Patent Law Blog (Patently-O)

Whither Obviousness: Narrow Range Anticipated by Broader Range in Disclosure

By Dennis Crouch

ClearValue v. Pearl River Polymers (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Opinion by Judge Moore, joined by Judges PROST and SCHALL)

This case presents a classic law school hypothetical of an invention that is anticipated but likely not obvious. According to the appellate panel, the prior art fully discloses and enables the invention but also teaches that the proposed invention is impractical and does not work well. As discussed below, however, the anticipation holding itself is somewhat controversial because it is based upon the conclusion that a broad range disclosure found in the prior art ("less than 150 ppm") anticipates the narrower range found in the claims ("less than 50 ppm").

A jury found ClearValue’s patent valid and infringed and the district court denied the defendants motions to set the patent verdict aside. On appeal the Federal Circuit reversed based upon the appellate court's own factual finding that a single prior art reference teaches and enables each element of the asserted patent claim.

Background: The patent at issue is directed to a process for clarifying water using a flocculated suspension of aluminum along with high molecular weight quarternized polymers. The listed inventor, Richard Haase continues to be an owner of the patent and also CEO of ClearValue. Haase has filed more than 50 water purification and energy related patents and is also a graduate of the University of Missouri (ChemE + Mathematics + Economics). The defendant, Pearl River was once ClearValue’s customer but later began making its own version of the patented process.  ClearValue and Haase sued for patent infringement and for trade secret violation (for using the process without authority even before he filed for patent protection).

Anticipation versus Obviousness: The appeal focused on anticipation. Pearl River argued that all of the elements of CV's asserted claim were previously disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 4,800,039 (Hassick). The jury found otherwise. As a matter of procedure, a jury's verdict must be supported by "substantial evidence." If not, it must be set aside either by the district court or on appeal. At trial, the defendants had presented their case that Hassick taught each element of the claimed invention while the plaintiffs pointed only to "teaching away" found in patent. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, "teaching away" is legally irrelevant to the question of anticipation. See Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Rather, under 35 U.S.C. § 102 a claim will be anticipated and therefore invalid if a single prior art reference describes "each and every claim limitation and enable[s] one of skill in the art to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention without undue experimentation." Quoting Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

Genus Species Anticipation: The only gap in the prior art disclosure was that Hassick generally disclosed "low-alkalinity systems (i.e., 150 ppm or less)" and "alkalinity of between 60-70 ppm" while the asserted patent claimed "alkalinity less than or equal to 50 ppm." In its 2006 Atofina decision, the Federal Circuit addressed a similar genus-species situation involving a narrow claimed temperature range and a broader temperature range found in the prior art. Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Atofina, the court held that a broad genus range disclosure in the prior art did not anticipate the narrow species range claimed. There, both the hypothetical “person having skill in the art”  (PHOSITA) and the patentee agreed that there was something special or “critical” about the claimed temperature range. The court distinguished this case from Atofina based upon its factual conclusion that “there is no allegation of criticality or any evidence demonstrating any difference across the range.”  Based upon the logical analysis that the narrow range is not critically different from the broad range, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed narrow range was fully disclosed by the broad range and therefore is unpatentable.

Comment – Whither Obviousness: Interesting notion: The mechanism that the court used to distinguish this case from Atofina are very much akin to obviousness principles — looking essentially for synergy or unexpected results that make the narrow range qualitatively different from the broad range.  It seems to me, however, that if these obviousness principles can be used to extend the anticipatory scope of prior art, then other obviousness principles (such as teaching away) should also be relevant.

Trade Secret Negated by Prior Art?: The Texas jury found Pearl River liable for trade secret misappropriations. However, the district court rejected that conclusion based upon an implicit admission by ClearValue that all of the elements of the alleged trade secret were publicly known at the time and found in the Hassick reference.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed without further analyzing the extent that public availability of knowledge in the form of a third-party prior art document is sufficient to disqualify the knowledge as a trade secret. I am not an expert on Texas trade secret law, but the at least the Restatement of Torts is clear that a trade secret “may be a device or process which is clearly anticipated in the prior art.”

 

 

USPTO Maintenance Fees

by Dennis Crouch

[This is an update of my 2009 post on the topic]

Over half of the USPTO operational budget is derived from maintenance (or renewal) fees paid by patentees. Fees are due at 3½, 7½, and 11½ years after issuance and each subsequent fee is substantially higher. Thus, under the current schedule, the first fee is $1,130, the second fee is $2,850, and the third fee is $4,730.  For the USPTO, this comes without any costs — all the work of examining is already complete.  The funds are used to subsidize ongoing examination. The USPTO has proposed to increase the maintenance fees substantially in near future as a mechanism of raising further funds for patent operations. 

The chart below shows the percentage of patents where maintenance fee payments are made for patents grouped by year of patent issuance.  The vast majority of patentees pay the first fee, but only about 50% pay all three. The 12–year delay in paying fees makes the chart appear to be missing data on the right side.

USPTO revenue from maintenance fees has been growing over time — lead primarily by an increase in the number of patents issued; an increase in the percentage of fees paid; an increase in the fees charged; and a decrease in the percentage of small entities who pay only ½ fare.

All USPTO fees are subject to market whims and macro-economic effects.  Maintenance fees are a particular problem because a decrease in maintenance fee payments does not lead to any decrease in workload for the Office. In 2009, the USPTO was suffering under a budget shortfall and I noted that the greatest cause of that shortfall was the dropping rate of renewal.

As an aside – it is interesting to note that, even though small entities receive a 50% discount on maintenance fee payments, they are much more likely to abandon their patents and not pay the mantenance fees. [Link]

Tags: Maintenance+Fees, Academic+Studies, Fees

The USPTO’s Proposed Fees: Understanding Context and Keeping Sight of the Big Picture

Guest Post by Rick D. Nydegger. Mr. Nydegger is the former Chair of the Patent Public Advisory Committee and a Past President of the AIPLA.

The USPTO's release last week of its Proposed Patent Fee Schedule will likely spawn a wide range of reaction. Almost certainly some will raise a "hue and cry" and claim that the USPTO is needlessly enriching its coffers in a way that unfairly disadvantages the community of USPTO users. Others, like Horacio Gutierrez, Corp. VP and Deputy GC for Microsoft, will tend toward a more balanced view. In comments posted Feb. 9, 2012, Mr. Gutierrez observed that "Arguably there is no good time for a fee increase, and some will question whether increasing fees in challenging economic times is the right thing to do. But to us, there should be no question that now is the right time to have a discussion about the benefits of investing in further improvements in patent quality and the potential costs of delaying that investment." Mr. Gutierrez is right – this is the right time to have a discussion, and that discussion, at least in the initial stages, should focus on the big picture questions:

• How important is reaching 10 months to first action and reducing total pendency to 22.9 months by 2015? This is a major assumption that cuts across virtually all the proposed fees.
• How important is it to build a reserve fund equivalent to 3 months of the USPTO's annual operating expense, and how quickly does that need to be done? By some estimates, the reserve may be being funded at levels ranging from 150 million to 300 million dollars per year. Does this rank in importance with reducing pendency? In other words, should the user community be willing to simultaneously fund both of these objectives through higher fee increases, or would the user community prefer to see a more gradual, staged approach to building the reserve fund so that fee increases need not be quite so steep, at least for the next few years?
• Will the currently proposed fee schedule permit adequate investment in critical USPTO resources such as improving its IT systems, and continued hiring, training and retention of qualified examiners? What are the projected costs and time frames for accomplishing such investments in human and physical resources? And do these costs rank in importance with reducing pendency and creating a meaningful reserve fund? One could argue that investment in critical resources such as its IT systems and the hiring, training and retaining of qualified examiners is one of the best things the USPTO could do to improve and insure patent quality.

With any proposal as sweeping as this one, and particularly where the impact goes right to the bottom line, there will be a tendency to want to dig in and debate whether the fee changes proposed for each part of the USPTO examination process are justifiable. This will have a tendency to compartmentalize the debate in a way that may not be helpful. That is not to say that it is inappropriate at some stage to have a candid and probing dialogue between the Office and the user community that is designed to help the user community understand the methodology, models and assumptions behind the USPTO's proposed fees. This can only ultimately help the user community provide more meaningful response and guidance to the USPTO. But before that happens, we should first attempt to provide some sense of priority to the Office on the big picture questions, since those will impact fee setting across the board, and in a very substantial way. In other words, as users, we need to help the Office understand what is most important to us, and then be willing to help fund those priorities.

Once that happens, we can then invite the Office to share the assumptions and modeling (such as cost recovery assumptions, front-end fee vs. back end fees as mechanisms for cost recovery, etc.) that will invite productive dialogue and input on the specific fee proposals on a more individualized basis.

In any discussion of this type, the process has to begin someplace. The USPTO's Proposed Patent Fee Schedule released last week is just that – a starting point for discussion. As users of USPTO services, we will have the opportunity on Feb. 15th and Feb. 29th to engage the process and begin providing response to the Office. PPAC should be applauded for providing a set of thoughtful questions to guide those hearings, with focus on the big picture issues. Hopefully, those of us who participate in the process will understand the need to start with the big ticket issues, and will not let the discussion become embroiled in minutiae.

BPAI Appeals Cyclic Decision Making

By Dennis Crouch

The USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals (BPAI) has an incredibly large backlog of ex parte appeals pending – more than 25,000. In 2006, that figure was less than 1,000 pending appeals. Since then, the backlog has grown month-after-month-after-month. Cases being decided by the BPAI now were fully briefed more than two years ago, and began the appeal briefing process more than three years ago. Most of those are on applications filed at least five years ago with priority claims reaching back even further. The current USPTO solution is to hire more Administrative Patent Judges – 100 new judges this fiscal year with at least that many arriving next year. I agree that this is an important part of the solution. However, in my view simply hiring more judges is insufficient.

The following chart looks at the number of BPAI decisions each month. The pattern reveals the results of a performance rating system (i.e., quota system) used to judge the Judges. Ordinarily, BPAI judicial performance is reviewed two times per year, and that process is reflected in a systematic incentive for the judges to do more work at the end of the fiscal year (September) and at the midpoint (March). The chart shows those months as the high-points for BPAI output and the subsequent months as low-points.

It seems to me that the current cadre of Administrative Patent Judges have proven that they have the capability of increasing their throughput by 60% or more in any given month. But, the Judges only act on that capability when properly motivated. I hate to play the "if I were manager" game, but once these phenomena are recognized, a likely general solution is fairly obvious – provide motivation for the Judges to more often work to their potential. Economists have shown that people almost always act in their own self-interest – that's why personal incentives work. However, in a team environment, personal incentives are rarely sufficient. Most highly successful teams also rely on team and other goal oriented incentives that suggest a culture of success. In my mind, the chart showing high-effort-as-deadline-approaches suggests a commitment to personal achievement but also a lack of commitment to the broader timeliness goal of ex parte patent appeal administration. Of course, timeliness is only one variable in the time-quality-cost equation, and the other important elements cannot be ignored.

As the PTO moves to more than double the size of the Board, now is the time to make structural changes to ensure a better future for this important segment of the Office.

Note - A key feature of the chart above is that the figures for FY2012 are significantly higher than for prior years. Unfortunately, the increase in productivity is still only slowing the growth of the backlog. With the increase in judges, I expect for the backlog to begin declining by the end of this fiscal year. Further, once implemented, the proposed increased appeal fees will also tend to reduce appeals filed.

Reviewing the New USPTO Post Grant Review System with Reference to EPO Oppositions

by Dennis Crouch

Time is flying and the newly revamped host of USPTO administrated post-grant patent procedures is on its way.  As we speak, the USPTO is continuing to develop its rules and internal operating procedures for handling the new options.  This post focuses on the new post-grant review (A.K.A. opposition proceeding), which is being created by splitting the current inter partes reexamination system into two parts: post-grant review and inter partes review.  Current reexamination practice focuses solely on questions of novelty and obviousness based upon prior art in the form of printed publications. The new post-grant review system broadens the bases for review to virtually any validity challenge.   However, post-grant reviews will only be available during a 9–month window following patent issuance. 

Full implementation of the post-grant review system will not be until 2013 & 2014 because the review is only available for patents with a priority date on or after March 16, 2013. The 2013 date is also the implementation date of the new Filing-Date-Priority rules. We will, however, get a preview of the PGR system once it becomes available to go against Business Method patents beginning September 16, 2012.

EPO Opposition Popularity: Europe has a popular opposition system and there is a natural comparison between our new post-grant review and their oppositions.  Around 5% to 7% of EPO-issued patents are opposed during the 9–month post-grant window.  This figures are an order-of-magnitude greater than the proportion of US patents that go through the inter partes reexamination system.

Obstacles to US Post-Grant Popularity: I do not expect that the US system will see the same level of utilization –  at least for some time.  The major legal impediment to filing a post-grant review is the tough new threshold that requires a showing “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged.”  If the threshold is not met, the petition for review will be rejected. This threshold is substantially greater than the USPTO's historic standard requiring a “substantial new question of patentability.” The EPO does not have a similar threshold. Rather, so long as certain formalities are met, the opposition proceeds with a full review with opportunity for appeal, etc.  That said, the EPO opposition proceeding results in cancellation or at least amendment in about 75% of cases.

The other major roadblock to popularity for US post-grant review will be cost.  Current behind-the-scenes discussion peg the USPTO filing fees at over $40,000 for a post-grant review. The equivalent fee for an EPO opposition is under $1,000 (€705).  The availability of limited discovery suggest that the legal fees for post-grant oppositions will also be fairly high.

Guest Post by Tun-Jen Chiang: Functionalism versus Faux Formalism at the Federal Circuit

Guest Post by Tun-Jen Chiang, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law

One of the longstanding myths about the Federal Circuit is that it is formalist.  This is usually levied by academics as a criticism, but no one does more than the Federal Circuit itself to spread the myth.  For judges, being labeled as a jurisprudential machine is a badge of honor.  Thus, even where their true motivation is clearly policy-based, judges invariably couch their opinions in legalistic terms.

The recent dissents from en banc rehearing in Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. provide perfect examples.  The issue in Retractable is an old one: should the Federal Circuit give deference to district judges on claim construction?  Judge Moore (joined by CJ Rader) and Judge O’Malley both argued the court should.  Their dissents each begin with the assertion that the Supreme Court in Markman held that claim construction is a “mongrel practice” with both legal and factual components, and this counsels for deference to trial judges.

Let me start by debunking this legalistic argument.  The Supreme Court in Markman did not hold that claim construction is a “mongrel practice.”  It started off by observing that claim construction is intrinsically a mongrel practice, and then held that the Court would adopt a legal fiction that claim construction was a pure question of law.

Why do I say this?  If it is correct that Markman held that claim construction has a factual component, then the result under traditional common law principles is not that trial judges get to decide the factual component.  Trial judges do not decide facts; juries do.  Some well-known exceptions are for suits in equity, for jurisdictional facts, and for procedural facts.  But nobody contends that these exceptions apply.  The claim-construction-is-factual line of reasoning is a legalistic and logical dead end.

Rather, the case for deference to district judges on claim construction must succeed, if at all, entirely based on policy-based concerns.  Trial judges have better access to evidence than appellate judges, and yet they are more experienced at dealing with legal documents like patents than juries.  This is a perfectly plausible policy-based argument, and is almost certainly the true reason for Judges Moore and O’Malley to seek deference for trial judges.  Too bad they feel the need to couch the argument in formalist terms.

Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making

Last year, Professor Merges and I co-authored this short article on the administration of Bilski. In light of the pending Section 101 cases and Judge Rader's opinion in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen, I thought I would post it here again. Download the twenty-page essay from SSRN.

Here is the introduction:

Now that the Supreme Court has decided Bilski v. Kappos, there is an enormous amount of speculation about the case's impact on patent applicants, litigants, and other participants in the patent system. Most of the commentary is concerned with the holding in Bilski, how this holding will be applied by courts and the Patent Office, and ultimately, the effect of the holding on inventors, and those who hold and seek patents.

We take a different approach; rather than try to cut through the complexity of Bilski, or predict how it will be applied, we talk about how to avoid it. We are interested in how to minimize the cost and confusion that accompany a review of patents for § 101 subject-matter eligibility. To be specific, we propose that the § 101 issue of Bilski be considered only when doing so is absolutely necessary to determine the validity of a claim or claims in a patent. We believe any claim that can be invalidated under one of the less controversial and less complex requirements for patentability—§§ 102, 103, and 112, for instance—ought to be disposed of without considering subject matter patentability. In other words, the Bilski issue should be avoided wherever it is not strictly necessary. To support this conclusion, we present a set of empirical data that indicates that the vast majority of patent claims challenged on subject matter eligibility grounds were also challenged on other patentability issues.

We set the stage for our proposal in Part II, which briefly reviews the history behind Bilski and explains its open-ended holding and individualized approach. The difficulty of applying the Bilski ruling to different types of patent claims leads us to Part III, in which we call into question an accepted (if largely implicit) principle of patent law—that the lexical priority of statutory provisions in the 1952 Patent Act dictates a necessary logical sequence of invalidity tests. We reject this widespread assumption. There is nothing in the statute that requires this.

Indeed, in Part III we argue that in many ways the very idea of a sequence of discrete patentability requirements is conceptually misleading. Claims can be and often are rejected by the Patent Office for multiple reasons, suggesting that at least certain claims suffer from defects that transcend specific statutory validity requirements. We argue further that the policy underpinnings of various requirements overlap in complex ways, so that in reality patentability doctrine does not test for a series of discrete and independent qualities that are distinct from and mutually exclusive of each other. In the same way, transcendent qualities of an invention can influence multiple doctrines simultaneously, with pioneering inventions (due to both a liberal treatment under enablement, and a broad reach under infringement doctrines) being a prime example. This demonstrates again that there is not and should not be a strong separation between various patent law doctrines. Another argument along these lines recognizes that while patentability doctrines are not discrete entities, neither is "the invention" whose validity is being considered. Patent applicants routinely present multiple, overlapping claims, all of which cover fine-grained variations on a central inventive insight or advance. So it is inaccurate to visualize patentability as a stepwise series of tests applied to a single "invention." It is not true for example that "invention X" passes § 101 and should thus proceed in logical sequence to be tested under § 102. One claim growing out of inventive insight X might present no § 101 problems at all, yet another claim in the same patent application might raise a difficult issue under this provision. Each claim, being a unique slice of the overall inventive insight, ought to be considered on its own terms, and in whatever order makes the most sense. Put another way, the mental model of a stepwise sequence of patentability determinations overlooks the highly granular nature in which different slices of the inventive concept are presented for validity testing.

This analysis is further developed in Section III.A. When a claim fails to pass muster under any single test of validity, that claim should be invalidated. No further tests should be applied. We describe this as "chain" theory of validity: once one link in the chain is broken, the claim fails, and there is no reason to proceed further. Beyond that point, any expenditure of resources on validity questions is inefficient. Pragmatic considerations enter at this point. Issues of cost, justiciability, and spillover effects are perfectly appropriate in determining the actual sequence in which validity tests are applied with respect to any particular patent claim. The non-linearity of patent validity tests, together with the principle of efficient administration, yields a simple rule: start with chain links that are, in general, easiest and cheapest to test, and when the chain fails, stop the process. That way, the costliest and most complex doctrines—the trickiest "links in the chain"— are often avoided, and in any event are put off until later. Therefore, § 101 should often be avoided, both at the Patent Office and in the courts. We justify this not only on efficiency grounds, but also by analogy to the Supreme Court rules of avoidance.

In Part IV, we apply this simple principle. It leads to several recommendations. First, though the PTO has good reasons for its longstanding practice of rejecting claims for multiple reasons, we recommend that §101 be used only as an exception or last resort even at the PTO. Next, we contend that the courts should proceed in a stepwise fashion, beginning with §§ 102, and 103, and 112, changing the order of doctrines as dictated by pragmatic considerations, and stopping as soon as a claim is conclusively invalidated. In all cases, the complex and costly process of deciding whether a claim presents patentable subject matter under § 101 should be deferred until very late in the process. Therefore, we recommend, courts should in effect hold off on the difficult task of evaluating claims under § 101—ideally deploying the full § 101 analysis only when that is essential, i.e., when a claim passes muster under the other validity doctrines.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953512. Thanks!

Sarnoff: Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act

In a new Patently-O Patent Law Journal essay, Professor Joshua Sarnoff (DePaul) highlights a set of important problems in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. The essay, titled Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act focuses primarily on the elimination of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and its implications regarding the patentability of material that was either wholly or partially derived from another source.

Professor Sarnoff writes: 

Legislation sometimes is enacted that obviously requires either immediate revision or creative administrative and judicial interpretation. The new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act's derivation and prior art provisions fall in that category. Whether or not the move from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system is viewed as good policy and as authorized by the Constitution, the particular changes made to the prior art provisions may not prevent or invalidate patents on inventions derived from others, i.e., when the applicant has obtained knowledge of an invention from another, original inventor and then files for a patent on the same or a similar invention. In particular, obvious inventions made with unauthorized derived knowledge will now be patentable, given the elimination of prior art section § 102(f). Absent creative interpretations by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts, the new derivation proceedings will not prevent a first filer from obtaining a patent even if the first filer's invention is merely an obvious extension of information derived from another. Further, the new act adds a narrow and poorly understood category of prior art that may generate years of needless litigation to re-settle the currently well-understood boundaries of the public domain. I discuss these problems in detail below.

There is some hope that Congress and the Administration will take Professor Sarnoff's concerns to heart.

Read the article: Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Review 12 at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf.

Prior Patently-O Patent Law Journal Articles include:

• Bernard Chao, Not So Confidential: A Call for Restraint in Sealing Court Records, 2011 Patently-O Patent L.J. 6.
• Benjamin Levi and Rodney R. Sweetland, The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Recommendations to the International Trade Commission (ITC): Unsound, Unmeasured, and Unauthoritative, 2011 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on King Pharmaceuticals: The Printed Matter Doctrine as a Structural Doctrine and Its Implications for Prometheus Laboratories, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 111.
• Robert A. Matthews, Jr., When Multiple Plaintiffs/Relators Sue for the Same Act of Patent False Marking, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 95.
• Kristen Osenga, The Patent Office's Fast Track Will Not Take Us in the Right Direction, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 89.
• Peter S. Menell, The International Trade Commission's Section 337 Authority, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 79.
• Donald S. Chisum, Written Description of the Invention: Ariad (2010) and the Overlooked Invention Priority Principle, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 72.
• Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 60.
• Etan Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law's Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37.
• Michael Kasdan and Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing and Slashing Patent Damage Awards, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 24.
• Dennis Crouch, Broadening Federal Circuit Jurisprudence: Moving Beyond Federal Circuit Patent Cases, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 19.
• Edward Reines and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, Part II, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 7.
• Gregory P. Landis & Loria B. Yeadon, Selecting the Next Nominee for the Federal Circuit: Patently Obvious to Consider Diversity, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Edward Reines, and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Paul Cole, Patentability of Computer Software As Such, 2008 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.
• Mark R. Patterson, Reestablishing the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 38
• Arti K. Rai, The GSK Case: An Administrative Perspective, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 36.
• Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and the New Need to Eliminate Federal Patent Law Preemption of State and Local Price and Product Regulation, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 30
• John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 21.
• Joseph Casino and Michael Kasdan, In re Seagate Technology: Willfulness and Waiver, a Summary and a Proposal, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1.

Accessing Brand-Generic Settlement Data

FTC v. Cephalon (E.D. Pa. 2010)

Peter Loftus at the Wall Street Journal has written a short article titled “Drug Firms Want Patent Documents Kept Secret.”  At issue is a large cache of brand-generic settlement data held by the FTC and DOJ. 

In 2008, the FTC sued Cephalon alleging antitrust violations based on a set of reverse-payment settlements to generic manufacturers companies. The settlements meant that Cephalon could retain market exclusivity for its major drug Provigil until 2012.

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”) requires pharmaceutical companies to submit (to the FTC and DOJ) most major pharmaceutical patent settlements; brand-generic marketing or licensing agreements; and generic-generic agreements regarding the 180 day exclusivity.  Up to now (and according to law), the US government has kept those settlements secret except for (1) times when it challenges a settlement as anticompetitive and (2) aggregate settlement data released in FTC reports.

In its lawsuit, Cephalon has asked the District Court to compel disclosure of the underlying settlement information. According to the defendant, the FTC has repeatedly cited its own analysis of the settlement data, and Cephalon is requesting the source materials “in order to be in a position to respond to any use of the studies in motion practice and to be able to cross-examine experts or other witnesses relying upon them.”  In response, the FTC argued that its studies should be available to the court even if it does not reveal the underlying data because “reliance on extra-record empirical studies for … facts that have relevance to legal reasoning, is a well-established practice in federal courts.”  Of course, the problem here is that the FTC is both the plaintiff and the creator of the empirical study.  In addition to the FTC, a group of 35+ pharmaceutical companies also filed a brief — arguing that the disclosure would be highly prejudicial to their interests in keeping the information secret.   (The pharma brief may have been quite expensive to draft — it was signed by lawyers from 21 different major law firms).

The MMA includes some secrecy language preventing the government from disclosing the submissions “except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding.”

• File Attachment: Cephalon's Motion to Compel
• File Attachment: Pharma Response
• File Attachment: FTC Response
• WSJ Article
• FTC 2010 Study on Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements

A Poor Man's Tale of a Patent

John Smith's book got me thinking about the Charles Dickens 1850 essay titled “A Poor Man's Tale of a Patent.”  The essay — much like Smith's book — derides difficulty of obtaining a patent. In Dickens world, the patent applicant was forced to walk through 35–stages and spend the equivalent of $15,000 in order to obtain a patent. 

But I put this: Is it reasonable to make a man feel as if, in inventing an ingenious improvement meant to do good, he had done something wrong? How else can a man feel, when he is met by such difficulties at every turn? All inventors taking out a Patent MUST feel so. And look at the expense. How hard on me, and how hard on the country if there's any merit in me (and my invention is took up now, I am thankful to say, and doing well), to put me to all that expense before I can move a finger! Make the addition yourself, and it'll come to ninety-six pound, seven, and eightpence. No more, and no less. . . .

Look at the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Patent Office, the Engrossing Clerk, the Lord Chancellor, the Privy Seal, the Clerk of the Patents, the Lord Chancellor's Purse-bearer, the Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Clerk of the Hanaper, the Deputy Sealer, and the Deputy Chaff-wax. No man in England could get a Patent for an Indian-rubber band, or an iron-hoop, without feeing all of them. Some of them, over and over again. I went through thirty-five stages. I began with the Queen upon the Throne. I ended with the Deputy Chaff-wax. . . .

I will now conclude with Thomas Joy. Thomas said to me, when we parted, 'John, if the laws of this country were as honest as they ought to be, you would have come to London - registered an exact description and drawing of your invention - paid half-a-crown or so for doing of it - and therein and thereby have got your Patent.' My opinion is the same as Thomas Joy.

The British government was apparently quite moved by the essay and quickly passed the Patent Law Admendment Act of 1852 that established a single office to control patenting. It was not until 1883 that the British Patent Office began a limited examination of the patents — although even at that time the concern was only whether the specification sufficiently described the invention.  As you might expect, Dickens tale was an exaggeration.  The UKIPO reports that in 1850, a patent applicant only needed to visit seven offices (paying the appropriate fee at each).

In a recent essay, Professor Scott Kieff uses Dickens to argue against further layers of post-grant opposition procedures — writing that “[t]oday's patent system already too closely resembles the burdensome and byzantine procedures described in Dickens' A Poor Man's Tale of a Patent. Adding subsequent windows of administrative review will only make matters worse. A better direction is to strip away the range of inter partes administrative procedures and adopt the set of changes to court litigation that are proposed below.” Kief's proposed changes include “easier access to enhanced damages” and a reduction of the presumption of validity. F. Scott Kieff, The Case For Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over Second-Window Review And Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn't Fit All, How Could Two Do The Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937 (2009).

• Read the full Dickens essay
• Steinbeck on Patents

 

 

IN DEFENSE OF SOFTWARE PATENTS - PART 2

Guest Post by Martin Goetz

 

Back on November 30, 2009, Patently-O published my article “In Defense of Software Patents” in response to the editorial “Abandoning Software Patents” by Ciaran O’Riordan, Director of End Software Patents (posted on Patently-O on November 6, 2009) which had as its premise that software companies are trying to protect “software ideas”.

 

In this article I comment on the Bilski Opinion as well as give some concrete examples of software-only patents as well as hardware/software patents. Also, my previous article received hundreds of comments, many being negative, and part of this new post is in response to those negative comments.

 

Since the June 28^th Supreme Court Bilski decision there have been many articles[1] on what the Opinion stated and inferred about the patentability of software.

 

The Opinion restated what previous Supreme Courts concluded: that laws of nature, physical phenomena, mathematics, mathematical formulas (by themselves), algorithms (by themselves), and abstract ideas (which would include software ideas) are not eligible for patent protection.

 

While the Bilski Opinion never directly questioned the patentability of software, the Justices wrote extensively about the meaning of Section 101, the meaning of the term “process” and why the test for patent eligibility should not exclusively be “the machine-or –transformation test”. Justice Kennedy, with the concurrence of all other Supreme Court members, wrote that the Information Age puts innovation in the hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law (and the Patent Office) to determine who should or should not receive patent protection.[2]

 

My November 2009 Patently-O article “In Defense of Software Patents” produced hundreds of comments. Many wrote that they were against the patenting of software because software was an “algorithm” or “mathematics”. In that article my primary argument was that a computer software invention is as patentable as a computer hardware invention and the only difference is the mode of implementation. My thesis was that Software Product companies in the Software Industry are looking to patent a machine process and not a computer program, which is protected by the copyright law. I showed why software product companies can be viewed as high technology manufacturing entities and should be just as eligible for patent protection as computer hardware companies.   

 

In this article I give examples of patents where the preferred implementation of an inventive machine process is in software (via a computer program[3]), hardware (via circuitry), or a combination of both software and hardware.

 

There is little argument that “processes” and “machine processes” are patentable subject matter[4] The question has always been about the nature of software and what one is trying to patent. For over 40 years I have been involved in that argument since I received the first software patent in 1968 for an innovative way to sort large amounts data on a computer that had tape drives that could only read and write data in a forward direction (See Patent # 3,380,029, Sorting System, Issued April 23, 1968).

 

The Sorting System patent was dubbed a software patent but it could also have been a computer hardware patent. It was dubbed a software patent solely because the preferred implementation (the disclosure) was a logic chart (which is recognized by the patent office as a proper disclosure). My Sorting System patent would not have been controversial if the disclosure had been hardware circuitry since there were many hardware patents for sorting data on special-purpose computers and special apparatus. In my patent application I referenced six of those patents which all had unique hardware circuitry in their patent disclosure. Three of them are available online, courtesy of Google Patent Search[5].

 

From 1968 through 1980 my previous company, Applied Data Research filed Amicus briefs in the Prater & Wei, Benson, Johnson, Flook, and Diehr cases in which we argued that a machine process patentable in hardware is equally patentable in software. Here is exactly how we posed a “Question of Law” “in our 1980 Diehr brief:

Whether a computerized machine or industrial process that is patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101 when constructed with a hardware program (wired circuits) would also be patentable subject matter when constructed with a stored computer program (i.e., firmware or software)?

The USPTO is currently in agreement with that “Question of Law” when in 1996 it published its Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions (Final Version).  The Guidelines stated in its Introduction the following: “The Guidelines alter the procedure office personnel will follow when examining applications drawn to computer-related inventions and are equally applicable to claimed inventions implemented in hardware or software.”

 

In that 1980 Diehr brief we also posed the following argument to the Supreme Court:

An inventor demonstrates his new invention to his patent attorney with great pride; he has developed a cabinet for reading books out loud to the blind. The cabinet contains both a reading and talking computer. After the demonstration, the patent attorney responds:

 

What's inside the cabinet? Did you build it with software or hardware (a stored program or hardware circuitry)? If built with a hardware program, your machine would be patentable. But if you built it with a stored program, the Patent Office would say it was merely mathematics and, therefore, unpatentable.”

The example above of a hypothetical “cabinet for the blind” invention was back in 1980 in our Diehr Amicus brief.

 

Twenty years later, in 2000, a renowned inventor, Ray Kurzweil received a patent named Reading System which Reads Aloud From An Image Representation Of A Document. The patent disclosure shows a diagram of a monitor, scanner, speakers, and a PC computer composed of a processor, storage and a keyboard. The essence of the disclosure and the invention is a logic chart describing a machine system which interacts with a speech synchronizer and the various devices.  

 

The first sentence of the abstract in the patent stated “a reading system includes a computer and a mass storage device including software comprising instructions for causing a computer to accept an image file generated from optically scanning an image of a document.”

 

At that time, Ray Kurzweil’s company, Kurzweil Educational Systems marketed a special purpose hardware/software system called the Kurzweil 3000 Reading Machine which was marketed to the blind and poor readers. Their 2000 year patent protected this product from imitators. Today the company sells a software only system called Kurzweil 3000 and continues to have the protection of the patent system thru his original 2000 patent and with additional patents e.g., Reducing processing latency in optical character recognition for portable reading machine (which is a software-only patent).

 

Few would argue that the Kurzweil 3000 Reading Machine was not an invention and not deserving of a patent.

 

While I am a strong advocate for software-related patents I have always been opposed to the patenting of Business Method Patents (BMPs). In my 2006 article Patents: Where's the Invention? I stated that the Patent Office should do what the European Patent Convention did when it  ruled that anything that consists of "schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers" is not an invention and therefore not patentable.” Justice Stevens, in his Opinion[6] also wanted to ban BMP’s from being patentable subject matter when he concluded that a method of doing business is not a “process” under 101.

 

Although the Bilski Opinion disallowed the Bilski application they stated that under certain conditions business methods could still be patentable subject matter. On July 27^th the USPTO set up more stringent rules for the issuance of BMPs in their Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos. In many ways those guidelines are similar to the way computer software and hardware patents are currently being treated under the 1996 Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions.    

 

One of the greatest challenges facing the Patent office today for BMPs, software or hardware patent applications is in discovering prior art and determining if there is an invention. The USPTO “Peer to Patent” pilot project” which  allows the public (including professionals in their respective fields) to comment on patent applications is still in its infancy, but offers the potential to assist the Patent Office in rejecting the large number of applications that are filed each year. The stated goal of the pilot project was to “connect the USPTO to an open network of experts online.”   Also, private companies e.g., the Article One Partners, a patent research firm, have the potential to significantly reduce the large number of patent litigation cases.

 

In conclusion, while I am a strong proponent of software patents I am very aware, and agree with, many of the arguments against patents because of patent trolls, frivolous patents, e.g. Amazon’s one-click patent, and frivolous patent litigation that can put companies out of business. And I support changes in the Patent Law to reduce those problems. But if one believes in the how the Patent System has fostered innovation and helped the US grow and prosper, then there is no rational reason to eliminate technology inventions that use software as its implementation.

 

In my previous article there were many comments from die-hards that continued to believe that software companies are trying to patent a computer program,  Whether those die-hards still  believe that a computer program is mathematics, or a mathematical formula, or an algorithm, or an abstract idea, so be it. Computer software programs are not what software companies are trying to patent. A software patent invention is on a unique machine process ---- nothing more and nothing less. And the criteria should be 1. Innovation 2. A proper disclosure and 3. Usefulness --- the same requirement that is the criteria for all patentable subject matter.

---

[1] Click below for a sample of many of these articles. Reading the Bilski Tea Leaves For What The Supreme Court Thinks Of Software Patents Comments on Bilski and Software Patents; Here's Bilski: It's Affirmed, But . . .No Decision on Software Patentability; Supreme Court Decision Raises Software Patent Questions; Supreme Court 'Bilski' ruling doesn't rule out software, business-method patents; Software patent debate rages on; Software, pharmaceutical, and business method patents survive; Patent Office Says No to Supreme Court and Software Patents; Death Knell For Software Patents; Software Is Not Necessarily Business Method; Software Patents and Business Method Patents Still Possible after Bilski Supreme Court Decision.

 

[2](Underlining and bold added) (pages 9 & 10) “The machine-or-transformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the Industrial Age—for example, inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible form. But there are reasons to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. As numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital signals. See, e.g., Brief for Business Software Alliance 24– 25; Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization et al. 14–27; Brief for Boston Patent Law Association 8–15; Brief for Houston Intellectual Property Law Association 17–22; Brief for Dolby Labs., Inc., et al.”

 

The Opinion went on to state:

It is important to emphasize that the Court today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent protection. This Age puts the possibility of innovation in the hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law. With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent, creative application of general principles. Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where that balance ought to be struck.

[3] While the implementation is in a computer program, the disclosure for one skilled in the art, are thru flow charts (also called logic charts) and thru block diagrams.

[4]. The Bilski Opinion closely examined the meaning and the words of 35 U.S.C 101. From 35 U.S.C. 101: Inventions patentable: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there for, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

[5] The Sorting Patents below were described thru and/or gates, and as methods and apparatus for sorting data. Sorting Device, Fillebrown, 5/1961 #2,985,864; Sorting Apparatus, Guerber, 5/1960 #2,935,732; Apparatus for sorting of Recorded Digital data, Dirks 3/1966 #3,242,466.

 

[6] (page 15) Because the text of §101 does not on its face convey the scope of patentable processes, it is necessary, in my view, to review the history of our patent law in some detail. This approach yields a much more straightforward answer to this case than the Court’s. As I read the history, it strongly supports the conclusion that a method of doing business is not a “process” under §101.

 

Single-Attorney Prosecution; Compact Prosecution; and the USPTO Backlog

The US Patent Office has long favored a “compact prosecution” examination approach. With compact prosecution, once substantive examination begins, the Office focuses its attention on promptly conducting and concluding the examination.  By reducing the duration of substantive prosecution, it is more likely that the case will be examined by an individual examiner and less likely that the examiner will have to re-learn the technology each go-round. 

From the Patent Office perspective, the long backlog-queue does not hamper compact prosecution because substantive examination generally begins only once the patent application makes its way to the front of the backlog queue. 

The applicant perspective is somewhat different. For applicants, substantive prosecution begins with preparing the patent application and eventually continues with office action responses and potential agreement on final claim language.  I am beginning a project that looks at how the backlog impacts prosecution from the attorney side. As the first blunt analysis, I looked at the prosecution history files for 90 randomly selected recently issued patents and compared the practitioner signature of (1) the application as filed; (2) the first response to a non-final office action (if any); and (3) the issue fee transmittal.

Findings: The signing practitioner (attorney/agent) changed in 71% of the cases.  Of the cases with response to a non-final office action rejection, the practitioner that signed the application was different from the practitioner that signed the initial response 61% of the time. (+/–  11% at 95% CI).

 

Board of Patent Appeals

Although the Board of Patent Appeals (BPAI) is working harder than ever, its backlog continues to rise. The first chart below shows the BPAI’s inventory of undecided appeals in ex parte cases. This only includes fully-briefed appeals whose dockets have been transferred to the BPAI and does not include the thousands of other applications where awaiting briefing. The average timing from notice-of-appeal to appellate decision is 29 months.

I spoke with BPAI officials who identified the jump in early 2009 as a one-time issue involving the bulk transfer of cases that had been previously delayed.

The next chart shows the number of Ex Parte cases decided each month. The average number of cases being decided each month continues to rise. However, the chart also reveals a high month-to-month variability. That variability is explained by the BPAI judge quota system. BPAI judge performance is primarily judged two times per year, and that process is reflected in a systematic incentive for the judges to do more work in Feburary and August and then less work in March and September.

Although the BPAI is deciding more cases than ever, inventory continues to rise because more appeals are being filed than ever.

Law Review Case Note Topics for 2010-2011

Dear Law Review Editors: Please send me a note (dcrouch@patentlyo.com) to let me know about patent law focused articles that you publish in your journal so that I can highlight them on Patently-O.

Student Note Topics: Here are some suggestions for patent law focused law review topics for 2010-11 that I would like to see for my own edification. Please send me an e-mail if you choose one of these.

• Transnational Infringement: Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010). When is a patent "on sale" or "sold" in the US? This note is likely to be published because its subject matter relates to Deep-sea Horizon. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/transocean-v-maersk-speeding-up-deepsea-drilling.html
• Expanding the Printed Matter Exclusion: King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc. and Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/ignoring-non-patentable-elements-while-judging-novelty.html
• Hyatt v. Kappos will come out soon. That en banc decision will focus on the admissibility of new evidence when a patent applicant files a district court civil action to challenge the PTO's refusal to grant a patent. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/en-banc-hyatt-kappos-145.html
• Antitrust and Patent Misuse: Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission and U.S. Philips Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that an anticompetitive agreement between companies to suppress a given technology would not constitute misuse of a patent covering an alternative technology being promoted by the companies). I might consider whether antitrust law is sufficient to deter this type of alleged collusive behavior. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/federal-circuit-holds-line-on-patent-misuse-defense.html.
• Expanding the Scope of "Secret" Prior Art: In re Giacomini (Fed. Cir. 2010). In an important case, the Federal Circuit has expanded the scope of so-called 102(e) "secret prior art." Under the decision, a US patent or published application will be considered prior art as of the filing date of its qualifying provisional application. The case is important because of the large number of provisional patent applications being filed each year. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/federal-circuit-extends-the-scope-of-102e-secret-prior-art.html
• Suing Individuals for Patent Infringement: Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc. at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/employee-and-officer-liability-for-inducing-infringement.html
• Written Description Requirement and Post-Ariad Judicial DecisionMaking. I would locate all decisions that cite the 2010 en banc decision in Ariad, write about those decisions and try to uncover whether the separate written description requirement was important to the outcome. See http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554949
• A qualitative analysis of inequitable conduct pleading pre/post Exergen v Wal-Mart. For this study, I would uncover 100+ pleadings that allege inequitable conduct and see whether pleading style has changed. In Exergen, the CAFC emphasized the heightened pleading requirement for defenses of inequitable conduct. http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/08/fraud-on-the-patent-office-federal-circuit-emphasizes-rule-9b-heightened-pleading-requirement-for-defense-of-inequitable-c.html.
• Some of the ideas from 2009 and 2008 have not been taken.

Tags: AMP,+Hyatt,+102(e)

Kevin Collins: An Initial Comment on King Pharmaceuticals: The Printed Matter Doctrine as a Structural Doctrine and Its Implications for Prometheus Laboratories

Kevin Collins has written a new Patently-O Patent Law Journal essay discussing the recent decision in King Pharmaceuticals. [Read the full essay]

On August 2, 2010, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of patent invalidity in King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc. King Pharmaceuticals is most notable for its extension of the printed matter doctrine from objects claims that recite written texts as limitations to method claims that recite speech acts as limitations.

This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the King Pharmaceuticals opinion. Part II argues that the opinion was correctly decided, and it offers an original thesis about the role that the printed matter doctrine should play to enforce patentees’ disclosure obligations and preserve the deep structure of the Patent Act. Assuming that King Pharmaceuticals was correctly decided, Part III addresses the necessary next step in the continuing refinement of the printed matter doctrine. The Federal Circuit must explain why claims like the claim at issue in Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collaborative Services are novel.

Cite as Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on King Pharmaceuticals: The Printed Matter Doctrine as a Structural Doctrine and Its Implications for Prometheus Laboratories, 2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 111 at http://www.patentlyo.com/Collins.KingPharma.pdf.

Kevin Collins is a professor of law at Washington University in St. Louis.

A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights

I have posted a new draft-article to SSRN entitled A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights. The article is currently in the editing process and will hopefully be published later this year in the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology.

As the title suggests, I argue that trademark theory offers the best modern justification for ongoing design patent rights. I suggest that design patents serve as an alternative rule of evidence for trade dress rights and are especially useful when trade dress rights are unavailable (or not yet available).

The Abstract: In a series of cases spanning more than one hundred years, courts and the US patent office have made clear that design patents are not to be justified by a fact that the newly invented ornamental design aids in distinguishing a company's product from those of its competitors. This article reverses that conclusion and argues instead that the trademark-like distinctiveness function that helps eliminate customer confusion is the most compelling policy justification for the continued protection of design patent rights in the US.  In cursory language, a number of courts have suggested that the foundation of design patents policy follows the same incentive-to-create approach of copyright and utility patent law. I tentatively reject this traditional incentive model as unlikely to be important in most situations involving ornamental designs.  Rather, I suggest the better justification for design patent doctrine lies in the notion that design patent rights serve as an alternative rule of evidence for trade dress protection.  However, design patents are not merely a parallel alternative to trade dress.  Rather, the existence of practical differences between the doctrines means that design patents rights are available in situations where trade dress protection is unavailable or uncertain.

This article presents a new set of empirical results to support the theoretical construct that design patents fill a gap in trade dress law protection.  Based on the data, I tentatively reject the oft-stated conventional wisdom that design patents are worthless for many because procurement is too slow, expensive, and difficult.  Rather, based on an analysis of the prosecution history files of a large sample of recently issued design patents, I conclude that the current design patent examination system operates as a de facto registration system.  Notably, more than ninety-eight percent (98%) of the patents in my study were issued without the Patent Office challenging their inventiveness. The dramatic rise in the number of design patents being issued indicates that designers find value in design patent protection, and a study of parallel design patent and trade dress litigation suggests that design patents are serving as a back-up or replacement for trade dress rights.

Notes:

• Download the article at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590 and click on “One-Click Download”.
• E-mail comments to me dcrouch@patentlyo.com.
• If you think my conclusions are obvious, it may be because I have been making similar suggestions on Patently-O for the past few years. Or else your standards are too high. :)

Michel & Nothhaft: Inventing Our Way Out of Joblessness

Judge Paul Michel and Hank Nothhaft (Tessera CEO) have written an important OP-ED for the New York Times. They argue that an important way for the US government to stimulate entrepreneurship and job growth is by giving the USPTO a large bolus of money ($1 billion) to put its affairs in order:

This would enable the agency to upgrade its outmoded computer systems and hire and train additional examiners to deal with the threefold increase in patent applications over the past 20 years. Congress should also pass pending legislation that would prohibit any more diverting of patent fees and give the office the authority to set its own fees.

. . . .

To be sure, not every patent creates a job or generates economic value. Some, however, are worth thousands of jobs — Jack Kilby’s 1959 patent for a semiconductor, for example, or Steve Wozniak’s 1979 patent for a personal computer. It’s impossible to predict how many new jobs or even new industries may lie buried within the patent office’s backlog. But according to our analysis of the data in the Berkeley Patent Survey, each issued patent is associated with 3 to 10 new jobs.

In addition, the pair suggests an “innovation tax credit” for each patent received by a small business:

To encourage still more entrepreneurship, Congress should also offer small businesses a tax credit of up to $19,000 for every patent they receive, enabling them to recoup half of the average $38,000 in patent office and lawyers’ fees spent to obtain a patent. Cost, after all, is the No. 1 deterrent to patent-seeking, the patent survey found.

For the average 30,000 patents issued to small businesses each year, a $19,000 innovation tax credit would mean a loss of about $570 million in tax revenue in a year. But if it led to the issuance of even one additional patent per small business, it would create 90,000 to 300,000 jobs.

Taken together, fully financing the patent office and creating an innovation tax credit could mean as many as 2.5 million new jobs over three years, and add up to 600,000 more jobs every year thereafter.

It only makes sense to help innovative small businesses make their way to the patent office and, once there, find it ready to issue the patents that lead to new jobs.

I have quibbles with the numbers used by the authors. However, I do think that they are on the right track in a few respects — especially with the idea that investing in incentives to innovate is a much more cost-effective and stable policy approach as compared with hiring folks to do government work.

Notes:

• Read the full Op-Ed: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/opinion/06nothhaft.html
• As academic quibbles: 
  • The statement that “each issued patent is associated with 3 to 10 new jobs” cannot be derived from the Berkeley Patent Survey.  However, I don’t see that figure as unreasonable or unlikely. It would be helpful to see how the authors calculated this figure.
  • In addition, it is important to recognize that patents are just one step along the road toward job creation. The idea is that patents can provide confidence and stability in business potential ventures.  That confidence and stability leads to investment and job creation.

An Empirical Study of the Role of The Written Description Requirement in Patent Prosecution

[Download the Draft Essay]

Essay Overview: In the pending case of Ariad v. Eli Lilly, an en banc Federal Circuit is considering whether Section 112 of the Patent Act as properly interpreted includes a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. Although the USPTO has no direct role in the infringement dispute, the government submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing that a separate written description requirement is “necessary to permit the USPTO to perform its basic examination function.” However, when pressed during oral arguments the government could not point to any direct evidence supporting its contention.

This essay presents the results of a retrospective empirical study of the role of the written description requirement in patent office practice. It is narrowly focused on rebutting the USPTO’s claim that the separate written description requirement serves an important role in the patent examination process. To the contrary, my results support the conclusion suggested by Chief Judge Michel during oral arguments that it is indeed “exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on written description.”

For the study, I analyzed 2858 Board of Patent Appeals and Interference (BPAI) patent opinions decided January-June 2009. Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the decisions in my sample. Perhaps surprisingly, I found that none of the outcomes of those decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely eliminated the written description requirement of Section 112 so long as the USPTO would still be allowed to reject claims based on the addition of “new matter” (perhaps under 35 U.S.C. Section 132). New-matter style written description requirement rejections were outcome-determinative in 20 of the 2858 cases – about 1.0% of the cases in my sample. (I am very confident that the PTO will retain its ability to make new matter rejections even if the separate written description requirement is eliminated.)

Although there may be valid reasons for retaining a separate written description requirement, this study safely leads to the conclusion that the government’s conclusory statements regarding the doctrine's critical importance for patent examination lack a factual basis.

Continue reading the essay. [PDF]

These results fit well with those of UMKC professor Christopher Holman that he reported in his 2007 article, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and PTO , 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 62 (2007).

Design Patents: Mueller & Brean

Professor Janice Mueller & Daniel Brean have posted a new working-draft article on design patent protection. The article argues "that courts and the USPTO have previously unrecognized flexibility in how they apply the nonobviousness requirement to designs." The authors recommend, inter alia, that courts (1) recognize that nonobviousness jurisprudence (e.g., KSR) has "very limited, if any, applicability to design patentability"; (2) plant patent patentability requirements serve as a better example; (3) the perspective of a non-expert ordinary observer should be used when considering nonobviousness; and (4) design anticipation should be limited to "strict identity situations."

Read the article here.

Claim Construction: A Structured Framework*

Guest post by Professor Peter S. Menell (UC-Berkeley School of Law); Matthew D. Powers (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP); and Steven C. Carlson (Fish & Richardson PC) 

The construction of patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent case. It is central to evaluation of infringement and validity, and can affect or determine the outcome of other significant issues such as unenforceability, enablement, and remedies. Yet jurists and scholars have long lamented the challenges of construing patent claim terms. The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), stands as the most authoritative decision on claim construction doctrine. But while putting to rest various controversies, many core tensions in claim construction persist. Moreover, the decision itself does not provide a step-by-step approach to construing claims. This commentary provides a structured road map.

Reissue Applications over Time

In 2008, the patent office reissued over 640 patents – breaking the prior record of 630 set in 1875. The historic numbers of reissued patents are shown in the first chart below grouped according to year of reissuance.

Although today's absolute numbers rival historic highs of the 19th century, today's relative number of reissued patents is close to the all-time low. The next chart shows the relative percentage of reissues as compared to utility patents granted (denominator based on a moving average of patents issued over of the prior ten years).

The final chart shows a time series of the average reissue pendency as measured from the reissue application filing date to the reissuance date. As is apparent, the pendency has been growing dramatically since 1997. 2009 looks to mark a second record – the first time that average prosecution pendency of reissues applications will be greater than five years.

Background: The reissue process is designed to allow a patent holder to correct a defective patent and is nestled between certificates of correction (minor errors) and reexamination. 35 U.S.C. §251 spells out particular defects that may be corrected in the process: Defect in the specification; Defect in the drawing; Error in claiming too much; or Error in claiming too little. In Medrad, the Federal Circuit broadly read these final two defects to "encompass any error that causes a patentee to claim more or less than he had a right to claim." Medrad, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, 466 F.3d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A major limit on the reissue process is that "[n]o reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent." Section 251, final paragraph. The limit on improper broadening of reissues is strict and applies when claims are "broader in any respect." Predicate Logic, Inc. v. Distributive Software, Inc., 544 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Published Applications as Prior Art

[edited to fix my pre-coffee typos where my eyes though provisional = published]

In 2001, the USPTO published its first patent application. Since then, almost two-million patent applications have published. During this same time period, about 1.3 million patents issued. There are a couple of ways that the prior art created by patent applications change the prosecution game. First, published applications increase the sheer volume of prior art. Most notably, around ten percent of the published applications will never issue and would not have been otherwise published. And, even if published elsewhere at a later date, applicants would be faced with the later 102(a) effective date rather than the 102(e) effective date associated with a published application. This ties in with the second importance of published patent applications — they bring innovations to light more quickly and in a manner that patent examiners can readily use. Along these lines, the early publication of published applications triggers the clock for the statutory bar of 102(b).

Looking at patents issued during the past four years, I calculated the average percent of cited references that are US published patent applications. As you might expect, that figure has been rising steadily – doubling from under 6% in 2006 to almost 12% for patents issued in the early part of 2009. The evidence shows that examiners are using the patent applications. On their own examiner’s locate 41% of all cited US patent application publications even while locating only 25% of other cited references. (The remaining references are submitted by the applicant).

Note, this post was prompted by an interesting series of comments on IPWatchdog questioning whether this newly available prior art has been a factor in the dropping allowance rate.

Priority Claims in Issued Patents

Patent families continue to grow. With the increasing popularity provisional patent applications, most issued patents now claim priority to at least one prior patent filing. I created a database of all priority claims for non-reissue utility patents issued February 14, 2006 – February 17, 2009 (Pat. Nos. 7,000,000 – 7,493662). In fact, only 31% of the patents have no listed priority claims. For the graph below, I looked at the earliest listed priority date (one for each patent) and then categorized those according to the type of priority claim. 40% of the earliest claims were to foreign patent filings, and 18% claimed earliest priority to a provisional patent application. The remaining 11% earliest priorities reached back via US continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part (CIPs).

Diverging Claim Constructions

Yesterday raised a valuable discussion on claim construction with many excellent comments on the Cotropia-Bey article. The issue is obviously important since claim construction disputes arise in virtually every attempt to enforce a patent. One problem with claim construction in litigation is that the district court follows a completely different process of claim construction than do PTO examiners. The rules suggest that the two claim construction scopes should form concentric circles with the PTO's broad construction and the Court's narrower construction. The reality is that it is hard to form these concentric circles -- especially with complex claims. And, it is virtually impossible to form concentric circles of construction using such distinct construction processes. Instead of nested constructions, in many cases the outcome of the district court tends to diverge from that suggested during prosecution.   

It seems odd that the patent prosecution process does not focus on determining the correct meaning of the claims. The better approach may well be to allow the original examination to determine the correct meaning of claims in a way that can be followed by courts down the line. I suspect that this approach would actually lead to more valid patents -- especially if examiners applied a stronger hand on issues of indefiniteness.

Notes:

• Joel Miller's 2006 JPTOS article in the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation standard is available here.
• Mark Lemley and Dan Burke recently wrote a paper arguing that we should admit defeat and move to a central claiming system. Their analogy is that claims might be better used as sign-posts rather than fence-posts. [Link]
• Lemley's 2005 article on The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms is also a good read. [Link]

The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office's 'Broadest Reasonable Interpretation' Standard

Chris Cotropia (Richmond Law) and Dawn-Marie Bey (King & Spalding) have an interesting draft article out on the PTO's "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard for interpreting claims during patent prosecution. The article notes that the increase in post-grant reviews (reexaminations) running concurrently with infringement litigation raises the stakes of the PTO's standard.

From the abstract:

Although there has been much commentary on patent claim interpretation methodology in general, very little has been written about the unique interpretation approach the Patent Office employs. The courts, starting with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and continuing with the Federal Circuit, instruct the Patent Office to give every applied-for claim its 'broadest reasonable interpretation' (BRI) during patent examination. This Article explores this special standard and concludes that not only are the previously articulated rationales behind the BRI standard severely lacking, the standard is also contrary to both the patent statutes and the concept of a unitary patent system. The BRI standard additionally allows patent examiners to avoid difficult claim interpretation issues, leads to improper and uncorrectable denials of patent protection, and is incurably ambiguous.

Notes:

• Read the article here.
• MPEP 2111 "CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION"
• Ex parte Koo (BPAI 2008) (PTO Should Apply Broadest Reasonable Claim Interpretation to Section 101 Analysis)

The Effectiveness of Examiner Interviews

Often, a face-to-face discussion can help two parties resolve a sticky dispute. In patent prosecution, the patent applicant can request to sit down interview with an examiner to discuss the examiner's rejections. See 37 CFR 1.133. The interview can be face-to-face or via telephone or even video conference. Law firms located across the street from the PTO tend to tout the value of examiner interviews while those outside of DC tend to downplay their significance.

I recently created a database of about 17,000 patent applications filed 2000–2005. For each of those applications, I also have a listing of the prosecution history that indicates the timing of any examiner interview. I used this data to consider the effectiveness of examiner interviews. Note two important caveats: I did not look at the underlying documents in the file wrapper, and my data does not distinguish between interviews in person and those done at a distance.

The results: Overall 18% of applications were associated with an examiner interview. I broke the data into two groups.

Early Interviews: In what I call the "early interview" group are applications where the examiner interview took place prior to the mailing of any final office action. Applications in the early interview group had the same grant rate as those that did not have an early interview (70% grant rate of terminated cases). However, those with an interview tended to stay pending longer, and be more likely to have an RCE in the file history.

Late Interviews: In what I call the "late interview" group are applications where an examiner interview took place after a final office action was mailed. Applications in the late interview group had a much higher grant rate than did applications where a final action was mailed but the case was not subsequently interviewed. Here, 74% of those in the late interview group were allowed as compared with only 60% other applications where a final action was mailed. (+/– 3% at 95% CI).

Interviews by Organization: The table below looks at the top twenty filing organizations (as listed in the application correspondence) in my dataset based on the number of applications filed 2000-2005. For each organization, the table lists the number of applications that were interviewed, number of issued patents, percent of cases interviewed, and the percent of cases patented. (Note, this percent of patented cases includes still pending cases in the calculation instead of only terminated cases and is consequently lower than the rates reported above). Although these are organizations who filed the most applications, readers should note that they represent less than 20% of all filed patent applications.

Organization	Number of Applications in Database	Applications with Interviews	Number of Issued Patents	Percent of Cases Interviewed	Percent of Cases Patented
OBLON SPIVAK	374	107	241	29%	64%
SUGHRUE MION	248	35	150	14%	60%
BIRCH STEWART	210	46	138	22%	66%
HEWLETT PACKARD	190	26	91	14%	48%
OLIFF BERRIDGE	172	60	124	35%	72%
Harness Dickey	171	37	92	22%	54%
FOLEY LARDNER	153	25	93	16%	61%
KNOBBE MARTENS	138	27	73	20%	53%
NIXON VANDERHYE	138	21	82	15%	59%
FISH RICHARDSON	136	30	74	22%	54%
FINNEGAN HENDERSON	129	18	68	14%	53%
MCDERMOTT	119	14	80	12%	67%
Blakely Sokoloff	115	15	65	13%	57%
STAAS HALSEY	109	21	60	19%	55%
FITZPATRICK CELLA	108	19	74	18%	69%
TOWNSEND	108	22	65	20%	60%
ANTONELLI TERRY	101	12	68	12%	67%
PHILIPS IP	93	9	54	10%	58%
YOUNG THOMPSON	92	12	50	13%	54%
WENDEROTH LIND PONACK	91	22	57	24%	63%

  

Patent Application Pendency: Percent of Applications Still Pending

The large backlog of cases at the PTO has added greatly to the problem of long patent application pendency. There are other contributors to the problem – such as applicants and examiners unwilling to reach a compromise solution (often based on the demands of superiors).

To provide some measure of pendency, I created a database of 20,000+ randomly selected patent applications and issued patents filed 2000 - 2007. For each of case, I tallied the final status as of mid-July 2009. (Status is either patented, abandoned, or pending). Using that data, I created a chart of the percent of utility applications still pending as of July 2009. This data can be helpful for someone considering whether their still-pending application is an anomaly. Over 84% of the applications filed in 2007 are still pending (+/– 2% at 95% CI) , while less than 1% of applications filed in 2000 are still pending (+/– 1% at 95% CI).

The second chart standardizes the same data according to the amount of time in prosecution.

Notes:

• This data only includes applications that were either (1) published or (2) patented. I do not know the percentage of cases unpublished cases that are still-pending versus those that are abandoned.
• The data presented here does not distinguish between technology centers, continuations, etc. The still-pending rates varies considerably within those different categories.
• The pendency rate for applications filed Q4 2004 appears unexpectedly high and the rate for Q1 2005 appears unexpectedly low.. That is at least partially explained by a data collection artifact. My data sample includes a relatively large number of applications filed in late December 2004 and early January 2005 rather than being more evenly distributed throughout the respective three months.

The Changing Nature Inventing: Collaborative Inventing

Although inventing can still be a solo endeavor, patenting data indicates that paradigm no longer predominates. Over the past four decades, the number of inventors per patent has steadily crept upward. The first chart below shows the average number of inventors per patent moving from 1.6 for patents issued in the 1970’s to 2.5 for patents issued since 2000.*

As the chart below shows, this rising average is being driven by a dramatic increase in the proportion of “highly collaborative” inventions with three or more listed inventors. That rise is coupled with a proportional decrease in the proportion of solo inventions. Interestingly, the proportion of two-inventor patents has stayed relatively steady throughout the entire time period.

Some areas of technology lend themselves to team work. Biotech research and drug development is typically extremely expensive and done in structured teams while lower-tech areas may not be so structured. Compare, for instance patents in classes 514 (drugs) and 435 (chemistry of molecular biology) with patents in classes 135 (tents) and 297 (chairs). The first group averages three times the number of inventors as the second group.

It may also be that team-built inventions are more likely to get funding and be patented. Thus, non-US applicants are more likely to spend patenting money in the US on multi-inventor applicants. Likewise, multi-inventor applications are likely to have larger patent families through continuations and CIPs.

The rugged individualists are still out there – they are just getting more lonesome.

Notes:

• This data is derived from a sample of 750,000 patents issued from August 1971 through February 2009. All reported results are significant at the 99% confidence level.

Inter Partes Reexamination Statistics

In August 2008, Messrs Baluch and Maebius of Foley & Lardner published an interim report on the results of inter partes reexamination proceedings. At the time of their writing, however, only 30 inter partes reexaminations had been pushed-through to conclusion with a reexamination certificate. In the past year, that total has more than doubled to 73 issued reexamination certificates.

Of course, the main point about inter partes reexaminations is that the process can be incredibly slow if either party pushes. Only about 50% of the inter partes reexaminations filed 2001-2005 have been completed either through issuance of a reexamination certificate (on the merits) or procedurally terminated. Overall, the reexamination certificates took an average of 37.5 months to issue (median of 34.4 months). When all is said and done, this pendency will be much longer since the slow and/or hotly disputed cases are all still pending. Only one (1) of the completed cases received a BPAI decision (all claims were cancelled after BPAI affirmed) and no completed cases have received a court decision.

Results of the reexamination certificates: Inter partes reexaminations continue to show promise as a mechanism for "killing" patent claims. Of the 73 issued reexamination certificates, 60% (44) cancel all the claims and only 12% (9) confirm all the original claims as patentable. The remaining 27% (20) change the claimset in some way. For the 19 inter partes reexamination certificates issued on patents with co-pending litigation, 42% (8) resulted in all claims being cancelled; 5% (1) confirmed all claims as patentable; and 53% (10) changed the claimset in some fashion.

    

Evidence Based Prosecution: The Status of Applications Filed 4 ½ Years Ago

This morning I created a dataset of prosecution information for 462 randomly selected utility patent applications filed in December 2004 and January 2005 to get a sense of where those applications stand after 4 ½ years of prosecution. Overall, 48% of the applications have issued as patents; 26% have been abandoned; and 26% are still pending. (Note – I excluded the 12% of cases from my sample that were never published as applications because data is not available for most of them).

Table 1 below shows the detailed status for each case as provided by the USPTO's PAIR system. All but two of the pending cases have received at least an initial examination. The two still-unexamined cases are both software-related applications.

High-Level Status	Status	Percent of Cases
Patented	Patented Case	47.8%
Abandoned	Abandoned -- Failure to Respond to an Office Action	25.2%
Abandoned	Abandoned -- Failure to Pay Issue Fee	0.7%
Abandoned	Expressly Abandoned -- During Examination	0.2%
Pending	Non Final Action Mailed	8.9%
Pending	Final Rejection Mailed	6.4%
Pending	Response to Non-Final Office Action Entered and Forwarded to Examiner	5.0%
Pending	On Appeal -- Awaiting Decision by the Board of Appeals	1.0%
Pending	Notice of Allowance Mailed -- Application Received in Office of Publications	1.0%
Pending	Notice of Appeal Filed	0.7%
Pending	Publications -- Issue Fee Payment Verified	0.5%
Pending	Examiner's Answer to Appeal Brief Mailed	0.5%
Pending	Docketed New Case - Ready for Examination	0.5%
Pending	Appeal Awaiting BPAI Docketing	0.5%
Pending	Withdrawn Abandonment awaiting examiner action	0.2%
Pending	Response after Final Action Forwarded to Examiner	0.2%
Pending	Appeal Brief (or Supplemental Brief) Entered and Forwarded to Examiner	0.2%
Pending	Advisory Action Mailed	0.2%
Table 1

An often frustrating aspect of application pendency is that abandoned cases can be kept alive by filing a continuation application. Of those cases that have been either patented or abandoned, 25% have one or more descendents in the form continuation or CIP applications. (I have not determined whether those continuations are themselves still pending.)

Of the cases already completed (no longer pending), the median patent took 2.6 years to issue while the median abandonment did not occur until 3.1 years into prosecution. Along this line, the longer a case was pending, the greater the likelihood that the case was abandoned. Thus, 71% of cases that were pending for fewer than three years were allowed while only 29% of cases that were pending for three to four and a half years were allowed.

The chart below shows the percentage of applications pending as a function of the number of years in prosecution. Although the average time in prosecution for this cohort cannot be calculated yet (because so many cases are still pending), the median time in prosecution – as seen in the chart – is 3.3 years.

The patent office examination corps is divided into various technology centers. In my sample, TC 2800 (Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components) had allowed the highest percentage of cases (70%) and had the lowest rate of applications still-pending after 4 ½ years (3%). TC 1600 (Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry) has the highest abandonment rate (36%) while TC 2600 has the highest percentage of cases still pending (48%).

Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal

By Dennis Crouch     PDF Version of the Article

Abstract:

This study provides an issue-by-issue analysis of decisions on ex parte appeals by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All the cases in this study were appealed to the BPAI after one or more of the pending claims were rejected by a patent examiner. 

In the study, I report that most BPAI appeals focus on two or more issues. Of those, the majority of issues (61%) are affirmed and the remainder reversed. When more issues are presented, the case as a whole becomes more likely to be affirmed-in-part. In addition, I find that the likelihood that a case is affirmed has increased over time (Jan 2008 - May 2009).

By far, the most common issue on appeal is obviousness. I find that 87% - 90% of ex parte BPAI decisions decide an issue of obviousness. Only 4% of appeals consider neither obviousness nor novelty. The major aberration of this trend is for cases involving biotechnology and organic chemistry (TC 1600). 18% of BPAI decisions arising from TC 1600 focus on issues other than obviousness and novelty.

In comparing results by issue, I find that obviousness rejections are more likely to be affirmed than are other types of rejections. Most cases (74%) that discuss neither obviousness nor novelty are reversed.

The BPAI is becoming increasingly important. Over the past several years, the BPAI has seen a dramatic rise in the number of appeals being filed. In addition every recent patent reform legislative proposal has included an increased role for the Board.

Speeding-Up Design Patents

Design patents are cheap and usually involve little prosecution. In a recent report at "Design Day", the USPTO noted that the agency is working to further shrink the timeline. Notably, the average number of days from payment of the issue fee to issuance of the patent has shrunk by 2/3 since 2006. In FY2009 (thus far), the delay averages 52 days while in FY 2006, the delay averaged 140+ days. The average pendency is about 16 months. Applications in the "rocket docket" issue within 6 months on average.

Appealing BPAI Rejections: Part I

My keen research assistant Patrick Barnacle pulled up records on 56 ex parte patent appeals that have been decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit since March 2005. All of these cases arise from rejections sustained by the USPTO's internal Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). We are working to create a more complete database. In the meantime, I wanted to report some preliminary results on timing.

The median ex parte appeal took just over fifteen months to complete as measured from the date of the BPAI decision until the date of the Federal Circuit decision. As measured from the filing of the CAFC Notice of Appeal, the median appeal took exactly one year (365 days). Some appeals took longer: Comiskey, Ferguson, and Bilski each took more than two years from the NOA, but they were all tied to en banc decisions. About 25% of the appeals took less than ten months from the NOA.

Once oral arguments (if any) are complete, the Federal Circuit is rather quick at issuing an opinion. The median decision was issued 47 days after the oral arguments. (Again, a skewed average of 86 days is driven by the handful of en banc decisions) 30% of the decisions came within one week of oral arguments - most of those took one to two days.

We have not yet analyzed the correlation between delay and results, but it appears that especially quick decisions tend to favor the PTO over the applicant. As you might expect, delays in judgment correlate with longer opinions; opinions marked precedential; dissenting opinions; and opinions with Judge Newman on the panel.

Survey: Swearing behind prior art

Take the survey on a separate page Here.

Take the survey on a separate page Here.

BPAI Statistics: How Many Opinions do BPAI Judges Write?

As a follow-up to an earlier post on BPAI decisions; appeal efficiency and potentially over-worked Administrative Patent Judges, I took a look at BPAI decisions from January and February 2009. According to BPAI's statistics, the BPAI disposed of 993 ex parte appeals during that two month period. Based on the PTO's FY2009 numbers, about 9% of those disposals were either remands or dismissals without a decision on the merits. The examiner's rejection was affirmed in 55% of the cases; Affirmed-in-part in 14% of the cases; and reversed in 23% of the cases.

776 of the Jan-Feb 2009 ex parte decisions show-up in the Westlaw database. Those 776 decisions were authored by 78 different Administrative Patent Judges. During the two month period, four judges penned more than 25 opinions, although the average is closer to 10 opinions. (If we assume that Westlaw includes 80% of the opinions, then the average jumps to 12 opinions in the two months – or six opinions per month). On an annualized basis this extrapolates to authoring an average of 72 opinions per year. Of course, this average includes opinions by BPAI administration who regularly write only a small handful of decisions. Excluding those individuals pushes the extrapolated average to about 75 opinions per year for each BPAI Judge handling ex parte cases.

These numbers are comparable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Each of the twelve Federal Circuit judges (not counting Senior Judges) wrote about 28 majority opinions in 2008. In addition, each Federal Circuit judge participated in over 400 cases (most of which were decided without opinion). Thus, while the BPAI judges write more opinions, the Federal CIrcuit judges actually decide more cases.

Notes:

• The lower number of cases found in Westlaw is due – in part – to the fact that many of the cases being appealed are unpublished. In those cases, the BPAI decisions are kept secret. In addition, for some reason, Westlaw is not picking up all of the released BPAI decisions. Still, the Westlaw format is easier to use than the BPAI PDF.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 110

• Tom Bakos and Mark Nowotarski have posted their own inventions on the Peer-to-Patent site. You can review them and add prior art: Invention 1, a Risk Assessment Company; Invention 2, SoberTeen Driving Insurance
• I am expecting an announcement of the next PTO director on Friday (May 8). Jim Pooley is being nominated as deputy director of WIPO and is apparently out of the running for the job of PTO director. The two leading candidates thus appear to be Todd Dickinson and David Kappos.
• If Kappos is nominated, the Peer-to-Patent system (originally funded by IBM) will receive a boost.
• Speaking of WIPO, the US has proposed "comprehensive" PCT Reform "which would result in the establishment of a new Patent Cooperation Treaty, PCT II. The new treaty would serve to better facilitate workload sharing between the patent offices.
• I just looked at Prof. Margo Bagley new article on First-to-Invent published in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal. Her conclusions: "The US First-to-Invent system may be unique in the world but it offers significant benefits to small entity entrepreneurs and others." Bagley sees these benefits as primarily coming through the "robust grace period." When should FITF be adopted? "Only when such a move will provide a clear advantage for small entities by facilitating the adoption of a one-year grace period outside of the US." See The Need for Speed (and Grace).
• Bagley's short article is well received. My one quibble is that she perpetuates the idea that a desire to end interferences is a major motivation in the debate. She says "Eliminating interferences and the uncertainty associated with them appears to be a prime motivation for the FITF legislation." Lets be clear, in the US, proponents of the first to file legislation want to make it easier to invalidate patents by creating more prior art.

Holman: A Contrarian Law Professor’s Two Cents on the Arkansas Carpenter's (Ciprofloxacin) Petition for Certiorari

By Christopher M. Holman, Ph.D., J.D., Associate Professor at UMKC Law School

Professor Mark Lemley recently filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of himself and a cohort of prominent professors of law, economics, and business in support of a petition for certiorari in Arkansas Carpenter's Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer (the "Professors’ Brief").[1] Joining the professors as amici on the brief are the American Antitrust Institute, the Public Patent Foundation, and AARP. These professors and organizations are asking the Supreme Court to review and reverse the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.[2] Arkansas Carpenter's is the latest in a string of certiorari petitions that have been filed in cases involving an unsuccessful antitrust challenge to a so-called “reverse payments settlement” between a drug patent owner and a potential generic competitor. So far the Supreme Court has denied all of the petitions.

The defining characteristic of a reverse payments settlement is the transfer of some form of consideration, often but not always cash, from the patent owner to the alleged infringer. In most settlements of patent infringement suits any payment typically flows from the alleged infringer to the patent owner, i.e., in the "forward" direction. Reverse payment settlements of challenges brought against prescription drug patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act have been controversial for years. The FTC and others charge that these agreements are anti-competitive and result in substantially higher prescription drug prices for consumers (and ultimately third-party payers such as the government). The atypical direction of the payment is considered suspect by many who view it as evidence that the merits of the patent case must be weak, and argue that the branded drug company is in effect paying the generic company to stay off the market and using the patent as a mere pretense to skirt antitrust liability. Clearly, absent the patent a naked agreement by a generic drug company to stay off the market in exchange for cash would constitute an antitrust violation.

Nonetheless, courts who have considered the legality of reverse payment settlements have repeatedly concluded that, in view of the incentives and dynamics created by the unique structure of a patent infringement suits brought under the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is neither surprising nor particularly suspicious to find payments flowing from the patent owner to the alleged infringer in the settlement of these suits. In fact, even the FTC has acknowledged that at least some reverse payment settlements are legitimate and even pro-competitive. In most patent infringement litigations, the alleged infringer faces the prospect of potentially large money damages based on its past infringement, so there is often an incentive to pay the patent owner to settle the lawsuit and avoid this risk. In contrast, Hatch-Waxman litigation generally occurs before the potentially infringing generic drug goes on the market. The generic drug company typically faces no risk of money damages for past infringement. At the same time, the drug patent owner faces huge potential financial losses if even one court finds its patent invalid or not infringed, and given the uncertainty patent litigation, particularly at the district court level, it is not surprising that some patent owners would be willing to pay to settle the lawsuit and resolve the uncertainty.

The Professor's Brief is essentially an updated version of a brief Professor Lemley filed in 2006 in support of a petition for certiorari in In re Tamoxifen, a reverse payment settlement antitrust challenge arising out of the Second Circuit. In 2006, I seriously considered signing on to his Tamoxifen amici brief; without having delved into the issue, the notion of reverse payments settlements as characterized by Professor Lemley and others struck me as suspicious and anti-competitive . After all, why would a patent owner pay an alleged infringer to settle a lawsuit unless the merits of the patent case were weak? Under these circumstances, is it not logical to infer that the parties are using the patent lawsuit as a mere pretense to provide cover for what is in actuality an agreement between potential competitors not to compete? However, before I signed on to the brief I decided to read the Second Circuit'sTamoxifen decision, as well as the reverse payments settlement decisions that had already been issued by the Sixth and Eleventh circuits. In his brief, Professor Lemley argued that the decisions from these other circuits were in conflict with the Second Circuit's decision in Tamoxifen. After reading the cases, I found that I disagreed with Professor Lemley's interpretation of the decisions, and concluded that in fact there is no split between the circuits. In fact, the decisions by the Second, Sixth and Eleventh circuits (and now the Federal Circuit) are all quite consistent, taking into account that each case involves its own unique settlement agreements and other surrounding facts, and that the decisions necessarily reflect the facts of the individual case being decided.

Reading these decisions sparked my curiosity, particularly since my interpretation of the case law diverged substantially from that of Lemley and many other academic commentators. I decided to research the topic, and in 2007 I published an article entitled “Do Reverse Payments Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?”[3] In the article, I survey the diverse array of patent settlements that have been lumped together under the imprecise label "reverse payment settlement,” and explain the factors that motivate the structure of these settlements. After reviewing the facts surrounding specific settlement agreements, and considering the well reasoned explanations of various judges who have rejected the notion that the mere presence of a reverse payment can render an otherwise legitimate patent settlement illegal, I came to disagree with the position propagated by the FTC and academics such as Professor Lemley, i.e., that the mere inclusion of a reverse payment in an otherwise legal patent litigation settlement renders the agreement per se or presumptively in violation of the antitrust laws. Moreover, my view is aligned with that of the vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue. After a close reading of the decisions, it is clear to me that the purported split between the circuits has so far failed to materialize, although the situation could change if and when other circuits weigh in on the issue.

In this short article penned for Patently-O, I will challenge some of the specific assertions made in the Professors’ Brief. For simplicity, many of the citations in this article are to my law review article. Those interested in a more expansive treatment of the subject are encouraged to consult the law review article, which includes primary cites to the cases and other authorities.

Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO Part II

In an earlier article, I noted that only 25.6% of recently issued design patents received at least one rejection during prosecution. I wanted to develop a better understanding of the reasons for rejections, I filtered for recently issued patents that had been initially rejected during process and then pulled-up their file histories using PAIR. For this study, I looked the first non-final rejection of only 86 file wrappers, but even that small number of cases showed a dramatic result.

In my sample, the first non-final rejection came in some combination of six basic forms: anticipation; obviousness; lack of enablement or written description; indefiniteness; new matter; and double patenting.

The surprising results are that only 3.5% (3 of 86) of the rejections were prior art related rejections. In three of the cases, the examiner rejected the pending application as obvious in light of the prior art, and in one of those cases the examiner also asserted that the claimed design was anticipated by the prior art. In the remaining 83 cases, the examiner conducted prior art searches but indicated that the claimed design was patentable over the art. Combining probabilities: My data indicates that fewer than 1% of recently issued design patents ever received a novelty or anticipation rejection. (At 99%CI, this may go as high as 2.5%). In other words, design patent applications sail through the PTO.

Although design patent prosecution does not have much focus on inventiveness, examiners are keen to ensure that the scope of the patent claim (via the drawings) is well defined. The most common rejection in my sample was based on confusion created by the drawings. In a design patent application the drawings represent the majority of the specification and also define the claim scope. Thus, it makes sense that confusing or inconsistent drawings would lead to rejection based on both the first and second paragraph of 35 USC 112. In my sample, 79.1% of the rejections (68 of 86) raised a combination of both lacking enablement/description and indefiniteness.

16.2% of the rejections (14 of 86) included an obviousness-type double patenting rejection against an applicant's own previously-filed application. Those rejections are curably through a terminal disclaimer. However, some applicants prefer to argue over the rejection and save patent term. Finally, 3.5% (3 of 86) of rejections focused on new matter added during prosecution. Often, the new matter was allegedly added when the applicant submitted pen and ink drawings to substitute for photographs found in the original.

A Registration System: My data indicates that our design patent system is approaching a registration system. But, there is no problem with a system of design registration - especially if design patents continue to be narrowly construed. Europe's design registration is working well as are the US systems of trademark and copyright registration. In the US, most property rights are registered or recorded rather than thoroughly examined, and those lower-cost mechanisms should probably be the default unless we have some reason to believe that thorough examination is necessary.

Notes:

• See, Dennis Crouch, Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO, Patently-O (April 2, 2009).
• My samples of recently issued design patents consists of design patents issued Feb-April 2009.
• As I mentioned in the earlier post, these numbers are a bit skewed because the file histories of abandoned design patent applications are kept secret by the PTO unless used as a priority document. Just under 20% of design patent applications are abandoned during prosecution, and I suspect that a greater percentage of those are rejected during prosecution. This consideration would thus skew the results for someone considering the likelihood that a pending design patent application will be rejected.
• In an upcoming paper (not yet available) I note that design patents are often used as substitutes for trade-dress protection, but that the overlapping of regimes does not create significant problems.

Challenging the Strong Presumption of Patent Validity

One of the next major legal challenges to patent rights will be against the strong presumption of validity associated with the patent grant. Section 282 of the patent act says only that a patent and its claims "shall be presumed valid." Under longstanding doctrine, this presumption can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. The challenge to this presumption is most likely on two fronts: (1) expanded post-grant review and (2) court challenges to the weight of the presumption.

Expanded Post Grant Review: The PTO uses the lower preponderance (more likely than not) standard when refusing to grant patent rights, and expanded post-grant oppositions will likely allow would-be defendants to challenge patents at the lower standard.

Challenging the Weight of the Presumption: The greater change would come, however, if the Supreme Court takes a case on point. Since the 1952 Supreme Court has not definitively weighed-in on the the level of proof necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of validity, and the Court's Radio Corp (1934) opinion arguably sums up the pre-unification state of the law: "The force of that presumption has found varying expression in this and other courts." Of course, the unified Federal Circuit cleared the air by firmly establishing the clear and convincing standard as the standard. In a 2004 article, Mark Janis reviews the history of the presumption - finding that the clear and convincing standard was already the majority rule prior to unification, but that the Federal Circuit made the standard "meaningful once again." His message: "there is no strict, inevitable correlation between the words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by the presumption of validity."

More recently, in KSR the Supreme Court all but suggested one potential petition question: "whether the failure to disclose [relevant prior art] during prosecution ... voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents." A more likely focus may be on reducing strength of the presumption over prior art that was not considered during prosecution.

Question: How would patent practice change if the strong presumption of validity was only applicable over prior art actually considered during prosecution?

Notes:

• I do not believe that the presumption of validity should be reduced. However, I wrote this post to let folks know that it is on the horizon and that a change is somewhat likely during the life of any currently pending patent application.
• Mark Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious Preponderance", 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 923 (2004).
• This post was prompted by an e-mail amongst IP law professors with special input from Mark Lemley, Arti Rai, David Hricik, Howard Skaist, Josh Sarnoff and Tom Field. See also Mark A. Lemley and Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 Stanford Law Review 45 (2007)(suggesting gold-plated patents).

In re Ferguson (Answers to Frequently Asked Questions FAQ)

Scott Harris is the attorney who prosecuted, briefed, and argued in re Ferguson at the Federal Circuit. Harris is a former Fish & Richardson partner and is now in solo practice. He is also listed as a co-inventor on the patent application in dispute here as well as 40 other patents and 100+ pending applications. I asked him to provide his perspective on the case. In response, Harris provided the following FAQ.

What is Ferguson’s holding?

In order for a claim to be patentable under 35 USC 101, that claim must recite either a machine, or recite something that is tied to a machine; or the claim must transform some physical thing. The machine or the physical thing being transformed cannot be a paradigm, cannot be a corporation, and cannot be a legal obligation. 35 USC 101 requires that you must be able to “touch” the machine or the thing being transformed.

How does Ferguson differ from Bilski?

The patent application of In re Bilski, 545, F.3d 943 (Fed Cir 2008) related to an improved mathematical way in which hedged commodities were analyzed and managed. Like many of the previous “preemption” cases that had been decided by the Supreme Court and by the Federal Circuit, Bilski’s claims recited a mathematical algorithm. The Federal Circuit holding announced a new test – requiring the claim combination to be either tied to a “machine” (e.g. a computer) , or claiming a transformation of an object. Since there was no “machine” or “transformation”, the court concluded that Bilski’s claims would “preempt” one specific mathematical form of hedging, effectively stopping anyone else from using these mathematical formulas in the same way. The machine/transformation cannot be peripheral to the claim – which means that the machine or transformation cannot be related to data gathering or “mere” post solution activity.

Unlike the “preemption” cases relied on by the Bilski court, Ferguson had no mathematical calculation at all. The Federal Circuit chose to extend the Bilski test beyond the confines of “preemption” to defeat patentability of Ferguson’s pure business method. Ferguson holds that Bilski’s “machine or transformation” test is the sole and exclusive test for determining patentable subject matter, with or without a mathematical calculation.

Ferguson also held

- that the machine prong of the Bilski test must be a physical thing that one must be able to touch, and

- that the “article” to be changed into a different state or thing cannot be a legal obligation – and presumably likewise must be something that can be touched.

What was the Ferguson patent application about?

In a nutshell – software written by the little guy that was marketed and supported as though it had been written by the big guy. We believed that institutions would simply refuse to adopt or purchase any software unless it was supported by a credible company. Someone in their basement could write the best word processor or drawing program ever – but no one would ever know, because few would ever adopt it.

The patent application claimed a way to support a very small software developer or writer - who had the skills to write the software, but did not have the skills or resources to market and support the software. Ferguson claimed a shared marketing force that took a share of the income or profit from the software in return for doing this marketing and support.   

Why did you write claims to a “paradigm”?

In 1999, new forms of patents and claims were erupting. The patent office had decided to accept as statutory Beauregard claims, which recited a sequence of instructions on a readable computer media. I was excited by the prospect of writing a whole new claim form for the business method genre.

I had originally filed Ferguson’s patent application with many claims reciting a “paradigm”, a way in which a business organization would carry out a specific business task. Other claims defined a process of doing that business task. Ferguson was about selling computer software, and that was not something that would normally be carried out on a computer.   

Based on everything I knew at that time, business methods should be patentable. I wanted to see if we could get the patent office to accept a wholly new form of claim adapted to the business method. I called this a paradigm, which Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions defined as “an accepted model or pattern, . . . Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.” A paradigm in this sense, therefore, referred to the successful way in which a problem is solved.

Why did you think you get claims like this?

I believed the Supreme Court when they said that 35 USC §101 allows you to patent “anything under the sun that is made by man". Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 308 (1980).

I believed the Federal Circuit, when they said that "business methods" were patentable. State Street Bank and Trust v Signature Financial Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998).

I did not believe there was any prior art defeating patentability, and indeed, the patent office never found any.

Are Business Methods still patentable after Bilski/Ferguson?

Bilski expressly did not overrule the part of State Street Bank and Trust v Signature Financial Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998), which held that business methods were NOT per se unpatentable.

However, I define a business method as a novel and unobvious way that a business carries out a new business function.

The holdings in Bilski and Ferguson make any such business method unpatentable, unless tied to a machine, or operated to transform a physical object. Therefore, some ways of carrying out the business method may be patentable under Bilski / Ferguson. I do not believe any pure business method could be patented under the holdings of Bilski/Ferguson.

What’s your take away from Ferguson?

Disclose (and claim) interaction with a computer in every patent application that is not a pure mechanical device.

Don’t get your hopes up about the patent office accepting an innovative claim form.

Economic Downturn => Downturn in Patent Filings

PTO Director John Doll was kind enough to provide me with updated numbers on patent filings through March 17, 2009. The PTO's numbers tell the story that original utility application filings and continuation application filings have slowed in FY 2009 while requests for continued examination (RCE's) filings continue to rise. The Office is now faced with a serious financial crisis. Original filings (i.e., revenues) are down to FY 2004 - 2005 levels but the budget and backlog are both at all time highs. Although I the numbers are still being compiled, two of the PTO's other primary sources of revenue - maintenance fees and late fees - are also down this fiscal year.

The first chart below shows a time series for the percentage of continuation applications and RCE filings as compared to the total UPR filings (Utility, Plant, and Re-Issue applications). Remember here, that for most PTO statistics, RCE filings are counted as a utility application. According to this data, 27.6% of all of the UPR filings thus far in FY09 are RCEs - continuing a steady trend of of rising RCE filings. (Note - the RCE data also includes historical data for CPA and R129 filings).

For the next chart, I extrapolated the partial FY 09 data to the entire fiscal year to find some expectation of the total filings for the year. I also removed the RCE/CPA data because most practitioners would not consider those as separate applications. As mentioned above, both the original and continuation filings are down to around FY 04 levels. As compared to FY 08, original filings are on track to drop about 10% while continuations will likely be down over 20%. The large drop in continuation filing is likely an artifact due to the large number of continuations filed at the beginning of FY 08 in anticipation of the looming limits on continuation practice.

In the title of this post, I link the economic downturn with the downturn in patent filings. Some may also link the drop in patent filings with other recent events that may drop the allure of a patent application - namely, KSR v. Teleflex; eBay v. MercExchange; Bilski; Seagate; the prospect of further patent reform; the Second Pair of Eyes review; 750,000 backlog of unexamined patents; and the 26 month average pendency before the first OA.
> Although not in the title of the graph, the numbers do include plant patent filings which have hovered around 1,000 per year.
Of course, other factors may also

Tags: backlog, uspto

Percentage of Patents that were Initially Rejected

This relates to my statements regarding the percentage of applications that receive at least an initial rejection. The graph below shows the percentage of patents issued (2000-2006) that were initially rejected by the PTO broken up into groups of art-units. Thus AU 1630 group actually includes AU 1630 - 1639. Close to 95% of the patents issued through the AU 1630 group during that period were initially rejected before being eventually allowed.

As with the design patent discussion yesterday, the rejection rate above is for applications that eventually issue as patents. For any given application, the effective rejection rate was likely higher because abandoned applications are probably more likely to have been rejected.

This data is now getting a bit old - but it is what it is. This data came from public PAIR before researchers were blocked from accessing it in any substantial way. Since 2006, applicants have complained of increased rejections. My perception that this change is not a shift toward more first office action rejections, but rather a shift toward sustaining more of those rejections in the second and subsequent office actions.

Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO

Over eighty percent of utility patent applications are initially rejected during prosecution. Some areas of technology – such as semiconductors – have a lower rejection rate while others – such as electronic commerce methods – have an even higher rejection rate.

I wanted to compare the result for utility patents with design patents. I pulled up information on 1000 of the most recently issued design patents (all issued in March, 2009) and parsed through the file histories to see how design patent prosecution compares. As the graph below shows, in my sample, only 25.6% of the recently issued patents received an initial rejection during prosecution. To be clear, this 25% rejection rate is for applications that eventually issue as patents. To get an overall picture of design patent rejections, we need to also consider the applications that are abandoned and never issue as patents. Recent PTO statistics show that a bit under 20% of design patent applications are abandoned. Because design patent file histories are kept secret unless a patent issues, we cannot know why any individual case is abandoned – However, the two most likely situations are that the applicant (a) failed to respond to a rejection or (b) failed to pay the issue fee. Even if we assume that 100% of the abandoned cases are initially rejected, that only pushes the initial rejection rate to about 40%.

As the graph below shows, of the 1000 issued design patents in my sample, only 4.1% received a final rejection during prosecution; and only 0.2% cases (2 out of 1000) included a notice of appeal. None of the 1000 cases included an appeal brief.

The design patents in the study had an average pendency of 15.3 months calculated by finding the number of months between the filing date and the issue date. As may be expected, applications that included at least one rejection took considerably longer to issue (21.5 months) as compared to those that were never rejected (13.2 months). (These means are different at 99.9 CI).

Most design patents (58%) in my sample have only one inventor. However, 69% of the inventors are listed as joint inventors. A number of the muliti-inventor patents included trans-national inventorship with inventors originating from two or more separate countries. About 1% of the applications listed at least one inventor from the US & Great Britain. Another 1% listed at least one inventor from both the US and China.

Supreme Court Asked to Expand Defenses to Patent Infringement

IGT v. Aristocrat Tech of Australia (on petition for certiorari)

Every year, the PTO revives hundreds of unintentionally abandoned patent applications, and about half of those eventually issue as patents (not counting continuations and other descendants).

In the IGT case, the gaming-manufacturer was sued for allegedly infringing two of Aristrocrat's slot-machine patents. The first patent stemmed from an Australian provisional application that was followed by an international PCT filing. At the national stage in the US, the applicant missed the filing deadline but was able to convince the PTO to revive the application as unintentionally abandoned. The second patent is a continuation from the first.

In court, IGT has argued the revival was improper and thus, that the patents are invalid. IGT reasoned (and the district court agreed) that the revival was improper because the PTO lacked authority to revive national stage applications that were unintentionally filed late. Rather, the statute arguably only allows revival of applications upon proof that the tardiness was unavoidable.

Without determining the proper scope of the PTO's revival authority, the Federal Circuit rejected IGT's argument - holding that improper revival is not a "cognizable defense" to patent infringement and reminding defendants that a patent is not invalid simply because the PTO erred in issuing the patent.

Enumerated Defenses in Litigation: Section 282 of the Patent Act defines the defenses available against charges of patent infringement. These enumerated defenses include:

1. Noninfringement …,
2. Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II of this title as a condition for patentability,
3. Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title.
4. Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.

In its analysis, the Federal Circuit found that improper revival did not fall within any of the four categories of defenses - and thus cannot be raised as a litigation defense. The case implicitly calls into question other traditional defenses such as nonstatutory double patenting, improper inventorship. IGT argues that the decision also implies that a defendant could not challenge a patent based on its expiration due to failure to pay maintenance fees. Of course, a defendant should have some mechanism for challenging an improperly revived patent - either through the courts or a post-grant procedure at the PTO. Under the Federal Circuit's rule, however, a typical defendant would have no recourse. (Two potential avenues could be (1) inequitable conduct in the revival and (2) trigger an interference.)

Leaving the PTO's revival grant's unchallengeable is particularly troublesome because of the serious lack of transparency in the petitions office. Pre-grant revivals are tucked away in individual prosecution file wrappers and cannot be searched in any public database. Thus, the public is left without any check on the system at either the micro or macro level.

Petition for Certiorari: IGT has petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and has garnered the support of the group of usual defendants (Cisco, Dell, Google, Microsoft, etc.) with the simple question:

Whether a patent infringement defendant may assert as a defense the fact that the patent resulted from an abandoned application that was not revived according to the requirements prescribed by Congress.

In several ways, this cases parallels the other recent Supreme Court patent cases such as KSR, eBay, and MedImmune. At least as history tells the story, each of those cases began with a rigid rule created by the Federal Circuit to favor patent holders. In each case, the Supreme Court softened the rule to add flexibility in a way that favors the defendants. In KSR, the rigid TSM test for applying multiple references during obviousness analysis was relaxed. In eBay, the rule strongly favoring injunctive relief was relaxed. And, in MedImmune, the rule setting a reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit as a condition precedent to a declaratory judgment action was also relaxed. In the IGT case at hand, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to tear down another rigid application of the law and open a new avenue for defendants to challenge a patent holder's rights.

Invalidity of the patent or any claim: Although slightly off-topic, I am intrigued by the wording of Section 282, which creates the defense of "invalidity of the patent or any claim." (Emphasis added). Ordinary validity issues focus on individual claims. Is the claim anticipated or obvious? Is the claim definite, fully described, and enabled, and does it properly claim patentable subject matter? The general focus on the validity of claims begs the question of what we mean by "invalidity of the patent." IGT's theory of invalidity based on improper revival is bolstered here because it would breathe meaning into the statutory invalid "patent."

Aristocrat's opposition and any amici in opposition are due April 22.

Briefs:

• IGTSupremeCt.pdf
• IGTamicus.pdf

Related Posts:

• Dennis Crouch, Erroneous Revival by PTO is not a Cognizable Defense in an Infringement Action, Patently-O (Sept. 22, 2008)
• Dennis Crouch, CAFC to Decide Important Revival Case: Aristocrat v. IGT, Patently-O (Dec. 12, 2007)
• Dennis Crouch, No Revival For "Unintentional" Missed National Stage Filing Date (Delay Must Be Unavoidable), Patently-O (Jul. 26, 2007)
• Dennis Crouch, Reviving Unintentionally Abandoned Patent Applications, Patently-O (Feb. 26, 2008)
• Dennis Crouch, IGT Petitions for En Banc Rehearing: Asking Court to Allow Invalidity Defense for “Improper Revival”, Patently-O (Oct. 7, 2008)
• Dennis Crouch, Reinstating Patents After Failure to Pay Maintenance Fee, Patently-O (Feb. 26, 2009)
• I mentioned above that improper revival could be challenged in the course of an interference. Chico Gholz pointed me to his 2009 IP Today article addressing the issue: Aristocrat V. IGT: Another Reason Why Provoking An Interference May Be Preferable To Defending An Infringement Action. Of course, as one comment already indicates, interferences are severely time-limited.
  

Best Practices for Trade Secret Protection

I recently attended a conference of senior corporate patent counsel. Much of the discussion focused on cost savings in a tight economy. In patent prosecution, this process has been going on for years by limiting prosecution fees and filing abroad only on important cases. Part of the discussion focused on short-term mechanisms to push off cost - such as using provisional and timing PCT applications.

New Focus on Trade Secrets: One alternative suggested is increased reliance on trade secret. Trade secrets are relatively much cheaper than patents. Trade secret protection is automatic so long as sufficient steps are taken to keep the secret and the secret is economically valuable. Patent filings are dropping and many companies are taking a harder look at trade secret law as a mechanism to at least temporarily protect rights.

The public benefit of public disclosure is often touted when comparing patents with trade secrets. Patents require public disclosure with the aim of promoting the flow of ideas and information. Trade secret laws prohibit disclosure.

The private benefit of private disclosure: Anyone who has practiced trade secret law intuitively knows that patents naturally create additional information benefits that I call "private disclosure." I note two of these benefits below: The benefit of defining rights

Value of Defining Rights: Despite serious problems with claim scope unpredictability, patents do a good job of explicitly stating the rights being claimed. Defined rights can be sold, traded, and accounted-for both externally and within the company. And, patent law facilitates a process for looking at by-product innovations to consider whether they should be pursued. These benefits flow from Coase's work on property rights. Although trade secrets can also be well defined, trade secret law does not require explicit pre-identification nor does it provide such a mechanism. Rather, in most cases, a company's knowledge about its own trade secret information is left nebulous and largely undefined.

Employee Relations: The patent system also creates a nice mechanism for managing employee relations. Inventors typically have a duty to assign all their work-related inventions to their employer. However, that duty is crystalized when the inventor files an oath and an assignment of rights. Often, the inventor gets a cash bonus at that point as well. Although the inventor already had a duty to assign, the actual assignment is important psychologically - to ensure that all the parties agree who owns what. Typical trade secret practice does not involve any explicit acknowledgment of the trade secret nature of particular innovations and information. Some companies attempt an end-of-employment statement that This is important because most trade-secret practice involves former employees using inside knowledge to benefit a competitor.

Best Practices for Trade Secret Law: Most companies have invention disclosure programs, but few of them link those disclosures to trade secret practice. Notably, when a company decides not to pursue patent protection, a process of assignment (and possible small bonus) should still be followed to ensure that the creator understands that the innovation belongs to the company and is not being given to the public. Likewise, companies may consider implementing broader innovation identification programs that encompass both patentable inventions and trade secret information.

Notes:

• One query: In the US, trade secret law is state specific - although most jurisdictions follow the Uniform Trade Secret Act. Do any jurisdictions have a "working" requirement for trade secret? Take the situation where a company employee creates a new product, but the company decides not to pursue the product and it just sits in the file cabinet?
• China: In the US, the commercialization of trade secrets will block the user from later obtaining a patent on the otherwise secret information. A Foley & Lardner report by Sharon Barner and Hal Wegner indicates that under Chinese law, there commercialized trade secrets may still be patented. Is this true in other FTF countries?

Inequitable Conduct: Trends at the Federal Circuit

In Larson Mfg, Judge Linn revived the call to rebuild the ramparts protecting patent applicants against charges of inequitable conduct. For some sense of history, I used Westlaw to pull-up the past twenty-five years of Federal Circuit decisions and counted the number of decisions that at least mention "inequitable conduct." The result is a clear increase in the number of decisions discussing inequitable conduct. Although the absolute number of Federal Circuit patent decisions has also risen somewhat, the growth rate of IC decisions greater.

The graph below shows the number of Federal Circuit decisions that at least mention "inequitable conduct" for each year 1984-2008.

2009 may buck the trend. As of March 19, 2009, only two decisions mentioned inequitable conduct (Larson Mfg., and Rothman). At that rate, we might project only nine or ten decisions for the entire year.

I use the 'mention' of inequitable conduct here because the stated 'plague' primarily focuses on the allegations of inequitable conduct. The mere allegations of inequitable conduct are certainly harmful to the patentee. However - more than that - they are harmful to the profession and to the patent system as a whole by continually suggesting that patent attorneys and patent agents are facilitating fraudulent activities.

Rooklidge: Patent Reform Damages Provision Violates Seventh Amendment

The following post is by Bill Rooklidge. Rooklidge is a patent litigator and former head of the AIPLA. He clerked at the Federal Circuit in the early 1980's.

Richard Cauley’s March 14, 2009 guest post accurately characterized the damages reform provision of the Patent Reform Act of 2009 as “a judicial nightmare” because of its procedural complications, attendant delay and reversal potential. Two additional problems with that provision merit note: it perpetuates prior art subtraction and introduces into jury trial multiple potential violations of the Seventh Amendment.

Fact-finding and the Seventh Amendment. The Supreme Court coined the term “gatekeeper” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to describe the trial court’s obligation to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” In addition to rulings on Daubert motions, courts also fulfill their gatekeeper role by ruling on motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, motions in limine, evidentiary objections, and jury instructions. The bills’ damages section would enhance the courts’ gatekeeper role, but in doing so unconstitutionally invade the jury’s province as fact finder.

The bills would add to 35 U.S.C. §284 paragraph (c)(1), which would require the court to select from three methods for calculating a reasonable royalty “based on the facts of the case and after adducing any further evidence the court deems necessary.” A procedural rule requiring the court to weigh evidence to select from alternate theories would be void for depriving the patentee of its right to jury trial. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902). A genuine issue of material fact, that is, a dispute over facts that might affect the outcome, requires the issue to go to the jury. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Similarly, the trial court’s exclusion of the entire market value rule under paragraph (c)(1)(A) for the patentee’s failure to make “a showing to the satisfaction of the court,” would violate the Seventh Amendment in a jury trial in which the patentee presents enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating because trial “court necessarily engaged in an independent review of the evidence and substituted its conclusion for that of the jury on the factual issue of compensatory damages”).

The first section of the bills’ section (c)(1)(B) authorizes trial courts to exclude the patentee’s prior licenses for failure to make a “showing to the satisfaction of the court” of three facts regarding the claimant’s other licenses:

“the claimed invention has been the subject of a nonexclusive license for the use made by the invention by the infringer”;

the licenses have been extended “to a number of persons sufficient to indicate a generally marketplace recognition of the reasonableness of the licensing terms”; and

“the license was secured prior to the filing of the case before the court.”

The court also must determine whether the infringer’s use is “of substantially the same scope, volume, and benefit of the rights granted under such license. The second sentence of paragraph (c)(1)(B) requires a similar procedure for noninfringing substitutes for the infringing product or process. And paragraph (c)(1)(C) likewise requires the court to “conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only the portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art.” A court making these findings would invade the province of the jury where the patentee presents substantial evidence on these issues.

Prior Art Subtraction. Section (c)(1)(A)’s requirement for application of the entire market value rule that the “claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art” be the “predominant basis for market demand” is just the latest form of “prior art subtraction.” Use of “specific contribution over the prior art” is an attempt to separate the “gist” or “heart” of the invention from the patent claims, and would introduce the extra step of subjectively redefining the scope of a patent. The Federal Circuit long ago rejected using the “gist” or “heart” of the invention to determine obviousness, see Para-Ordnance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and recently rejected using the “point of novelty” in design patent law. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Stripping the prior art elements out of the claimed invention that has been examined by the USPTO, construed by the federal district court, and relied upon to determine validity and infringement, in no way approximates the “heart” or “gist” of the invention, and that inherently subjective process would be unfair to the patent owner, and would eliminate application of the entire market value to inventions consisting entirely of prior art elements, arguably the vast majority.

Paragraph (c)(1)(C) would limit the reasonable royalty base to the “economic value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art,” replacing apportionment with prior art subtraction. This analysis is no substitute for the sophisticated and nuanced apportionment approach available under existing case law such as Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1133-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Paragraph (c)(1)(C) would address the combination invention problem by stating that for combination inventions “the contribution over the prior art may include the value of the additional function resulting from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or all of the prior art elements as part of the combination, if the patentee demonstrates that value.” This analysis, which finds no precedent in existing case law and lacks any readily definable economic standards, does not even begin to address the problem that subtracting the prior art elements simply does not approximate what the inventor really invented.

Replacement of “contribution over the prior art” with the “essential features” language from the Supreme Court’s recent Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), would just put another label on prior art subtraction. Regardless of label, the bills’ damages provision would drastically reduce patent owners’ ability to obtain reasonable royalty damages, which could not be less fair to those, like independent inventors, research institutions and universities, that have no ability to obtain lost profits damages.

Notes

• Forward Looking Patent Damages
• Patent Reform 2009: Damages
• Patent Reform Act of 2009
• Richard Cauley’s March 14, 2009 guest post
  
• Rooklidge: Reform of a Fast-Moving Target: The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report: rooklidgereform.pdf

Guest Post: Hot Topics in US Patent Reexamination

By Robert Greene Sterne. Rob Sterne is a founding director of the IP firm Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox. I asked him to write about current 'hot topics' in patent reexamination.

The marked increase in the use of reexamination has naturally caused more frequent and closer evaluation and scrutiny of its unique procedures by involved parties and the courts. In FY2008, according to official USPTO (PTO) statistics, 168 inter partes reexams and 680 ex parte reexams were instituted. Compare this to FY2005, where 59 inter partes reexams and 524 ex parte reexams were instituted just three years ago. In short, it is becoming one of the faster developing areas of intellectual property law and, in the words of top PTO officials, it is a true "work in progress."

Developed in conjunction with the Sedona Patent Litigation Conference and a team of my colleagues (and incorporating feedback of dozens of sources including judges, senior officials from the PTO, patent litigators, patent prosecutors, academics, bloggers, and interested members of the public), a comprehensive and neutral white paper overview of this subject matter provides an in-depth review of hot issues currently confronting parties that find themselves in the "parallel universe" of patent reexamination and concurrent litigation in the district courts and USITC. The hot topics addressed include (A) impact of PTO decisions on stock price, (B) reexamination pendency, (C) substantial new questions of patentability, (D) real party in interest, (E) duty of disclosure, (F) protective orders, (G) stay of litigation in view of reexamination, (H) appeals from the Central Reexamination Unit to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, (I) the impact of reexamination on settlement, and (J) page and time limits in reexamination proceedings.

Here is a closer look at three of these topics:

• Litigation Stays: Reality or Myth – The percentage of reexams that are in the 'parallel universe' of district court or USITC patent litigation continues to climb. For example, in FY2008, 62% of current inter partes reexams and 30% of ex parte reexams were in parallel litigation. Judges have wide latitude in granting or denying stays and litigants must carefully evaluate prior stay decisions from their judge and the court they are in to effectively prognosticate how the judge will rule. Especially with respect to inter partes reexams, the grant of a stay can effectively be "game over" for the patent owner.
• Stock Fluctuation: Impact of PTO and Court Decisions on Stock Price – The practical impact of reexam on patent owners can be enormous. There are recent celebrated examples of stocks dropping 40% in hours after the release of a non-final office action rejecting claims in a suit, even though this development is not controlling on a court case because the reexam is not final. Third party requestors engage in litigation in the press by issuing inflammatory press releases that spin the truth. Patent owners need to be prepared for this media battle to protect their stock price. Moreover, the PTO mails decisions to parties in the reexam, putting the patent owner at a real disadvantage in dealing with the potential reexam media war.
• Reexamination Pendency: So How Long Does it Take? – The stated goal of the PTO CRU is 24 months from the time the reexam is instituted to a Final CRU office action or action closing prosecution. By statute, the CRU must handle reexams with “special dispatch.” However, there are no definitive statistics on how long it takes for a reexam to be handled to completion by the CRU and then through appeal at the BPAI. Our current best estimate is that it takes approximately two to four years for the CRU to complete a reexam, typically a little faster for ex parte reexams, and two to four years for the BPAI to complete a reexam appeal. Thus, the reexam process could take four to eight years before it arrives at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on appeal. This is a significant amount of time and requires additional strategy and tactical decisions by the parties.

For additional insight into patent reexamination, download recent podcasts – "2008 Patent Reexamination Trends" (Episode #1) here and "The Parallel Universe of Patent Reexamination and Litigation" (Episode #2) here.Download the latest version of the Sedona Conference related paper referenced above here, where you can read in-depth about the full list of hot topics identified above.

Forward Looking Patent Damages

In the wake of eBay, courts and scholars have been working to figure out what to do after denying injunctive relief. A common suggestion is to award an ongoing royalty - often termed a compulsory license. In an impressive body of research stretching back to the year 1660, Lewis & Clark professor Tomás Gómez-Arostegui concludes that "federal courts lack the authority, in either law or equity, to award prospective compensation to plaintiffs for post-judgment copyright or patent infringements."

Until such time as Congress creates a new form of compulsory licensing, future-damage awards and continuing royalties can only be granted in lieu of a final injunction by consent of the parties.

In non-patent cases, such as accidental death, courts regularly calculate future damages - such as earning capacity. However, in those cases, the award is based on a past tort. In patent cases, prospective damages are based upon future infringing actions.

Looking historically, Gómez-Arostegui could not find a single instance prior to 1789 where the Chancery "awarded a continuing royalty in lieu of a final injunction in infringement cases." In cases where no injunction was granted, the court did "nothing at all" about ongoing infringement.

How does this cut:

Read the paper here.

Stays Pending Inter Partes Reexamination

In an earlier post I indicated my suprise that courts continue to “grant stays of litigation pending re-examination – especially inter partes reexaminations which tend to be incredibly slow.” In thumbing through Matthew Smith’s new book on Inter Partes Reexaminations, the following statements caught my attention and reaffirmed my conclusion that stays do not make sense here:

“A fully contested proceeding, therefore, could consume six to seven years. . . . [However t]here is as yet no reliable data available to estimate the total time of the proceeding. As of the end of 2008, the only cases with issued reexamination certificates were those in which technical mistakes were made, or in which at least one party chose not to contest the proceedings.”

The first request for inter partes reexamination was made in 2001 and still no contested inter partes reexamination has completed its course. Mr. Smith’s suggestion of “six to seven years” may well be optimistic.

Part of the Patent Reform Act of 2009 would be to take inter partes reexaminations out of the hands of the examination corps and put it under the direction of “an administrative patent judge.” Under the proposal, the PTO is given authority to spell out the actual procedures. Of course, the Board of administrative patent judges has been handling this sort of trial-in-the-first-instance for many years in the form of interference proceedings. The board already has a trial division that is ready to go. Although there are some outliers, interference proceedings are generally terminted within less than two years. For the Oct-Dec 2009 period, 13 interference proceedings were terminated with an average pendency of 9.5 months. 100% of those cases were terminated in less than two years. See 37 C.F.R 41.200(c) (“Patent interferences shall be administered such that pendency before the Board is normally no more than two years.”)

Notes:

• Matt Smith’s book is online and free (1.5 mb). Smith is a patent attorney at Foley & Lardner's DC Office.