle of patent law—that the lexical priority of statutory provisions in the 1952 Patent Act dictates a necessary logical sequence of invalidity tests. We reject this widespread assumption. There is nothing in the statute that requires this.

Indeed, in Part III we argue that in many ways the very idea of a sequence of discrete patentability requirements is conceptually misleading. Claims can be and often are rejected by the Patent Office for multiple reasons, suggesting that at least certain claims suffer from defects that transcend specific statutory validity requirements. We argue further that the policy underpinnings of various requirements overlap in complex ways, so that in reality patentability doctrine does not test for a series of discrete and independent qualities that are distinct from and mutually exclusive of each other. In the same way, transcendent qualities of an invention can influence multiple doctrines simultaneously, with pioneering inventions (due to both a liberal treatment under enablement, and a broad reach under infringement doctrines) being a prime example. This demonstrates again that there is not and should not be a strong separation between various patent law doctrines. Another argument along these lines recognizes that while patentability doctrines are not discrete entities, neither is "the invention" whose validity is being considered. Patent applicants routinely present multiple, overlapping claims, all of which cover fine-grained variations on a central inventive insight or advance. So it is inaccurate to visualize patentability as a stepwise series of tests applied to a single "invention." It is not true for example that "invention X" passes § 101 and should thus proceed in logical sequence to be tested under § 102. One claim growing out of inventive insight X might present no § 101 problems at all, yet another claim in the same patent application might raise a difficult issue under this provision. Each claim, being a unique slice of the overall inventive insight, ought to be considered on its own terms, and in whatever order makes the most sense. Put another way, the mental model of a stepwise sequence of patentability determinations overlooks the highly granular nature in which different slices of the inventive concept are presented for validity testing.

This analysis is further developed in Section III.A. When a claim fails to pass muster under any single test of validity, that claim should be invalidated. No further tests should be applied. We describe this as "chain" theory of validity: once one link in the chain is broken, the claim fails, and there is no reason to proceed further. Beyond that point, any expenditure of resources on validity questions is inefficient. Pragmatic considerations enter at this point. Issues of cost, justiciability, and spillover effects are perfectly appropriate in determining the actual sequence in which validity tests are applied with respect to any particular patent claim. The non-linearity of patent validity tests, together with the principle of efficient administration, yields a simple rule: start with chain links that are, in general, easiest and cheapest to test, and when the chain fails, stop the process. That way, the costliest and most complex doctrines—the trickiest "links in the chain"— are often avoided, and in any event are put off until later. Therefore, § 101 should often be avoided, both at the Patent Office and in the courts. We justify this not only on efficiency grounds, but also by analogy to the Supreme Court rules of avoidance.

In Part IV, we apply this simple principle. It leads to several recommendations. First, though the PTO has good reasons for its longstanding practice of rejecting claims for multiple reasons, we recommend that §101 be used only as an exception or last resort even at the PTO. Next, we contend that the courts should proceed in a stepwise fashion, beginning with §§ 102, and 103, and 112, changing the order of doctrines as dictated by pragmatic considerations, and stopping as soon as a claim is conclusively invalidated. In all cases, the complex and costly process of deciding whether a claim presents patentable subject matter under § 101 should be deferred until very late in the process. Therefore, we recommend, courts should in effect hold off on the difficult task of evaluating claims under § 101—ideally deploying the full § 101 analysis only when that is essential, i.e., when a claim passes muster under the other validity doctrines.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953512. Thanks!

Sarnoff: Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act

In a new Patently-O Patent Law Journal essay, Professor Joshua Sarnoff (DePaul) highlights a set of important problems in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. The essay, titled Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act focuses primarily on the elimination of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and its implications regarding the patentability of material that was either wholly or partially derived from another source.

Professor Sarnoff writes: 

Legislation sometimes is enacted that obviously requires either immediate revision or creative administrative and judicial interpretation. The new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act's derivation and prior art provisions fall in that category. Whether or not the move from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system is viewed as good policy and as authorized by the Constitution, the particular changes made to the prior art provisions may not prevent or invalidate patents on inventions derived from others, i.e., when the applicant has obtained knowledge of an invention from another, original inventor and then files for a patent on the same or a similar invention. In particular, obvious inventions made with unauthorized derived knowledge will now be patentable, given the elimination of prior art section § 102(f). Absent creative interpretations by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts, the new derivation proceedings will not prevent a first filer from obtaining a patent even if the first filer's invention is merely an obvious extension of information derived from another. Further, the new act adds a narrow and poorly understood category of prior art that may generate years of needless litigation to re-settle the currently well-understood boundaries of the public domain. I discuss these problems in detail below.

There is some hope that Congress and the Administration will take Professor Sarnoff's concerns to heart.

Read the article: Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Review 12 at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf.

Prior Patently-O Patent Law Journal Articles include:

• Bernard Chao, Not So Confidential: A Call for Restraint in Sealing Court Records, 2011 Patently-O Patent L.J. 6.
• Benjamin Levi and Rodney R. Sweetland, The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Recommendations to the International Trade Commission (ITC): Unsound, Unmeasured, and Unauthoritative, 2011 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on King Pharmaceuticals: The Printed Matter Doctrine as a Structural Doctrine and Its Implications for Prometheus Laboratories, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 111.
• Robert A. Matthews, Jr., When Multiple Plaintiffs/Relators Sue for the Same Act of Patent False Marking, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 95.
• Kristen Osenga, The Patent Office's Fast Track Will Not Take Us in the Right Direction, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 89.
• Peter S. Menell, The International Trade Commission's Section 337 Authority, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 79.
• Donald S. Chisum, Written Description of the Invention: Ariad (2010) and the Overlooked Invention Priority Principle, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 72.
• Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 60.
• Etan Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law's Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37.
• Michael Kasdan and Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and Slashing Patent Damage Awards, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 24.
• Dennis Crouch, Broadening Federal Circuit Jurisprudence: Moving Beyond Federal Circuit Patent Cases, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 19.
• Edward Reines and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, Part II, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 7.
• Gregory P. Landis & Loria B. Yeadon, Selecting the Next Nominee for the Federal Circuit: Patently Obvious to Consider Diversity, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Edward Reines, and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Paul Cole, Patentability of Computer Software As Such, 2008 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Mark R. Patterson, Reestablishing the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 38
• Arti K. Rai, The GSK Case: An Administrative Perspective, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 36.
• Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and the New Need to Eliminate Federal Patent Law Preemption of State and Local Price and Product Regulation, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 30
• John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 21.
• Joseph Casino and Michael Kasdan, In re Seagate Technology: Willfulness and Waiver, a Summary and a Proposal, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.

The Use of Online Databases for Legal Scholarship

By Jason Rantanen

Many empirical studies of Federal Circuit jurisprudence rely on searches of one of the leading legal databases such as Westlaw or Lexis.¹ Relying on a search of a single database is potentially problematic, however, if the substantive content of the databases is not identical - in other words, if Lexis and Westlaw don't contain the same universe of cases, any claims about the results are necessarily limited by the dataset being used. 

In order to avoid this problem in connection with an empirical study of inequitable conduct that I'm working on, I recently performed a comparison of results obtained by a keyword search on Westlaw versus an identical search on Lexis.  This comparison revealed that although the data obtained from the two sources is largely comparable, small differences do exist that certain types of searchers may want to take into account.

The chart below shows the results, by year, produced by searching for the term "inequitable conduct" in the Federal Circuit databases for Lexis and Westlaw.^2,3  In large part, the results suggest that there is relatively little variation between the two databases: in the context of this analysis, only 30 out of 681 (4.4%) Westlaw opinions were not found in Lexis and only 6 out of 657 (0.9%) Lexis opinions were not found in Westlaw.  Furthermore, in no instance did a precedential opinion appear in one database but not another.  Rather, all of the single-database hits were nonprecedential opinions.  In addition, nearly all of the nonprecedential opinions appearing in only a single database issued prior to 1991.   That said, there is a significant difference with respect to nonprecedential opinions for the period prior to 1991: nearly all the nonprecedential opinions from this time period are found in only one database.⁴  Thus, while it may not be efficient for most practitioners to run keyword searches on multiple databases, scholars conducting empirical research on Federal Circuit decisions, or individuals searching for older party-specific nonprecedential opinions, may want to be sensitive to the differences between the two databases.

Figure 1: Hits Resulting from Search Term "Inequitable Conduct" in Lexis and Westlaw⁵

 


¹ See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, "Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit By Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review," 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 811 (2010); Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct,24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1348 (2009);  Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 667, 678 fn 40 (2002); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of The Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1075, 1092 (2001); but see R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1145 (2004) (using results from both Lexis and Westlaw).  In addition, some early empirical studies used the United States Patent Quarterly as their source (see, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 436 (2001)), which apparently contains some, but not all, nonprecedential patent decisions.  See e.g., Wirco, Inc. v. Rolock, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1084, 1990 WL 12901 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 1990) as opposed to Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Unifast Industries, Inc., 1988 WL 25422 (Fed. Cir. March 28, 1988).

²  For purposes of creating this chart, I used the additional limitation "CO(c.a.fed.)" to exclude CCPA and Court of Claims decisions, some of which are included in Westlaw's "ctaf" database.  In addition, I separately compared the results from a keyword search of the entire "ctaf" database to the results from the Lexis search in order to identify any Lexis-only hits that might have been excluded by the Westlaw court limiter.  This process did not reveal any such hits.

³ These results include every search hit that contained the term "inequitable conduct," regardless of the context.  It thus should not be viewed as reflecting any measure of substantive inequitable conduct determinations.  In addition, hits resulting from search terms appearing only in the database-specific casenotes were excluded, as were instances where the database contained duplicate entries of the case opinion or included a copy of a withdrawn opinion.   For more substantive analyses of inequitable conduct jurisprudence, see Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, ssrn id 1686102; Mammen, supra note 1.

⁴ In addition to double-checking the single-database cases against the search results of the other database, I also spot-checked several decisions against the Lexis/Westlaw case database as a whole by using terms from the parties' names and the Federal Reporter citation, where available.  Although in some instances this resulted in a hit, the contents of those hits were blank.  See, e.g., Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Tanner, 738 F.2d 454 (1984) (nonprecedential) (no opinion in Westlaw; opinion in Lexis).

⁴ Although the results for 1997 appear equal, each database contained one opinion for that year that is not in the other database.

Missouri Law Review Patent Law Writing Competition: $5,000 Award

The Missouri Law Review announces a student writing competition in association with its annual Symposium to be held February 25, 2011, at the University of Missouri School of Law. Submissions should fit with the symposium topic of "The Patent Jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." The winner will be awarded a $5,000 cash prize.

Eligibility: Submissions should follow the format of a case note or law summary cited in Bluebook style and must be submitted by January 14, 2011, via email to umclawrev@missouri.edu with the subject line "Patent Law Writing Competition." The submission must be between 20 and 30 pages and have at least 125 footnotes. The submission should be unpublished, and the author must be willing to publish the work in the Missouri Law Review. The competition is limited to current law students studying in a U.S. J.D. program. Current members of the Missouri Law Review are excluded from participating. Send questions to the Missouri Law Review at umclawrev@missouri.edu.

Deadline: Friday, 1/14/2011

Award: $5,000

Single-Attorney Prosecution; Compact Prosecution; and the USPTO Backlog

The US Patent Office has long favored a “compact prosecution” examination approach. With compact prosecution, once substantive examination begins, the Office focuses its attention on promptly conducting and concluding the examination.  By reducing the duration of substantive prosecution, it is more likely that the case will be examined by an individual examiner and less likely that the examiner will have to re-learn the technology each go-round. 

From the Patent Office perspective, the long backlog-queue does not hamper compact prosecution because substantive examination generally begins only once the patent application makes its way to the front of the backlog queue. 

The applicant perspective is somewhat different. For applicants, substantive prosecution begins with preparing the patent application and eventually continues with office action responses and potential agreement on final claim language.  I am beginning a project that looks at how the backlog impacts prosecution from the attorney side. As the first blunt analysis, I looked at the prosecution history files for 90 randomly selected recently issued patents and compared the practitioner signature of (1) the application as filed; (2) the first response to a non-final office action (if any); and (3) the issue fee transmittal.

Findings: The signing practitioner (attorney/agent) changed in 71% of the cases.  Of the cases with response to a non-final office action rejection, the practitioner that signed the application was different from the practitioner that signed the initial response 61% of the time. (+/–  11% at 95% CI).

 

USPTO's Data Visualization Center and Patent Dashboard

The USPTO has publicly released its data visualization center and patent dashboard. The site does an excellent job of providing a visual overview of the current USPTO state-of-affairs in terms of patent backlog, pendency, and allowance rate. The site also breaks-down those numbers in various ways that may be useful for advising your clients.  Data-downloads on the site provide unprecedented public access to PTO numbers that were previously either uncalculated or largely kept secret.

PTO Director Dave Kappos additionally sees the dashboard as providing patent office accountability and publicly facing the challenge of reducing patent pendency. Kappos writes on his blog:

An important part of the effort to reduce pendency is better understanding the numerous factors that contribute to examination delays and measuring their impact in a way that makes the USPTO more transparent to the public.  By looking at the whole picture, we can more effectively develop ways to increase the efficiency of the examination process.  While we know we have to hire more examiners to reduce the backlog, we also know that we must re-engineer the way we do business at the USPTO and have already implemented a series of initiatives designed to improve efficiencies.  These process changes will empower our workforce to be more effective and have already begun to yield important gains.

. . . [The Dashboard] will help the entire IP community to better understand our processes, and enable applicants to make more informed decisions about their applications, especially as we develop more opportunities for applicants to control the timing at which their applications are examined.  The new dashboard, which will be updated monthly, will also be used internally by the USPTO to analyze and improve our examination process and to track the effectiveness of our improvement efforts.  We intend to further refine the dashboard and welcome your input about ways we can improve it.  A dedicated mailbox [feedback@uspto.gov] has been set up for your comments and we intend to monitor your feedback carefully. 
 
The dashboard introduces six new measures of pendency designed to give a better overall picture of the contributions of different parts of the examination process to application pendency.  For example, the traditional total pendency measure stops the clock with the filing of an RCE, which may not provide an accurate measure of the total time it takes to complete the examination of an application through request for continued examination (RCE) practice.  A new measure, called "Traditional Total Pendency Including RCEs," looks at pendency of applications from filing of the original application to ultimate disposal of that same application, including any additional time attributable to RCE filings in those applications where RCE filings are made.  Similar measures are provided relative to divisional applications and other types of continuation practice.  We also provide information about pendency for applications in appeal practice.

Links:

• Data visualization center and patent dashboard
• Kappos Blog
• [It appears that the site has a few kinks to work-out as the data downloads are not working properly]

Board of Patent Appeals

Although the Board of Patent Appeals (BPAI) is working harder than ever, its backlog continues to rise. The first chart below shows the BPAI’s inventory of undecided appeals in ex parte cases. This only includes fully-briefed appeals whose dockets have been transferred to the BPAI and does not include the thousands of other applications where awaiting briefing. The average timing from notice-of-appeal to appellate decision is 29 months.

I spoke with BPAI officials who identified the jump in early 2009 as a one-time issue involving the bulk transfer of cases that had been previously delayed.

The next chart shows the number of Ex Parte cases decided each month. The average number of cases being decided each month continues to rise. However, the chart also reveals a high month-to-month variability. That variability is explained by the BPAI judge quota system. BPAI judge performance is primarily judged two times per year, and that process is reflected in a systematic incentive for the judges to do more work in Feburary and August and then less work in March and September.

Although the BPAI is deciding more cases than ever, inventory continues to rise because more appeals are being filed than ever.

Law Review Case Note Topics for 2010-2011

Dear Law Review Editors: Please send me a note (dcrouch@patentlyo.com) to let me know about patent law focused articles that you publish in your journal so that I can highlight them on Patently-O.

Student Note Topics: Here are some suggestions for patent law focused law review topics for 2010-11 that I would like to see for my own edification. Please send me an e-mail if you choose one of these.

• Transnational Infringement: Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010). When is a patent "on sale" or "sold" in the US? This note is likely to be published because its subject matter relates to Deep-sea Horizon. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/transocean-v-maersk-speeding-up-deepsea-drilling.html
• Expanding the Printed Matter Exclusion: King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc. and Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/ignoring-non-patentable-elements-while-judging-novelty.html
• Hyatt v. Kappos will come out soon. That en banc decision will focus on the admissibility of new evidence when a patent applicant files a district court civil action to challenge the PTO's refusal to grant a patent. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/en-banc-hyatt-kappos-145.html
• Antitrust and Patent Misuse: Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission and U.S. Philips Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that an anticompetitive agreement between companies to suppress a given technology would not constitute misuse of a patent covering an alternative technology being promoted by the companies). I might consider whether antitrust law is sufficient to deter this type of alleged collusive behavior. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/federal-circuit-holds-line-on-patent-misuse-defense.html.
• Expanding the Scope of "Secret" Prior Art: In re Giacomini (Fed. Cir. 2010). In an important case, the Federal Circuit has expanded the scope of so-called 102(e) "secret prior art." Under the decision, a US patent or published application will be considered prior art as of the filing date of its qualifying provisional application. The case is important because of the large number of provisional patent applications being filed each year. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/federal-circuit-extends-the-scope-of-102e-secret-prior-art.html
• Suing Individuals for Patent Infringement: Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc. at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/employee-and-officer-liability-for-inducing-infringement.html
• Written Description Requirement and Post-Ariad Judicial DecisionMaking. I would locate all decisions that cite the 2010 en banc decision in Ariad, write about those decisions and try to uncover whether the separate written description requirement was important to the outcome. See http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554949
• A qualitative analysis of inequitable conduct pleading pre/post Exergen v Wal-Mart. For this study, I would uncover 100+ pleadings that allege inequitable conduct and see whether pleading style has changed. In Exergen, the CAFC emphasized the heightened pleading requirement for defenses of inequitable conduct. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/08/fraud-on-the-patent-office-federal-circuit-emphasizes-rule-9b-heightened-pleading-requirement-for-defense-of-inequitable-c.html.
• Some of the ideas from 2009 and 2008 have not been taken.

Tags: AMP,+Hyatt,+102(e)

Backgrounds of Registered Patent Practitioners

Tom Field and his co-authors have been kind enough to make their patent practitioner background database available to the public [Download 5mb database]. Their data is based on the registration applications that hopeful patent attorneys & agents submitted to the PTO. Using their data, I created a few interesting charts and tables on the educational background of registered patent law professionals.  

As the top chart shows, there is a very wide educational gap between practitioners in the chemical and biological fields and those in the mechincal, electrical, and computer fields. (Here, I included MD, DVM, EdD, and other similar degrees within the PhD category). Overall, 99% of the registration registered practitioners hold a bachelors degree, 29% hold a masters degree, and 15% hold a PhD or equivalent.  Although certainly not a dime-a-dozen, patent law professionals with a biological sciences PhD are more likely to have earned that degree at Harvard than at any other school.

The chart below shows the undergraduate degrees received broadly grouped according to area of technology. 

 Notes:

• The PTO anonymized the information before releasing it.

Patent Attorney Backgrounds

Professors Ralph Clifford, Tom Field, and Jon Cavicchi have published an interesting study on the technical backgrounds of patent attorneys and agents. After the trio submitted a FOIA request, the PTO handed-over 50,000 pages of patent bar registration applications.  Using that information, the trio created a database of registered patent attorneys and their associated degrees/schools. 

The paper makes the legitimate argument that the PTO should allow folks with a computer science degree to register — especially with the rise in the number of inventions related to computer science. “[A]n institutional bias exists within the PTO that prevents software-savvy individuals from registering with the Office.” 

The following table is excerpted from the article and shows the top-ten institutions where patent attorneys/agents received non-law degrees.

 

Rank	Non-Law Degree University	Count
1	Univ. Illinois	929
2	Massachusetts Inst. Tech.	908
3	Univ. Michigan	743
4	Cornell Univ.	631
5	Univ. California Berkeley	623
6	Purdue Univ.	602
7	Univ. Texas	582
8	Univ. Wisconsin	545
9	Univ. Maryland	520
10	Univ. Washington	503

Notes:

• The article’s data is of attorneys registered as of May 2006.
• Download the article here.

 

The Business Method Patent Art Units

By Dennis Crouch

In prior posts, I noted that the USPTO is issuing patents at an all-time-high-rate.  This increase is perhaps most dramatic in the art units that examine applications classified by the USPTO as "business methods."  This post explores the history and the numbers.

* * * * * 

The USPTO patent examiner corps is organized into small technology-specific groups known as art units.  Each art unit has a manager that reports to a technology center director.  About twenty art units have been classified as generally dealing with “business method” patents. (See list of art units).  I’ll call these art units “business method art units” for lack of a better term.  All of the patents issued from these art units are classified in class 705. And, these are the patents and applications that are most likely to be affected by the decision in Bilski v. Kappos (2010).

Under former PTO Director Jon Dudas, the business method art units received special attention.  Individual examiners were given free power to reject pending applications as unpatentable, but claims could not be allowed as patentable until being reviewed by at least a “second pair of eyes.”  Under Director Kappos and Commissioner Stoll, the second pair of eyes regime has been eliminated and, as might be expected, the number of patents being allowed in these art units has risen dramatically. Perhaps coincidentally, this rise also correlates with the Federal Circuit’s October 2008 decision in Bilski.

The following two charts respectively show the number and percentage of patents that issue from the business method art units for each quarter (three-month period) going back to January 2005.  (2010 Q3 only includes two-weeks worth of data). As a bit of perspective, since January 2005, more than 900,000 utility patents have issued. Fewer than 9,000 are associated with these business method art units.

As the charts show, the number of patents issued by the business method art units is on the rise — both in terms of absolute numbers and as a percentage of patents being issued. 

Most of the patents issuing from the business method art units are directed toward some type of computer software that helps solve a business problem. Newly issued U.S. Patent No. 7,747,465 is a typical example. The ‘465 patent claims a method and apparatus for determining the effectiveness of internet advertising. The claimed method does not explicitly recite any hardware except for a “manager console”, “dynamic sampling engine”, and “logic module.”  In response to a Section 101 rejection, the applicant amended its claims and then — without explanation — provided the conclusory argument that the application was “directed to statutory subject matter because the claims are either directed to statutory processes tied to a particular machine or directed to statutory apparatuses.”

One problem with studies of business method patents is that there is no accepted definition the term.  The 1998 State Street decision that jump-started business method patenting did not actually involve any method claims.  On the technology front, inventions that look like business methods are often examined in other art units. Rand Warsaw (Bernard Bilski's co-inventor) was issued a patent in 2004 on a method for providing energy efficiency changes based upon historic consumption and weather data.  That patent looks was examined by a non business method art unit in an entirely different technology center. (Patent No. 6,785,620).

An Empirical Study of the Role of The Written Description Requirement in Patent Prosecution

[Download the Draft Essay]

Essay Overview: In the pending case of Ariad v. Eli Lilly, an en banc Federal Circuit is considering whether Section 112 of the Patent Act as properly interpreted includes a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. Although the USPTO has no direct role in the infringement dispute, the government submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing that a separate written description requirement is “necessary to permit the USPTO to perform its basic examination function.” However, when pressed during oral arguments the government could not point to any direct evidence supporting its contention.

This essay presents the results of a retrospective empirical study of the role of the written description requirement in patent office practice. It is narrowly focused on rebutting the USPTO’s claim that the separate written description requirement serves an important role in the patent examination process. To the contrary, my results support the conclusion suggested by Chief Judge Michel during oral arguments that it is indeed “exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on written description.”

For the study, I analyzed 2858 Board of Patent Appeals and Interference (BPAI) patent opinions decided January-June 2009. Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the decisions in my sample. Perhaps surprisingly, I found that none of the outcomes of those decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely eliminated the written description requirement of Section 112 so long as the USPTO would still be allowed to reject claims based on the addition of “new matter” (perhaps under 35 U.S.C. Section 132). New-matter style written description requirement rejections were outcome-determinative in 20 of the 2858 cases – about 1.0% of the cases in my sample. (I am very confident that the PTO will retain its ability to make new matter rejections even if the separate written description requirement is eliminated.)

Although there may be valid reasons for retaining a separate written description requirement, this study safely leads to the conclusion that the government’s conclusory statements regarding the doctrine's critical importance for patent examination lack a factual basis.

Continue reading the essay. [PDF]

These results fit well with those of UMKC professor Christopher Holman that he reported in his 2007 article, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and PTO , 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 62 (2007).

Design Patent Rejections

Most utility patent applications are rejected at least once on either anticipation or obviousness.  Design patents are different.

As part of a larger project, I combed through 1049 file histories of design patents that issued in the past 12 months. Of those, 5 were rejected on novelty grounds and 8 on obviousness. This leads to a prior-art-based rejection rate of 1.2% (95% CI range of 0.7% – 2.1%).  The vast majority of the patents (81.6%) were never rejected during prosecution.  The most common rejections are under 35 USC 112 paragraphs 1 and 2.  Typically both paragraphs are asserted simultaneously.

According to the most recent USPTO annual report, design patents had an allowance rate of about 90% during the period FY2005–FY2009 as measured by the percentage of disposals that were allowances.  About half of design patents issued in 2009 were pending for less than one year.

These numbers suggest that the US design patent system is operating as a registration system rather than as one based on a true examination.  Along this vein, it is typically easier and cheaper to prosecute a design patent to issuance than to register a product design as trade dress.  To be clear, I support the idea of a design patent registration system. More on that in another post.

Design Patents: Mueller & Brean

Professor Janice Mueller & Daniel Brean have posted a new working-draft article on design patent protection. The article argues "that courts and the USPTO have previously unrecognized flexibility in how they apply the nonobviousness requirement to designs." The authors recommend, inter alia, that courts (1) recognize that nonobviousness jurisprudence (e.g., KSR) has "very limited, if any, applicability to design patentability"; (2) plant patent patentability requirements serve as a better example; (3) the perspective of a non-expert ordinary observer should be used when considering nonobviousness; and (4) design anticipation should be limited to "strict identity situations."

Read the article here.

The Increasing Role of Published Applications in Patent Examination

In 2001, the USPTO began publishing pending patent applications at approximately 18-months after the application's priority date. Over the past eight years, this publication rule has slowly become more integrated with the examination system. As the first chart shows below, most issued patents now cite to at least one US publication. (Patents issued January 1, 2009 - June 23, 2009 cite 4.2 US published applications, on average).

Moving toward Transparency in Prior Art: Patent applicants have historically been frustrated by prior art defined under Section 102(e) of the Patent Act. That section defines a class of "secret prior art" that was not publicly available at the time of an applicant's filing, but that was already on-file with the patent office. By opening-up the application files at an earlier date, the potential unfairness of secret 102(e) prior art is beginning to be reduced because the early publication makes the prior art searchable by the public. Although not directly proving this point, the second chart categorizes the cited US published applications according to their prior art classification. As time moves forward, more applications have become 102(b) prior art (published for more than one year before the applicant's filing) and the percentage of cited applications categorized as 102(e) prior art continues to drop.

Notes:

• This study is based on an analysis of all US patents issued between January 1, 2000 and June 23, 2009.
• A cited published application was counted as 102(e) prior art if the publication date of the cited application was later than the filing date of the issued patent that cited the application.
• A cited published application was counted as 102(b) prior art if the publication date of the cited application was more than one-year prior to the filing date of the issued patent that cited the application.  The graph shown limits the analysis to only issued patents that do not claim a priority date based on a prior patent filing.  Patents that claim an earlier priority date tend to eliminate a portion of 102(b) prior art.
• See also Dennis Crouch, Published Applications as Prior Art, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/published-applications-as-prior-art.html (July 28, 2009).

   

   

   

   

  

Reissue Applications over Time

In 2008, the patent office reissued over 640 patents – breaking the prior record of 630 set in 1875. The historic numbers of reissued patents are shown in the first chart below grouped according to year of reissuance.

Although today's absolute numbers rival historic highs of the 19th century, today's relative number of reissued patents is close to the all-time low. The next chart shows the relative percentage of reissues as compared to utility patents granted (denominator based on a moving average of patents issued over of the prior ten years).

The final chart shows a time series of the average reissue pendency as measured from the reissue application filing date to the reissuance date. As is apparent, the pendency has been growing dramatically since 1997. 2009 looks to mark a second record – the first time that average prosecution pendency of reissues applications will be greater than five years.

Background: The reissue process is designed to allow a patent holder to correct a defective patent and is nestled between certificates of correction (minor errors) and reexamination. 35 U.S.C. §251 spells out particular defects that may be corrected in the process: Defect in the specification; Defect in the drawing; Error in claiming too much; or Error in claiming too little. In Medrad, the Federal Circuit broadly read these final two defects to "encompass any error that causes a patentee to claim more or less than he had a right to claim." Medrad, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, 466 F.3d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A major limit on the reissue process is that "[n]o reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent." Section 251, final paragraph. The limit on improper broadening of reissues is strict and applies when claims are "broader in any respect." Predicate Logic, Inc. v. Distributive Software, Inc., 544 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Published Applications as Prior Art

[edited to fix my pre-coffee typos where my eyes though provisional = published]

In 2001, the USPTO published its first patent application. Since then, almost two-million patent applications have published. During this same time period, about 1.3 million patents issued. There are a couple of ways that the prior art created by patent applications change the prosecution game. First, published applications increase the sheer volume of prior art. Most notably, around ten percent of the published applications will never issue and would not have been otherwise published. And, even if published elsewhere at a later date, applicants would be faced with the later 102(a) effective date rather than the 102(e) effective date associated with a published application. This ties in with the second importance of published patent applications — they bring innovations to light more quickly and in a manner that patent examiners can readily use. Along these lines, the early publication of published applications triggers the clock for the statutory bar of 102(b).

Looking at patents issued during the past four years, I calculated the average percent of cited references that are US published patent applications. As you might expect, that figure has been rising steadily – doubling from under 6% in 2006 to almost 12% for patents issued in the early part of 2009. The evidence shows that examiners are using the patent applications. On their own examiner’s locate 41% of all cited US patent application publications even while locating only 25% of other cited references. (The remaining references are submitted by the applicant).

Note, this post was prompted by an interesting series of comments on IPWatchdog questioning whether this newly available prior art has been a factor in the dropping allowance rate.

The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office's 'Broadest Reasonable Interpretation' Standard

Chris Cotropia (Richmond Law) and Dawn-Marie Bey (King & Spalding) have an interesting draft article out on the PTO's "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard for interpreting claims during patent prosecution. The article notes that the increase in post-grant reviews (reexaminations) running concurrently with infringement litigation raises the stakes of the PTO's standard.

From the abstract:

Although there has been much commentary on patent claim interpretation methodology in general, very little has been written about the unique interpretation approach the Patent Office employs. The courts, starting with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and continuing with the Federal Circuit, instruct the Patent Office to give every applied-for claim its 'broadest reasonable interpretation' (BRI) during patent examination. This Article explores this special standard and concludes that not only are the previously articulated rationales behind the BRI standard severely lacking, the standard is also contrary to both the patent statutes and the concept of a unitary patent system. The BRI standard additionally allows patent examiners to avoid difficult claim interpretation issues, leads to improper and uncorrectable denials of patent protection, and is incurably ambiguous.

Notes:

• Read the article here.
• MPEP 2111 "CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION"
• Ex parte Koo (BPAI 2008) (PTO Should Apply Broadest Reasonable Claim Interpretation to Section 101 Analysis)

The Effectiveness of Examiner Interviews

Often, a face-to-face discussion can help two parties resolve a sticky dispute. In patent prosecution, the patent applicant can request to sit down interview with an examiner to discuss the examiner's rejections. See 37 CFR 1.133. The interview can be face-to-face or via telephone or even video conference. Law firms located across the street from the PTO tend to tout the value of examiner interviews while those outside of DC tend to downplay their significance.

I recently created a database of about 17,000 patent applications filed 2000–2005. For each of those applications, I also have a listing of the prosecution history that indicates the timing of any examiner interview. I used this data to consider the effectiveness of examiner interviews. Note two important caveats: I did not look at the underlying documents in the file wrapper, and my data does not distinguish between interviews in person and those done at a distance.

The results: Overall 18% of applications were associated with an examiner interview. I broke the data into two groups.

Early Interviews: In what I call the "early interview" group are applications where the examiner interview took place prior to the mailing of any final office action. Applications in the early interview group had the same grant rate as those that did not have an early interview (70% grant rate of terminated cases). However, those with an interview tended to stay pending longer, and be more likely to have an RCE in the file history.

Late Interviews: In what I call the "late interview" group are applications where an examiner interview took place after a final office action was mailed. Applications in the late interview group had a much higher grant rate than did applications where a final action was mailed but the case was not subsequently interviewed. Here, 74% of those in the late interview group were allowed as compared with only 60% other applications where a final action was mailed. (+/– 3% at 95% CI).

Interviews by Organization: The table below looks at the top twenty filing organizations (as listed in the application correspondence) in my dataset based on the number of applications filed 2000-2005. For each organization, the table lists the number of applications that were interviewed, number of issued patents, percent of cases interviewed, and the percent of cases patented. (Note, this percent of patented cases includes still pending cases in the calculation instead of only terminated cases and is consequently lower than the rates reported above). Although these are organizations who filed the most applications, readers should note that they represent less than 20% of all filed patent applications.

Organization	Number of Applications in Database	Applications with Interviews	Number of Issued Patents	Percent of Cases Interviewed	Percent of Cases Patented
OBLON SPIVAK	374	107	241	29%	64%
SUGHRUE MION	248	35	150	14%	60%
BIRCH STEWART	210	46	138	22%	66%
HEWLETT PACKARD	190	26	91	14%	48%
OLIFF BERRIDGE	172	60	124	35%	72%
Harness Dickey	171	37	92	22%	54%
FOLEY LARDNER	153	25	93	16%	61%
KNOBBE MARTENS	138	27	73	20%	53%
NIXON VANDERHYE	138	21	82	15%	59%
FISH RICHARDSON	136	30	74	22%	54%
FINNEGAN HENDERSON	129	18	68	14%	53%
MCDERMOTT	119	14	80	12%	67%
Blakely Sokoloff	115	15	65	13%	57%
STAAS HALSEY	109	21	60	19%	55%
FITZPATRICK CELLA	108	19	74	18%	69%
TOWNSEND	108	22	65	20%	60%
ANTONELLI TERRY	101	12	68	12%	67%
PHILIPS IP	93	9	54	10%	58%
YOUNG THOMPSON	92	12	50	13%	54%
WENDEROTH LIND PONACK	91	22	57	24%	63%

  

Patent Application Pendency: Percent of Applications Still Pending

The large backlog of cases at the PTO has added greatly to the problem of long patent application pendency. There are other contributors to the problem – such as applicants and examiners unwilling to reach a compromise solution (often based on the demands of superiors).

To provide some measure of pendency, I created a database of 20,000+ randomly selected patent applications and issued patents filed 2000 - 2007. For each of case, I tallied the final status as of mid-July 2009. (Status is either patented, abandoned, or pending). Using that data, I created a chart of the percent of utility applications still pending as of July 2009. This data can be helpful for someone considering whether their still-pending application is an anomaly. Over 84% of the applications filed in 2007 are still pending (+/– 2% at 95% CI) , while less than 1% of applications filed in 2000 are still pending (+/– 1% at 95% CI).

The second chart standardizes the same data according to the amount of time in prosecution.

Notes:

• This data only includes applications that were either (1) published or (2) patented. I do not know the percentage of cases unpublished cases that are still-pending versus those that are abandoned.
• The data presented here does not distinguish between technology centers, continuations, etc. The still-pending rates varies considerably within those different categories.
• The pendency rate for applications filed Q4 2004 appears unexpectedly high and the rate for Q1 2005 appears unexpectedly low.. That is at least partially explained by a data collection artifact. My data sample includes a relatively large number of applications filed in late December 2004 and early January 2005 rather than being more evenly distributed throughout the respective three months.

Office Actions

Although not necessarily any indication of quality, the length of non-final office actions has been increasing over time – shifting from an average of 7.5 pages in 2003 to 10.7 pages in 2009. The chart below – shows that the increase has been relatively steady over the past six years based on a sample of 8400 non-final office actions from patent applications filed 2001–2007. (Page count includes cover page and summary).

What is the cause of this rise?

The Changing Nature Inventing: Collaborative Inventing

Although inventing can still be a solo endeavor, patenting data indicates that paradigm no longer predominates. Over the past four decades, the number of inventors per patent has steadily crept upward. The first chart below shows the average number of inventors per patent moving from 1.6 for patents issued in the 1970’s to 2.5 for patents issued since 2000.*

As the chart below shows, this rising average is being driven by a dramatic increase in the proportion of “highly collaborative” inventions with three or more listed inventors. That rise is coupled with a proportional decrease in the proportion of solo inventions. Interestingly, the proportion of two-inventor patents has stayed relatively steady throughout the entire time period.

Some areas of technology lend themselves to team work. Biotech research and drug development is typically extremely expensive and done in structured teams while lower-tech areas may not be so structured. Compare, for instance patents in classes 514 (drugs) and 435 (chemistry of molecular biology) with patents in classes 135 (tents) and 297 (chairs). The first group averages three times the number of inventors as the second group.

It may also be that team-built inventions are more likely to get funding and be patented. Thus, non-US applicants are more likely to spend patenting money in the US on multi-inventor applicants. Likewise, multi-inventor applications are likely to have larger patent families through continuations and CIPs.

The rugged individualists are still out there – they are just getting more lonesome.

Notes:

• This data is derived from a sample of 750,000 patents issued from August 1971 through February 2009. All reported results are significant at the 99% confidence level.

Inter Partes Reexamination Statistics

In August 2008, Messrs Baluch and Maebius of Foley & Lardner published an interim report on the results of inter partes reexamination proceedings. At the time of their writing, however, only 30 inter partes reexaminations had been pushed-through to conclusion with a reexamination certificate. In the past year, that total has more than doubled to 73 issued reexamination certificates.

Of course, the main point about inter partes reexaminations is that the process can be incredibly slow if either party pushes. Only about 50% of the inter partes reexaminations filed 2001-2005 have been completed either through issuance of a reexamination certificate (on the merits) or procedurally terminated. Overall, the reexamination certificates took an average of 37.5 months to issue (median of 34.4 months). When all is said and done, this pendency will be much longer since the slow and/or hotly disputed cases are all still pending. Only one (1) of the completed cases received a BPAI decision (all claims were cancelled after BPAI affirmed) and no completed cases have received a court decision.

Results of the reexamination certificates: Inter partes reexaminations continue to show promise as a mechanism for "killing" patent claims. Of the 73 issued reexamination certificates, 60% (44) cancel all the claims and only 12% (9) confirm all the original claims as patentable. The remaining 27% (20) change the claimset in some way. For the 19 inter partes reexamination certificates issued on patents with co-pending litigation, 42% (8) resulted in all claims being cancelled; 5% (1) confirmed all claims as patentable; and 53% (10) changed the claimset in some fashion.

    

Evidence Based Prosecution: The Status of Applications Filed 4 ½ Years Ago

This morning I created a dataset of prosecution information for 462 randomly selected utility patent applications filed in December 2004 and January 2005 to get a sense of where those applications stand after 4 ½ years of prosecution. Overall, 48% of the applications have issued as patents; 26% have been abandoned; and 26% are still pending. (Note – I excluded the 12% of cases from my sample that were never published as applications because data is not available for most of them).

Table 1 below shows the detailed status for each case as provided by the USPTO's PAIR system. All but two of the pending cases have received at least an initial examination. The two still-unexamined cases are both software-related applications.

High-Level Status	Status	Percent of Cases
Patented	Patented Case	47.8%
Abandoned	Abandoned -- Failure to Respond to an Office Action	25.2%
Abandoned	Abandoned -- Failure to Pay Issue Fee	0.7%
Abandoned	Expressly Abandoned -- During Examination	0.2%
Pending	Non Final Action Mailed	8.9%
Pending	Final Rejection Mailed	6.4%
Pending	Response to Non-Final Office Action Entered and Forwarded to Examiner	5.0%
Pending	On Appeal -- Awaiting Decision by the Board of Appeals	1.0%
Pending	Notice of Allowance Mailed -- Application Received in Office of Publications	1.0%
Pending	Notice of Appeal Filed	0.7%
Pending	Publications -- Issue Fee Payment Verified	0.5%
Pending	Examiner's Answer to Appeal Brief Mailed	0.5%
Pending	Docketed New Case - Ready for Examination	0.5%
Pending	Appeal Awaiting BPAI Docketing	0.5%
Pending	Withdrawn Abandonment awaiting examiner action	0.2%
Pending	Response after Final Action Forwarded to Examiner	0.2%
Pending	Appeal Brief (or Supplemental Brief) Entered and Forwarded to Examiner	0.2%
Pending	Advisory Action Mailed	0.2%
Table 1

An often frustrating aspect of application pendency is that abandoned cases can be kept alive by filing a continuation application. Of those cases that have been either patented or abandoned, 25% have one or more descendents in the form continuation or CIP applications. (I have not determined whether those continuations are themselves still pending.)

Of the cases already completed (no longer pending), the median patent took 2.6 years to issue while the median abandonment did not occur until 3.1 years into prosecution. Along this line, the longer a case was pending, the greater the likelihood that the case was abandoned. Thus, 71% of cases that were pending for fewer than three years were allowed while only 29% of cases that were pending for three to four and a half years were allowed.

The chart below shows the percentage of applications pending as a function of the number of years in prosecution. Although the average time in prosecution for this cohort cannot be calculated yet (because so many cases are still pending), the median time in prosecution – as seen in the chart – is 3.3 years.

The patent office examination corps is divided into various technology centers. In my sample, TC 2800 (Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components) had allowed the highest percentage of cases (70%) and had the lowest rate of applications still-pending after 4 ½ years (3%). TC 1600 (Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry) has the highest abandonment rate (36%) while TC 2600 has the highest percentage of cases still pending (48%).

Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal

By Dennis Crouch     PDF Version of the Article

Abstract:

This study provides an issue-by-issue analysis of decisions on ex parte appeals by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All the cases in this study were appealed to the BPAI after one or more of the pending claims were rejected by a patent examiner. 

In the study, I report that most BPAI appeals focus on two or more issues. Of those, the majority of issues (61%) are affirmed and the remainder reversed. When more issues are presented, the case as a whole becomes more likely to be affirmed-in-part. In addition, I find that the likelihood that a case is affirmed has increased over time (Jan 2008 - May 2009).

By far, the most common issue on appeal is obviousness. I find that 87% - 90% of ex parte BPAI decisions decide an issue of obviousness. Only 4% of appeals consider neither obviousness nor novelty. The major aberration of this trend is for cases involving biotechnology and organic chemistry (TC 1600). 18% of BPAI decisions arising from TC 1600 focus on issues other than obviousness and novelty.

In comparing results by issue, I find that obviousness rejections are more likely to be affirmed than are other types of rejections. Most cases (74%) that discuss neither obviousness nor novelty are reversed.

The BPAI is becoming increasingly important. Over the past several years, the BPAI has seen a dramatic rise in the number of appeals being filed. In addition every recent patent reform legislative proposal has included an increased role for the Board.

Speeding-Up Design Patents

Design patents are cheap and usually involve little prosecution. In a recent report at "Design Day", the USPTO noted that the agency is working to further shrink the timeline. Notably, the average number of days from payment of the issue fee to issuance of the patent has shrunk by 2/3 since 2006. In FY2009 (thus far), the delay averages 52 days while in FY 2006, the delay averaged 140+ days. The average pendency is about 16 months. Applications in the "rocket docket" issue within 6 months on average.

Appealing BPAI Rejections: Part I

My keen research assistant Patrick Barnacle pulled up records on 56 ex parte patent appeals that have been decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit since March 2005. All of these cases arise from rejections sustained by the USPTO's internal Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). We are working to create a more complete database. In the meantime, I wanted to report some preliminary results on timing.

The median ex parte appeal took just over fifteen months to complete as measured from the date of the BPAI decision until the date of the Federal Circuit decision. As measured from the filing of the CAFC Notice of Appeal, the median appeal took exactly one year (365 days). Some appeals took longer: Comiskey, Ferguson, and Bilski each took more than two years from the NOA, but they were all tied to en banc decisions. About 25% of the appeals took less than ten months from the NOA.

Once oral arguments (if any) are complete, the Federal Circuit is rather quick at issuing an opinion. The median decision was issued 47 days after the oral arguments. (Again, a skewed average of 86 days is driven by the handful of en banc decisions) 30% of the decisions came within one week of oral arguments - most of those took one to two days.

We have not yet analyzed the correlation between delay and results, but it appears that especially quick decisions tend to favor the PTO over the applicant. As you might expect, delays in judgment correlate with longer opinions; opinions marked precedential; dissenting opinions; and opinions with Judge Newman on the panel.

Holman: A Contrarian Law Professor’s Two Cents on the Arkansas Carpenter's (Ciprofloxacin) Petition for Certiorari

By Christopher M. Holman, Ph.D., J.D., Associate Professor at UMKC Law School

Professor Mark Lemley recently filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of himself and a cohort of prominent professors of law, economics, and business in support of a petition for certiorari in Arkansas Carpenter's Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer (the "Professors’ Brief").[1] Joining the professors as amici on the brief are the American Antitrust Institute, the Public Patent Foundation, and AARP. These professors and organizations are asking the Supreme Court to review and reverse the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.[2] Arkansas Carpenter's is the latest in a string of certiorari petitions that have been filed in cases involving an unsuccessful antitrust challenge to a so-called “reverse payments settlement” between a drug patent owner and a potential generic competitor. So far the Supreme Court has denied all of the petitions.

The defining characteristic of a reverse payments settlement is the transfer of some form of consideration, often but not always cash, from the patent owner to the alleged infringer. In most settlements of patent infringement suits any payment typically flows from the alleged infringer to the patent owner, i.e., in the "forward" direction. Reverse payment settlements of challenges brought against prescription drug patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act have been controversial for years. The FTC and others charge that these agreements are anti-competitive and result in substantially higher prescription drug prices for consumers (and ultimately third-party payers such as the government). The atypical direction of the payment is considered suspect by many who view it as evidence that the merits of the patent case must be weak, and argue that the branded drug company is in effect paying the generic company to stay off the market and using the patent as a mere pretense to skirt antitrust liability. Clearly, absent the patent a naked agreement by a generic drug company to stay off the market in exchange for cash would constitute an antitrust violation.

Nonetheless, courts who have considered the legality of reverse payment settlements have repeatedly concluded that, in view of the incentives and dynamics created by the unique structure of a patent infringement suits brought under the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is neither surprising nor particularly suspicious to find payments flowing from the patent owner to the alleged infringer in the settlement of these suits. In fact, even the FTC has acknowledged that at least some reverse payment settlements are legitimate and even pro-competitive. In most patent infringement litigations, the alleged infringer faces the prospect of potentially large money damages based on its past infringement, so there is often an incentive to pay the patent owner to settle the lawsuit and avoid this risk. In contrast, Hatch-Waxman litigation generally occurs before the potentially infringing generic drug goes on the market. The generic drug company typically faces no risk of money damages for past infringement. At the same time, the drug patent owner faces huge potential financial losses if even one court finds its patent invalid or not infringed, and given the uncertainty patent litigation, particularly at the district court level, it is not surprising that some patent owners would be willing to pay to settle the lawsuit and resolve the uncertainty.

The Professor's Brief is essentially an updated version of a brief Professor Lemley filed in 2006 in support of a petition for certiorari in In re Tamoxifen, a reverse payment settlement antitrust challenge arising out of the Second Circuit. In 2006, I seriously considered signing on to his Tamoxifen amici brief; without having delved into the issue, the notion of reverse payments settlements as characterized by Professor Lemley and others struck me as suspicious and anti-competitive . After all, why would a patent owner pay an alleged infringer to settle a lawsuit unless the merits of the patent case were weak? Under these circumstances, is it not logical to infer that the parties are using the patent lawsuit as a mere pretense to provide cover for what is in actuality an agreement between potential competitors not to compete? However, before I signed on to the brief I decided to read the Second Circuit'sTamoxifen decision, as well as the reverse payments settlement decisions that had already been issued by the Sixth and Eleventh circuits. In his brief, Professor Lemley argued that the decisions from these other circuits were in conflict with the Second Circuit's decision in Tamoxifen. After reading the cases, I found that I disagreed with Professor Lemley's interpretation of the decisions, and concluded that in fact there is no split between the circuits. In fact, the decisions by the Second, Sixth and Eleventh circuits (and now the Federal Circuit) are all quite consistent, taking into account that each case involves its own unique settlement agreements and other surrounding facts, and that the decisions necessarily reflect the facts of the individual case being decided.

Reading these decisions sparked my curiosity, particularly since my interpretation of the case law diverged substantially from that of Lemley and many other academic commentators. I decided to research the topic, and in 2007 I published an article entitled “Do Reverse Payments Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?”[3] In the article, I survey the diverse array of patent settlements that have been lumped together under the imprecise label "reverse payment settlement,” and explain the factors that motivate the structure of these settlements. After reviewing the facts surrounding specific settlement agreements, and considering the well reasoned explanations of various judges who have rejected the notion that the mere presence of a reverse payment can render an otherwise legitimate patent settlement illegal, I came to disagree with the position propagated by the FTC and academics such as Professor Lemley, i.e., that the mere inclusion of a reverse payment in an otherwise legal patent litigation settlement renders the agreement per se or presumptively in violation of the antitrust laws. Moreover, my view is aligned with that of the vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue. After a close reading of the decisions, it is clear to me that the purported split between the circuits has so far failed to materialize, although the situation could change if and when other circuits weigh in on the issue.

In this short article penned for Patently-O, I will challenge some of the specific assertions made in the Professors’ Brief. For simplicity, many of the citations in this article are to my law review article. Those interested in a more expansive treatment of the subject are encouraged to consult the law review article, which includes primary cites to the cases and other authorities.

Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO Part II

In an earlier article, I noted that only 25.6% of recently issued design patents received at least one rejection during prosecution. I wanted to develop a better understanding of the reasons for rejections, I filtered for recently issued patents that had been initially rejected during process and then pulled-up their file histories using PAIR. For this study, I looked the first non-final rejection of only 86 file wrappers, but even that small number of cases showed a dramatic result.

In my sample, the first non-final rejection came in some combination of six basic forms: anticipation; obviousness; lack of enablement or written description; indefiniteness; new matter; and double patenting.

The surprising results are that only 3.5% (3 of 86) of the rejections were prior art related rejections. In three of the cases, the examiner rejected the pending application as obvious in light of the prior art, and in one of those cases the examiner also asserted that the claimed design was anticipated by the prior art. In the remaining 83 cases, the examiner conducted prior art searches but indicated that the claimed design was patentable over the art. Combining probabilities: My data indicates that fewer than 1% of recently issued design patents ever received a novelty or anticipation rejection. (At 99%CI, this may go as high as 2.5%). In other words, design patent applications sail through the PTO.

Although design patent prosecution does not have much focus on inventiveness, examiners are keen to ensure that the scope of the patent claim (via the drawings) is well defined. The most common rejection in my sample was based on confusion created by the drawings. In a design patent application the drawings represent the majority of the specification and also define the claim scope. Thus, it makes sense that confusing or inconsistent drawings would lead to rejection based on both the first and second paragraph of 35 USC 112. In my sample, 79.1% of the rejections (68 of 86) raised a combination of both lacking enablement/description and indefiniteness.

16.2% of the rejections (14 of 86) included an obviousness-type double patenting rejection against an applicant's own previously-filed application. Those rejections are curably through a terminal disclaimer. However, some applicants prefer to argue over the rejection and save patent term. Finally, 3.5% (3 of 86) of rejections focused on new matter added during prosecution. Often, the new matter was allegedly added when the applicant submitted pen and ink drawings to substitute for photographs found in the original.

A Registration System: My data indicates that our design patent system is approaching a registration system. But, there is no problem with a system of design registration - especially if design patents continue to be narrowly construed. Europe's design registration is working well as are the US systems of trademark and copyright registration. In the US, most property rights are registered or recorded rather than thoroughly examined, and those lower-cost mechanisms should probably be the default unless we have some reason to believe that thorough examination is necessary.

Notes:

• See, Dennis Crouch, Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO, Patently-O (April 2, 2009).
• My samples of recently issued design patents consists of design patents issued Feb-April 2009.
• As I mentioned in the earlier post, these numbers are a bit skewed because the file histories of abandoned design patent applications are kept secret by the PTO unless used as a priority document. Just under 20% of design patent applications are abandoned during prosecution, and I suspect that a greater percentage of those are rejected during prosecution. This consideration would thus skew the results for someone considering the likelihood that a pending design patent application will be rejected.
• In an upcoming paper (not yet available) I note that design patents are often used as substitutes for trade-dress protection, but that the overlapping of regimes does not create significant problems.

Challenging the Strong Presumption of Patent Validity

One of the next major legal challenges to patent rights will be against the strong presumption of validity associated with the patent grant. Section 282 of the patent act says only that a patent and its claims "shall be presumed valid." Under longstanding doctrine, this presumption can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. The challenge to this presumption is most likely on two fronts: (1) expanded post-grant review and (2) court challenges to the weight of the presumption.

Expanded Post Grant Review: The PTO uses the lower preponderance (more likely than not) standard when refusing to grant patent rights, and expanded post-grant oppositions will likely allow would-be defendants to challenge patents at the lower standard.

Challenging the Weight of the Presumption: The greater change would come, however, if the Supreme Court takes a case on point. Since the 1952 Supreme Court has not definitively weighed-in on the the level of proof necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of validity, and the Court's Radio Corp (1934) opinion arguably sums up the pre-unification state of the law: "The force of that presumption has found varying expression in this and other courts." Of course, the unified Federal Circuit cleared the air by firmly establishing the clear and convincing standard as the standard. In a 2004 article, Mark Janis reviews the history of the presumption - finding that the clear and convincing standard was already the majority rule prior to unification, but that the Federal Circuit made the standard "meaningful once again." His message: "there is no strict, inevitable correlation between the words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by the presumption of validity."

More recently, in KSR the Supreme Court all but suggested one potential petition question: "whether the failure to disclose [relevant prior art] during prosecution ... voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents." A more likely focus may be on reducing strength of the presumption over prior art that was not considered during prosecution.

Question: How would patent practice change if the strong presumption of validity was only applicable over prior art actually considered during prosecution?

Notes:

• I do not believe that the presumption of validity should be reduced. However, I wrote this post to let folks know that it is on the horizon and that a change is somewhat likely during the life of any currently pending patent application.
• Mark Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious Preponderance", 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 923 (2004).
• This post was prompted by an e-mail amongst IP law professors with special input from Mark Lemley, Arti Rai, David Hricik, Howard Skaist, Josh Sarnoff and Tom Field. See also Mark A. Lemley and Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 Stanford Law Review 45 (2007)(suggesting gold-plated patents).

Economic Downturn => Downturn in Patent Filings

PTO Director John Doll was kind enough to provide me with updated numbers on patent filings through March 17, 2009. The PTO's numbers tell the story that original utility application filings and continuation application filings have slowed in FY 2009 while requests for continued examination (RCE's) filings continue to rise. The Office is now faced with a serious financial crisis. Original filings (i.e., revenues) are down to FY 2004 - 2005 levels but the budget and backlog are both at all time highs. Although I the numbers are still being compiled, two of the PTO's other primary sources of revenue - maintenance fees and late fees - are also down this fiscal year.

The first chart below shows a time series for the percentage of continuation applications and RCE filings as compared to the total UPR filings (Utility, Plant, and Re-Issue applications). Remember here, that for most PTO statistics, RCE filings are counted as a utility application. According to this data, 27.6% of all of the UPR filings thus far in FY09 are RCEs - continuing a steady trend of of rising RCE filings. (Note - the RCE data also includes historical data for CPA and R129 filings).

For the next chart, I extrapolated the partial FY 09 data to the entire fiscal year to find some expectation of the total filings for the year. I also removed the RCE/CPA data because most practitioners would not consider those as separate applications. As mentioned above, both the original and continuation filings are down to around FY 04 levels. As compared to FY 08, original filings are on track to drop about 10% while continuations will likely be down over 20%. The large drop in continuation filing is likely an artifact due to the large number of continuations filed at the beginning of FY 08 in anticipation of the looming limits on continuation practice.

In the title of this post, I link the economic downturn with the downturn in patent filings. Some may also link the drop in patent filings with other recent events that may drop the allure of a patent application - namely, KSR v. Teleflex; eBay v. MercExchange; Bilski; Seagate; the prospect of further patent reform; the Second Pair of Eyes review; 750,000 backlog of unexamined patents; and the 26 month average pendency before the first OA.
> Although not in the title of the graph, the numbers do include plant patent filings which have hovered around 1,000 per year.
Of course, other factors may also

Tags: backlog, uspto

Percentage of Patents that were Initially Rejected

This relates to my statements regarding the percentage of applications that receive at least an initial rejection. The graph below shows the percentage of patents issued (2000-2006) that were initially rejected by the PTO broken up into groups of art-units. Thus AU 1630 group actually includes AU 1630 - 1639. Close to 95% of the patents issued through the AU 1630 group during that period were initially rejected before being eventually allowed.

As with the design patent discussion yesterday, the rejection rate above is for applications that eventually issue as patents. For any given application, the effective rejection rate was likely higher because abandoned applications are probably more likely to have been rejected.

This data is now getting a bit old - but it is what it is. This data came from public PAIR before researchers were blocked from accessing it in any substantial way. Since 2006, applicants have complained of increased rejections. My perception that this change is not a shift toward more first office action rejections, but rather a shift toward sustaining more of those rejections in the second and subsequent office actions.

Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO

Over eighty percent of utility patent applications are initially rejected during prosecution. Some areas of technology – such as semiconductors – have a lower rejection rate while others – such as electronic commerce methods – have an even higher rejection rate.

I wanted to compare the result for utility patents with design patents. I pulled up information on 1000 of the most recently issued design patents (all issued in March, 2009) and parsed through the file histories to see how design patent prosecution compares. As the graph below shows, in my sample, only 25.6% of the recently issued patents received an initial rejection during prosecution. To be clear, this 25% rejection rate is for applications that eventually issue as patents. To get an overall picture of design patent rejections, we need to also consider the applications that are abandoned and never issue as patents. Recent PTO statistics show that a bit under 20% of design patent applications are abandoned. Because design patent file histories are kept secret unless a patent issues, we cannot know why any individual case is abandoned – However, the two most likely situations are that the applicant (a) failed to respond to a rejection or (b) failed to pay the issue fee. Even if we assume that 100% of the abandoned cases are initially rejected, that only pushes the initial rejection rate to about 40%.

As the graph below shows, of the 1000 issued design patents in my sample, only 4.1% received a final rejection during prosecution; and only 0.2% cases (2 out of 1000) included a notice of appeal. None of the 1000 cases included an appeal brief.

The design patents in the study had an average pendency of 15.3 months calculated by finding the number of months between the filing date and the issue date. As may be expected, applications that included at least one rejection took considerably longer to issue (21.5 months) as compared to those that were never rejected (13.2 months). (These means are different at 99.9 CI).

Most design patents (58%) in my sample have only one inventor. However, 69% of the inventors are listed as joint inventors. A number of the muliti-inventor patents included trans-national inventorship with inventors originating from two or more separate countries. About 1% of the applications listed at least one inventor from the US & Great Britain. Another 1% listed at least one inventor from both the US and China.

Inequitable Conduct: Trends at the Federal Circuit

In Larson Mfg, Judge Linn revived the call to rebuild the ramparts protecting patent applicants against charges of inequitable conduct. For some sense of history, I used Westlaw to pull-up the past twenty-five years of Federal Circuit decisions and counted the number of decisions that at least mention "inequitable conduct." The result is a clear increase in the number of decisions discussing inequitable conduct. Although the absolute number of Federal Circuit patent decisions has also risen somewhat, the growth rate of IC decisions greater.

The graph below shows the number of Federal Circuit decisions that at least mention "inequitable conduct" for each year 1984-2008.

2009 may buck the trend. As of March 19, 2009, only two decisions mentioned inequitable conduct (Larson Mfg., and Rothman). At that rate, we might project only nine or ten decisions for the entire year.

I use the 'mention' of inequitable conduct here because the stated 'plague' primarily focuses on the allegations of inequitable conduct. The mere allegations of inequitable conduct are certainly harmful to the patentee. However - more than that - they are harmful to the profession and to the patent system as a whole by continually suggesting that patent attorneys and patent agents are facilitating fraudulent activities.

Rooklidge: Patent Reform Damages Provision Violates Seventh Amendment

The following post is by Bill Rooklidge. Rooklidge is a patent litigator and former head of the AIPLA. He clerked at the Federal Circuit in the early 1980's.

Richard Cauley’s March 14, 2009 guest post accurately characterized the damages reform provision of the Patent Reform Act of 2009 as “a judicial nightmare” because of its procedural complications, attendant delay and reversal potential. Two additional problems with that provision merit note: it perpetuates prior art subtraction and introduces into jury trial multiple potential violations of the Seventh Amendment.

Fact-finding and the Seventh Amendment. The Supreme Court coined the term “gatekeeper” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to describe the trial court’s obligation to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” In addition to rulings on Daubert motions, courts also fulfill their gatekeeper role by ruling on motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, motions in limine, evidentiary objections, and jury instructions. The bills’ damages section would enhance the courts’ gatekeeper role, but in doing so unconstitutionally invade the jury’s province as fact finder.

The bills would add to 35 U.S.C. §284 paragraph (c)(1), which would require the court to select from three methods for calculating a reasonable royalty “based on the facts of the case and after adducing any further evidence the court deems necessary.” A procedural rule requiring the court to weigh evidence to select from alternate theories would be void for depriving the patentee of its right to jury trial. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902). A genuine issue of material fact, that is, a dispute over facts that might affect the outcome, requires the issue to go to the jury. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Similarly, the trial court’s exclusion of the entire market value rule under paragraph (c)(1)(A) for the patentee’s failure to make “a showing to the satisfaction of the court,” would violate the Seventh Amendment in a jury trial in which the patentee presents enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating because trial “court necessarily engaged in an independent review of the evidence and substituted its conclusion for that of the jury on the factual issue of compensatory damages”).

The first section of the bills’ section (c)(1)(B) authorizes trial courts to exclude the patentee’s prior licenses for failure to make a “showing to the satisfaction of the court” of three facts regarding the claimant’s other licenses:

“the claimed invention has been the subject of a nonexclusive license for the use made by the invention by the infringer”;

the licenses have been extended “to a number of persons sufficient to indicate a generally marketplace recognition of the reasonableness of the licensing terms”; and

“the license was secured prior to the filing of the case before the court.”

The court also must determine whether the infringer’s use is “of substantially the same scope, volume, and benefit of the rights granted under such license. The second sentence of paragraph (c)(1)(B) requires a similar procedure for noninfringing substitutes for the infringing product or process. And paragraph (c)(1)(C) likewise requires the court to “conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only the portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art.” A court making these findings would invade the province of the jury where the patentee presents substantial evidence on these issues.

Prior Art Subtraction. Section (c)(1)(A)’s requirement for application of the entire market value rule that the “claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art” be the “predominant basis for market demand” is just the latest form of “prior art subtraction.” Use of “specific contribution over the prior art” is an attempt to separate the “gist” or “heart” of the invention from the patent claims, and would introduce the extra step of subjectively redefining the scope of a patent. The Federal Circuit long ago rejected using the “gist” or “heart” of the invention to determine obviousness, see Para-Ordnance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and recently rejected using the “point of novelty” in design patent law. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Stripping the prior art elements out of the claimed invention that has been examined by the USPTO, construed by the federal district court, and relied upon to determine validity and infringement, in no way approximates the “heart” or “gist” of the invention, and that inherently subjective process would be unfair to the patent owner, and would eliminate application of the entire market value to inventions consisting entirely of prior art elements, arguably the vast majority.

Paragraph (c)(1)(C) would limit the reasonable royalty base to the “economic value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art,” replacing apportionment with prior art subtraction. This analysis is no substitute for the sophisticated and nuanced apportionment approach available under existing case law such as Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1133-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Paragraph (c)(1)(C) would address the combination invention problem by stating that for combination inventions “the contribution over the prior art may include the value of the additional function resulting from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or all of the prior art elements as part of the combination, if the patentee demonstrates that value.” This analysis, which finds no precedent in existing case law and lacks any readily definable economic standards, does not even begin to address the problem that subtracting the prior art elements simply does not approximate what the inventor really invented.

Replacement of “contribution over the prior art” with the “essential features” language from the Supreme Court’s recent Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), would just put another label on prior art subtraction. Regardless of label, the bills’ damages provision would drastically reduce patent owners’ ability to obtain reasonable royalty damages, which could not be less fair to those, like independent inventors, research institutions and universities, that have no ability to obtain lost profits damages.

Notes

• Forward Looking Patent Damages
• Patent Reform 2009: Damages
• Patent Reform Act of 2009
• Richard Cauley’s March 14, 2009 guest post
  
• Rooklidge: Reform of a Fast-Moving Target: The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report: rooklidgereform.pdf

Guest Post: Hot Topics in US Patent Reexamination

By Robert Greene Sterne. Rob Sterne is a founding director of the IP firm Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox. I asked him to write about current 'hot topics' in patent reexamination.

The marked increase in the use of reexamination has naturally caused more frequent and closer evaluation and scrutiny of its unique procedures by involved parties and the courts. In FY2008, according to official USPTO (PTO) statistics, 168 inter partes reexams and 680 ex parte reexams were instituted. Compare this to FY2005, where 59 inter partes reexams and 524 ex parte reexams were instituted just three years ago. In short, it is becoming one of the faster developing areas of intellectual property law and, in the words of top PTO officials, it is a true "work in progress."

Developed in conjunction with the Sedona Patent Litigation Conference and a team of my colleagues (and incorporating feedback of dozens of sources including judges, senior officials from the PTO, patent litigators, patent prosecutors, academics, bloggers, and interested members of the public), a comprehensive and neutral white paper overview of this subject matter provides an in-depth review of hot issues currently confronting parties that find themselves in the "parallel universe" of patent reexamination and concurrent litigation in the district courts and USITC. The hot topics addressed include (A) impact of PTO decisions on stock price, (B) reexamination pendency, (C) substantial new questions of patentability, (D) real party in interest, (E) duty of disclosure, (F) protective orders, (G) stay of litigation in view of reexamination, (H) appeals from the Central Reexamination Unit to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, (I) the impact of reexamination on settlement, and (J) page and time limits in reexamination proceedings.

Here is a closer look at three of these topics:

• Litigation Stays: Reality or Myth – The percentage of reexams that are in the 'parallel universe' of district court or USITC patent litigation continues to climb. For example, in FY2008, 62% of current inter partes reexams and 30% of ex parte reexams were in parallel litigation. Judges have wide latitude in granting or denying stays and litigants must carefully evaluate prior stay decisions from their judge and the court they are in to effectively prognosticate how the judge will rule. Especially with respect to inter partes reexams, the grant of a stay can effectively be "game over" for the patent owner.
• Stock Fluctuation: Impact of PTO and Court Decisions on Stock Price – The practical impact of reexam on patent owners can be enormous. There are recent celebrated examples of stocks dropping 40% in hours after the release of a non-final office action rejecting claims in a suit, even though this development is not controlling on a court case because the reexam is not final. Third party requestors engage in litigation in the press by issuing inflammatory press releases that spin the truth. Patent owners need to be prepared for this media battle to protect their stock price. Moreover, the PTO mails decisions to parties in the reexam, putting the patent owner at a real disadvantage in dealing with the potential reexam media war.
• Reexamination Pendency: So How Long Does it Take? – The stated goal of the PTO CRU is 24 months from the time the reexam is instituted to a Final CRU office action or action closing prosecution. By statute, the CRU must handle reexams with “special dispatch.” However, there are no definitive statistics on how long it takes for a reexam to be handled to completion by the CRU and then through appeal at the BPAI. Our current best estimate is that it takes approximately two to four years for the CRU to complete a reexam, typically a little faster for ex parte reexams, and two to four years for the BPAI to complete a reexam appeal. Thus, the reexam process could take four to eight years before it arrives at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on appeal. This is a significant amount of time and requires additional strategy and tactical decisions by the parties.

For additional insight into patent reexamination, download recent podcasts – "2008 Patent Reexamination Trends" (Episode #1) here and "The Parallel Universe of Patent Reexamination and Litigation" (Episode #2) here.Download the latest version of the Sedona Conference related paper referenced above here, where you can read in-depth about the full list of hot topics identified above.

Patent Law Professors on the Move

The lateral market for patent law professors is alive and steaming ahead.

• Scott Kieff has accepted a position at GW law school in DC and will be moving from Washington University in St. Louis. GW may well have the best patent focused program in the country. At any opportunity, Kieff promotes the notion that strong property rights almost always lead to the best outcome.
• Tim Holbrook is off a recent stint at Stanford Law school and is taking a position at Emory in Atlanta. Emory's patent space has been vacant since Margo Bagley left for UVA several years ago. Holbrook is leaving his fulltime position at Chicago-Kent.
• Also leaving Chicago is Katherine Strandburg (from Depaul). Strandburg is taking a position at NYU where she will join Richard Epstein and my undergraduate classmate Troy McKenzie. McKenzie is a chemical engineer, but does not do patent law. Instead he focuses on bankruptcy.
• In a coup, Mark Janis is headed home to Indiana (Bloomington) - leaving his longtime post at Iowa. Janis largely focuses on the interplay between trademark and patent rights.
• Dave Schwartz is moving from John Marshall to fill Holbrook's position at Kent. Before moving into academia, Dave was a partner at a firm handling patent litigation and prosecution.

Each of these individuals have been helpful to me at some point during the past few years. Thank you, and good luck in your new positions!

What is a troll patent and why are they bad?

By TJ Chiang (Professor at George Mason Law School). Professor Chiang wrote the following squib after reading yet another article complaining about patent trolls.

There is much debate and controversy over the term "patent troll." Let me suggest a fairly narrow definition, but one that identifies a category of patents with distinct problems. Moreover, let me suggest that we should talk about individual patents as "troll patents," rather than entire entities as patent trolls. A troll patent is one that:

1. Is owned by someone that does not practice the invention.
2. Is infringed by, and asserted against, non-copiers exclusively or almost exclusively. By copying I mean any kind of derivation, not just slavish replication.
3. Has no licensees practicing the particular patented invention except for defendants in (2) who took licenses as settlement.
4. Is asserted against a large industry that is, based on (2), composed of non-copiers.

The problem with a patent troll—or, more accurately, the particular troll patent—that fits all four conditions above is that the troll patent does only two things. First, it gathers dust in the patent office. Second, it inflates prices on products. The patent itself contributes nothing useful to society, in so far as the people who actually make anything useful would have done it equally in the absence of the patent.

These four conditions also rule out a few non-practicing entities; or, rather, many of the patents held by these entities. University-held patents are largely not troll patents, in so far as they are often on substantial advances where the infringers copy. Individual inventors are also not always trolls. An individual inventor that licenses others to commercialize the invention is not a troll; nor where the inventor actually has something significant that gets pirated. But a patent owner who sits in wait to ambush an industry later, with a patent that does nothing otherwise except gather dust, is a troll.

One hypothetical that will surely be thrown at me is the individual inventor who tries to commercialize the invention, but fails, and then sues the industry years later. This inventor is a visionary ahead of his time who was merely unlucky. On the other hand, this inventor still contributed nothing useful to society. It is worth emphasizing the fact that, by my hypothetical, the industry produced the same technology independently, without copying anything from the patent. In the absence of copying by someone else or the commercialization of the product through the patent, I do not see the inventor as having done society much of a favor.

Reinstating Patents After Failure to Pay Maintenance Fee

In a prior post, I discussed payment of maintenance fees. Ordinarily, three post-issuance maintenance fees must be paid in order to keep the patent in force for its entire term. A large entity pays $980 3.5 years after issuance; $2,480 7.5 years after issuance; and $4,110 11.5 after issuance. If the fee is not paid then the patent will expire at the next 4, 8, or 12 year mark. In that 6-month interim (e.g., between the 3.5 year due date and the 4 year expiration date), the fee can still be paid with a $130 surcharge. Once the patent expires, it can still be reinstated if the fee is paid along with an additional surcharge for either unavoidable failure to pay the fee ($700) or unintentional failure to pay the fee ($1,640). In addition, the Patent Office (PTO) must accept your explanation for the delay. Under 35 U.S.C. 41(c), revival for unintentional expiry is only available within two years of the expiration date. Later revival requires proof that the failure to pay the fee was unavoidable - a difficult standard to meet.

The PTO publishes reinstated patents each week in the Official Gazette. Using those publications, I compiled the following table showing the number of patents being reinstated each year. As the chart show, the number of reinstated patents has risen over time. The absolute number of issued patents is also rising, but at a slower rate. Thinking about this as an applicant's 'error rate' - for the past decade, about 2.5 percent of patents that expire due to non-payment of maintenance fees are later reinstated. This is an incredibly high error rate for a purely ministerial function of paying a fee.

I pulled Patent No. 6,798,824 from the list of reinstated patents that was published in the February 24, 2009 Official Gazette. That patent originally was assigned to InterDigital and is directed to a particular type of spread spectrum communications device. The patent issued on September 28, 2004 and expired four yeas later due to failure to pay the maintenance fees. Realizing its problem, the patent holder filed a petition to accept late payment of maintenance fees on December 19, 2008 and the petition was granted on January 30, 2009. (Note - the petition is not available in PAIR).

Note:

• Cite, Dennis Crouch, Reinstating Patents After Failure to Pay Maintenance Fee, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/02/reinstating-pat.html (Feb. 26, 2009). See also, Dennis Crouch, USPTO Maintenance Fees, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/02/uspto-maintenance-fees.html (Feb. 23, 2009); Dennis Crouch, Formalism at the Federal Circuit: Equitable Plea for Revival is Rejected, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/06/formalism-at-th.html (June 10, 2008) (discussing the Federal Circuit's decision in Burandt v. Dudas); Dennis Crouch, Unavoidable Delay: Ignorance as an Excuse?, Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/08/unavoidable-del.html (Aug. 15, 2007) (discussing the FemSpec case where the DC district court refused to revive a patent - holding that the unavoidable delay standard has a due care element).

USPTO Maintenance Fees

A large portion of PTO revenue comes through applicant’s payment of maintenance fees. Under the current fee structure, three post-grant maintenance fees must be paid in order to keep a patent from prematurely expiring. A large entity pays $980 3.5 years after issuance; $2,480 7.5 years after issuance; and $4,110 11.5 after issuance. If the fee is not paid then the patent will expire at the next 4, 8, or 12 year mark. In FY08, the PTO reported over $500 million in revenue from maintenance fees.

I wanted to look at how maintenance fees are being paid, so I downloaded the past decade of OG Notices and parsed-out notices of patent expiration. The chart below shows some results.

The chart shows survival rates for the four (red), eight (blue), and twelve (green) year marks. Each datapoint represents the average survival rate for patents that would have expired on that date. For instance, of the 2229 utility patents that issued on December 31, 1996, the first fee was paid for 84% of the patents, the first two fees were paid for 63% of the patents, and all three fees were paied for 49% of the patents. (Note – I did not yet add-back cases that were revived due to unintentional abandonment.)

The median patent has an ordinary enforceable term of about 17 years. This is based on the twenty year term which begins at filing of the non-provisional application minus three years of prosecution. If prosecution takes longer than three years, then the term will likely be extended under the PTA provisions.

However, this data shows that the median patent term is actually cut short by about five years because applicants decide not to pay the large final fee.

A third feature to recognize from this chart is that the percentage of patents whose fees are being paid is increasing over time. However, the PTO has indicated that it expects a drop in maintenance fee payments due to the economic slump.

Judge Moore looked at expiration data for patents issued in 1991 in her paper on “Worthless Patents.” Her result is that patents were more likely to “survive” (i.e., have their maintenance fees paid) when they have more claims, more art cited, more related applications, and longer prosecution times. US corporate owners were more likely to pay the fees than individual or foreign owners. She also found that Semiconductor and Optics patents were the most likely to survive. Amusement patents were unlikely to survive.

Provisional Patent Applications: Waiting to File Non-Provisionals

For better or worse, provisional patent applications have always been used as a way to delay patent prosecution. The procedure has become popular as a relatively cheap and informal mechanism for preserving priority of invention without losing patent term. Although a provisional application sets a priority date, the application does not even reach the examination queue until the full utility patent application is filed. Thus, on average, each day of delay in filing the utility patent application pushes the issue date back one day as well. However, provisional applications also serve as a mechanism for extending the tail end of the patent term because the twenty-year patent term does not begin to run until filing of the utility patent.

Provisional applications have become quite popular. In FY2007, for instance, over 132,000 provisional applications were filed and about 30% of recent patents assigned to US companies reference a provisional filing. [Link]

To see how provisional filings are being used, I compiled a set of 65,000 patents that issued sometime between Jan 2007 and Feb 2009 (inclusive). All the patents in the group share the common property of claiming priority only to one or more provisional applications. I additionally excluded patents that made other priority claims such as continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part. Once I formed the set of patents, I then looked at the filing date of the provisional application compared with the filing of the utility application to how applicants are using the extra year of deferred examination. For patents claiming priority to multiple provisional applications, I used the date of the earliest filed provisional application.

The graph below shows the result. The vast majority of applicants wait until the year is almost up before taking action and filing the non-provisional application. About two-thirds of the non-provisional applications were filed with less than ten days remaining in the one-year provisional pendency. In over ten percent of the cases, applicants properly filed the non-provisional more than 365 days after the original provisional filing because of weekends, holidays, and/or leap year.

Two weeks ago, I had a conversation with a patent litigator about the propensity of patent attorneys to barely meet deadlines. He was worried about the potential for malpractice claims against his firm. And, here, I found a surprising number of cases that appear to miss the deadline.

My lingering question for patent attorneys and applicants -- why delay so long? Is it simply a matter of doing work according to deadline? Does it matter that delaying filing the application also delays the eventual issuance of the patent?

References Cited

I compiled a list of the over five hundred thousand reference citations in the almost eighteen thousand utility patents issued in the past two months. (Jan 1, 2009 – Feb 18, 2009, excluding reissues and reexaminations). In this sample, the average patent issued with 31 cited references. This is a skewed average – the median patent only cites 15 references. The vast majority of references (77%) are introduced by the applicant during prosecution while less than a quarter (23%) are cited by the examiner.

Patent documents (including US & foreign issued patents and published applications) represent 82% of the cited documents while non-patent literature represents 18% of the total. As was noted in the comments regarding PTO search tools, PTO searches are overwhelmingly focused on patent documents. Thus, 95% of references cited by PTO examiners are patent documents. (See pie chart aside).

Although – on average – applicants submit most of the prior art, Applicants submitted absolutely no references (zero) 15% of the patents in my study, and the median number of references cited by the applicant is only 7. Applicants cite over 200 references in only 2% of cases. The PTO's stalled IDS rules give the applicant 20 'free' references that can be cited without payment of a fee or further description. About 23% of the issued patents in my sample include more than 20 references cited by the applicant. The chart below is a histogram of applicant submitted references. About 12% of patents are "off the chart." In those cases the applicant cited more than 40 references.

Take-away: First, the data shows that applicant submitted references are substantially different from those cited by examiners. Non-patent literature is an important category of prior art that is largely missed by examiners, and the current information disclosure system does a pretty good job of getting more of that type of art in front of the examiner than he or she would otherwise see. A second point is that most of the time, examiners are not being swamped by reference submissions. It is surprising that 15% of patented cases include absolutely no applicant cited references. On the other hand, folks who submit over 200 references are deliberately choosing to do so. Generally, the very large reference volume comes in cases where the applicant knows that the innovation is important and is looking for more assured protection. In those cases, I don't see the harm in making the applicant somehow pay for the additional resources required to review those references. [Of course, in that case, the PTO should allow more examination time as well]

The next graph shows the average number of applicant-cited references for various top-patenting companies. The size of the blue bar reflects the number of applicant cited reference on average, for that assignee's Jan-Feb 2009 patents. (Scale at bottom). The graph is sorted so that companies with the greatest average number of cites are shown at the top. Although this is not strictly true, the difference between companies is largely a difference in areas of technology. Thus, companies patenting electronics generally cite less prior art than others. You may also notice in this list that US based companies tend to cite more prior art. The final chart in the series shows that – on average, US assignees submit over three times as many prior art references as do their foreign counterparts or patents without an assignee.

Extending Patent Terms

I looked again at patent term adjustments (PTA) for US patents. 3294 utility patents were granted on February 17, 2009. Of those, 2467 (75%) included some patent term adjustment based on PTO delays in prosecution under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). For each of these patents, some additional quantum of exclusivity is added to the end of the patent term so long as maintenance fees are paid.

The median adjustment was just over one year (376 days) with the average adjustment of 430 days. The longest adjustment in the group was over five years (1958 days). That patent (No. 7,490,438) is directed to an automobile door and is based on an application filed in 2000. In that case, the applicant appealed twice. The examiner was reversed both times. The applicant lost 11 potential PTA days for filing an IDS after the first office action.

Notes

• I upted the post to clarify that I am talking about Patent Term Adjustment here (PTA) available under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). PTA applies to patents filed after May 2000.
• See also http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03/extending-the-p.html

Percent of Patents Discussing “Microsoft,” part II

In an earlier post, I introduced some data relating to patents that discuss Microsoft somewhere in the patent document. That post showed that almost 5% of newly issued patents refer to the software giant in some way. That data also showed a strong upward trend over time. The post received a few interesting comments as well as a few suggestions. [LINK] In response, I have added some additional data to the graphs. The first graph below shows the percent of patents that discuss Microsoft (in blue) and now also includes the percent of patents that are assigned to Microsoft (in red). Several years ago, Microsoft publicized their intention to obtain a large number of patents. That intention is becoming a reality, and Microsoft recently obtained its 10,000^th patent. However, only about 20% of patents that discuss Microsoft are actually assigned to the company.

The next graph compares the patents discussing "Microsoft" with other products/companies. Here, I include patents that discuss "Microsoft" (blue), "UNIX" (green), "LINUX" (red), and "Apple" (tan). UNIX has seen some growth, but not much since the mid 1990's. In the past couple of years, the number of LINUX patents have grown dramatically, but still pale in comparison to Microsoft patents. Although the absolute numbers for LINUX related patents are still small, they are surprisingly high based on the anti-patent lore of LINUX developers. Apple has remained steady over the years. Of course, my results for Apple should be tempered by the false positive results that actually refer to the fruit rather than the computer company or its products.

An issue in all these graphs is time lag. The time lag of issued patents may be easily seen by searching for patents that discuss "Google." – The result is only 1342 patents but 4682 published applications.

Percent of Patents Discussing “Microsoft”

I looked at all patents that include the word "Microsoft" somewhere within the patent document. These include patents assigned to the company as well as well as patents that simply refer to Microsoft in the specification or list of cited references. That almost 5% of new all patents refer to the software giant is a sign that the company's technology serves as a creative platform for ongoing developments.

Law Firms That Appeal

A patent applicant has several options after receiving a final rejection from a patent examiner. "After final" practice is a matter of strategy, tactics, and art. The primary approaches are (1) abandon the application; (2) appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI); (3) file a request for continued examination (RCE) arguing against the rejection; or (4) concede scope and narrow the application (probably through an RCE). Each of these approaches differs in cost, timing, and likelihood of success. Of course, success may depend upon whether broad claims are important. And, in the background, applicants know that alternate claims can later be pursued in continuation applications (for a fee).

BPAI Appeals are generally thought to have a higher up-front cost – both in terms of PTO fees and attorney costs. However, if you win, appeals have the benefit of dramatically changing the course of the examination. Often, an applicant's successful appeal results in an issued patent soon thereafter.

In this study, I looked at law firms involved in ex parte appeals to the BPAI that were decided in the calendar year 2008. Of the 4000+ decisions, only about 75% of the decisions mentioned the law firm name in the case caption. Using those names, I constructed the following table of the firms associated with the most decisions during 2008. It is interesting to compare Oblon Spivak and Sughrue Mion – both firms handle over 3000 patents each year - many of them involving electronics owned by non-US entities. Oblon, however, appears to have taken the strategy of appealing while Sughrue may be using alternate strategies. Foley & Lardner is regularly listed in the top-ten firms in terms of the number of patent grants – however, that firm does not make the list of having the most appeal decisions.

Some words of caution on the numbers game: (1) These are ordinarily dominated by lower cost electronics and software patents. (2) Some clients request that docketing go through their office – in those cases, the firm name would not show up here. (3) Focusing on appeals, it may be that some firms not on the list actually filed more appeal briefs. It turns out that in most cases, examiners withdraw their final rejections in the face of a high quality appeal brief.

2008 Rank	Law Firm	Number of BPAI Decisions	Primary Location
1	OBLON SPIVAK	62	VA
2	FISH & RICHARDSON	46	MA
3	NIXON & VANDERHYE	42	VA
4	KENYON & KENYON	38	NY
5	TROP PRUNER	38	TX
6	GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN	36	VA
7	CARLSON GASKEY	35	MI
8	FINNEGAN HENDERSON	34	DC
9	GIFFORD KRASS	33	MI
10	SUGHRUE MION	32	DC
11	BROOKS KUSHMAN	29	MI
12	TOWNSEND	29	CA
13	SCHWEGMAN	28	MN
14	HARNESS DICKEY	27	MI
15	PATTERSON & SHERIDAN	27	NJ
16	ARMSTRONG TEASDALE	23	MO
17	BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE	22	PA
18	RYAN MASON	22	CT
19	FULBRIGHT JAWORSKI	21	TX
20	ALSTON & BIRD	19	NC
21	BARNES & THORNBURG	19	IN
22	WILLIAMS MORGAN	19	TX
23	BIRCH STEWART	18	VA
24	BLAKELY SOKOLOFF	18	CA
25	CAREY RODRIGUEZ	18	FL

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 91

• Statistics on the Use of Means Plus Function Language: Thus far in 2009 (1/1/2009 – 2/8/2009) the PTO has issued 17,206 patents. Of those, only 12% (2060) have a “means for” clause in the claim language.  Looking back one decade, 24% of patents issued in January 1999 included a “means for” clause in the claim language. Looking back two decades, 34% of patents issued in January 1989 included a “means for” clause in the claim language. Looking back three decades, 40% of patents issued in January 1979 included a “means for” clause in the claim language.
• New Funny Blog: http://courtoons.wordpress.com/ by appellate attorney David Mills
• Watch The Symposium: The hardworking folks at Santa Clara’s Computer & High Technology Law Journal (CHTLJ) have posted materials and video from their conference two weeks ago. Those of you who have practiced before Judges Whyte or Ware will certainly enjoy the tribute video. [LINK] [The best portion begins at 11:20 in the Whyte video].
• PTO Transparancy: Readers submitted two additional suggestions for PTO Transparancy
• • The PTO should calculate and publish the expiration date of each patent.
  • The PTO should publish reexamination certificates so that they are searchable. [Via NIPPER]

Federal Circuit Disposition Statistics

The Federal Circuit had done a nice job summarizing their outcomes for the past year. Looking at cases decided on the merits, patent cases arising from district court were affirmed 55% of the time; affirmed-in-part 24% of the time; and reversed 19% of the time.

Federal Circuit Statistics Page